

# UNITED STATES ARMY SERGEANTS MAJOR ACADEMY



## 2009 Excellence in Writing

Sergeants Major Course Class 59  
Sergeants Major Nonresident Course  
Class 01-09

**Gen. (ret) Ralph E. Haines Competition Essays**  
**Ethics Essays**  
**Military History-Based Argumentative Essays**

The United States Army Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA) is the Army's executive agent for administering, executing, and overseeing the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES).

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## Foreword

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Formal, relevant instruction is critical in developing a professional military led by men and women who know how to develop effective strategies and successfully execute sensitive missions in today's combat environments.

At the United States Army Sergeants Major Academy, we pay particular attention to the relevance and effectiveness of instruction provided at the Sergeants Major Course. We use it to foster individual thinking, and to encourage a wide range of perspectives essential to the continued success of the Army, well beyond today. This publication represents a part of that goal. In it, you'll read the most outstanding papers produced by students from Sergeants Major Course Class 5; , who attended the Academy from August 200: to May 200; . Included are the winners and runners-up for essays in the following three areas; Gen. Ralph E. Haines Research, Military History-Based Argumentative, and Ethics. These essays are the property of the respective authors and of the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy.

Challenges to the status quo are the bedrock of innovative thinking and transformation. All of the Sergeants Major Course annual essay competitions do exactly that – provide an opportunity for the students to explore the issues and present individual and unique assessments of the many ideas espoused by others. The vigorous debates which arise from sharing these ideas in a classroom environment are what lead to the professional development of each and every student involved in the process and, in turn, to these outstanding essays.

We want to thank the staff and faculty and every member of Class 5; for their overwhelming success attained throughout the academic year. The essays which follow are indicative of the high caliber of noncommissioned officers we are fortunate to see pass through the halls of our esteemed institute of higher learning. These are the men and women who continue to make this Academy the envy of the world, the pinnacle of the Noncommissioned Officer Education

## Introduction

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When Gen. Ralph E. Haines established the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy in 1972, he intended it to be the capstone of the Non-commissioned Officer Education System, which had been established a year and a half earlier. The curriculum was lengthy for an Army course – six months. The intent of the course was to provide the education and background necessary for senior NCOs to work effectively on a staff with senior officers. The new sergeant major needed an educational background roughly similar to that provided by the Army War College.

Among other subjects, the curriculum provided instruction in international affairs, military history, current Army problems, and training in writing. These subjects were combined in one of the larger lessons in the course. Gen. Ralph E. Haines lent his name to the competition that came out of the lesson. He funded the awards for the winning essays and for many years has visited the Academy to witness each competition.

The Haines essays are written by groups of students. They receive or pick their assigned topics near the beginning of the course and finish the essays with a presentation near the end. Each member of the group contributes to a portion of the written essay. The group essays are evaluated by that group's faculty advisor (small-group instructor). A winnowing process then begins in order to choose the best papers for the Haines Award Competition. In committee, the faculty advisors choose the four best essays from each of the three major course divisions (Leadership, Resource Management and Military Operations). The 12 best essays then go forward to be evaluated by a committee made up of the leaders from the three course divisions. They, in turn, choose the best essay from each division. These three papers, and the student groups that wrote them, compete for the Haines Award.

The group of students who wrote each of the three essays then prepares and presents a multimedia presentation of the winning essay before the entire class. Each year, the commandant, command sergeant major, Staff and Faculty Battalion commander, and the Academy historian evaluate each essay and its accompanying presentation to determine the overall winner of the Haines Award. The winning team this year was announced immediately after the presentations. The award is considered a prestigious achievement.

Each member receives an engraved plaque and their names are

## Introduction (Cont.)

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engraved on a plaque that stays at the Academy. The plaque contains the names of all Haines Award winners. All three of those outstanding essays are featured in this volume.

The ethics essays and the history-based argumentative essays also emanate from lessons in the Sergeants Major Course. Unlike the Haines papers, these are written by individual students.

The Ethics Lesson was introduced in 1994. As a part of the lesson, each student writes a short essay on some aspect of an ethical issue facing the Army and its Soldiers. They are chosen by a series of panels made up of faculty advisors in much the same way the Haines essay finalists are chosen. The winning writers are then recognized at graduation. We are honored to offer this year's top three essays here.

The NCO history argumentative essays are the product of the NCO history lesson. Five winners from Class 5; of the resident Sergeants Major Course were selected by the Academy historian and are printed here. In addition, for the first time the top two essays from each of the two Sergeants Major Non-Resident Courses are included in this volume. The first course graduated in June 200; and second graduated in early July. Each class's essays illustrate some aspect of military history. Presented in the classroom, all the resident Sergeants Major Course essays expose the students to a rather wide variety of topics. The history papers for the non-resident course students are presented to sergeants major at their home stations. The writers of this year's nine essays are also recognized at graduation.

You will discover that the essays in this book address widely divergent topics. Some cover current events from an historical perspective; others address issues in international affairs and problems facing the Army today. You are invited to read and enjoy the best the students of Sergeants Major Course Class 5; and Sergeants Major Non-Resident Course classes 1-0; and have to offer in the following pages.



# Haines Competition Essays

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Increased Use of Civilians in Combat

Public Affairs Operations

U.S. Coast Guard Is Not a Deterrent in War on Drugs

The Role of the Citizen Soldier in Combat

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## **Increased Use of Civilians in Combat**

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February 20, 2009*

### **Abstract**

The attack on the United States on September 11, 2001 has forced the nation to increase its security in virtually all aspects. The number of military personnel sent overseas to fight the War on Terrorism has forced the Department of Defense (DOD) to hire civilians to perform a variety of duties. Throughout history, there have always been civilians on the battlefield. In the recent decade however, DOD has hired an unprecedented number of civilians to support our military both in the continental United States and abroad. The increased use of civilians in combat may put more Soldiers on the battlefield; however, the contracting process is inefficient and costly.

### **Increased Use of Civilians in Combat**

Civilians have always been present with the United States military in the comfort of bases during peacetime and on the fields of combat. One could date contractors even before 1492 when, in essence, contracts from the Spanish king and queen authorized Christopher Columbus to expand Spanish control. Captain John Smith received his contract from the Virginia Company to protect and even form a militia to secure Jamestown in 1606 (Preservation Virginia, 2000). Civilian contractors mainly worked the jobs deemed menial. Logistical applications such as cooking, cleaning, moving items from one location to the other and even medical positions are the original contractor workloads.

General George Washington's Continental Army had many workers who followed his men from battlefield to battlefield. This continued with the American Indian War thru the Civil War and even on today's battlefield. The vast majority of these contractors were local hires or family members of the Soldiers who continued moving with the Army to assist where needed and the majority did not receive pay except in the form of shelter and rations.

And, on the ground, it was a private businessman who, before the start of the Revolution, offered to build a thousand-man army at his own expense, if the Continental Congress, of which he was a member, failed to fund a standing military. That was a far more financially risky endeavor than anything a private security firm like Blackwater has ever attempted. That entrepreneur was George Washington. By the way, Washington himself invested in at least one wartime privateer (Isenberg, 2008).

## Costs

Determining the overall expense is almost impossible. Government officials have inquired about the number of incomplete records, lack of documentation, and the simple issue of ongoing and unfulfilled contracts. From September 11, 2001 until June 15, 2008 the estimated costs for the Global War on Terror exceeds \$864 billion. Each month contract payments are in excess of \$12.3 billion (Belasco, 2008).

According to the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), the U.S. Army awarded contracts worth approximately \$733 million to obtain contract security guards at 57 Army installations in 2006. This total is much more than other DOD services so far (United States Government Accountability Office, 2006). The Army is also using contract security guards at several facilities overseas to include Iraq and Afghanistan. With the need for Soldiers overseas to fight the war on terror, these contracts provide the security force necessary to protect our U.S. Army installations and facilities world wide, the same installations that house many military Families. One factor escalating the cost for these civilian security forces is sole-source contracts.

The government terms sole-source contracting as a contract awarded to one company meeting certain criteria without opening the contract to public bid. When a government contract is open to public bid, companies compete against each other in an attempt to obtain the contract for the lowest cost to the government. The Army has relied heavily on sole-source contracting for its contracted security. The Army has awarded \$495 million and placed sole-source contractors at 46 out of 57 installations in the U.S. This amount is two thirds of the total contract dollars spent on sole-source contract security (United States Government Accountability Office, 2006). It is unclear why the DOD decided to use primarily sole-source contracts for security at these installations; however, it is clear that the Army could have saved a great deal of money if more than one third of the contract dollars were bid for by security companies as opposed to using sole-sourcing. These facts indicate just how inefficient and costly the government contracting system is.

Compounding these already inefficient and costly contracts are award fees. An award fee is an amount that the contractor may earn, in whole or in part, during contract performance that is sufficient to provide motivation for excellence in such areas as quality, timeliness, technical ingenuity, and cost effective management. The Government's subjective evaluation of the contractor's performance in terms of the criteria stated in the award fee plan determines the amount of the award fee (National Contract Management Office, 2008). The Federal Acquisition Regulation states, "Award fees are issued to fixed fee contracts to motivate the contractor."

The GAO has estimated that the Army has paid out more than \$18 million in award fees; however, these fees were only for compliance of the contracts, and in some cases, the contractor was not in compliance but still received up to 90% of the award fee. The GAO identified one case where a contract review board

recommended the contractor receive 99% of the available award fee although they were under investigation for falsifying training records. To correct the mistake, the board later recommended lowering the award fee from 99% to 90% of the available amount (United States Government Accountability Office, 2006). Again, the problem of insufficient oversight and quality control is evident in all these examples. Contractors falsifying documents may have very questionable ethics, but they are still receiving 90% of their award fee. This provides more confirmation that this system is inefficient and brings into question the necessity and effectiveness of the award fee program. If a contractor fulfills the contract obligations, pay that contractor for that job and eliminate the award fee. If a contractor is falsifying documents and placing unqualified personnel in positions of protecting our installations, terminate their contract and bar them from competing for any other government contracts.

### **Historical Overview of Monetary Costs**

Until recently, military officials have found zero reasons to track or know the number of contractors servicing the branches. In Vietnam, officials contracted organizations such as General Electric and Johnson, Drake, and Piper and relied on those organizations to maintain and determine the number of workers required. During the Vietnam conflict estimates are that 10% of the total force was contractors (Civilian Contractor History, 2009). These men and women were then and are still force multipliers in the eyes of some. Contractors were in Vietnam in 1964 serving not just the military but other organizations such as the U.S. State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency. Air America was a logistical organization, which flew resupply (combat) missions for Special Forces and local indigenous forces. There were no “front lines” in Vietnam and these civilian warriors faced the same dangers as their uniformed partners.

In August 1990, the Iraqi Army invaded their neighboring country of Kuwait. Simultaneously the United States Army was undergoing a transformation within both the logistics and combat arms arenas. Upon deployment to Saudi Arabia, our Army made a cautious decision to deploy over 9,200 contractors. The lack of organic maintenance forces within the organizations was the major contributor forcing this response. With varying missions, the array included both U.S. and foreign contractors.

The first order of business was logistical. Contractors provided rations and water operations immediately upon troops entering the country. Transportation for personnel and equipment was also necessary. The UH 60 Blackhawk, Hawk Missile Systems, Patriot Missiles, and many other new systems within the Army inventory required civilian weapons’ experts. The United States Air Force deployed the U-2R tactical reconnaissance aircraft in mid-August 1990 to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. This invaluable intelligence asset requires multiple contractors to maintain not only the aircraft but the

imagery equipment also. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) negotiated more than 550,000 contracts worth nearly \$760 billion (Quartermaster Professional Bulletin, 1997).

*Operation Restore Hope* and *Operation Joint Endeavor* both occurred in the mid-1990s. The United States Navy required logistical support in Somalia for improved computer operations to assist in tracking supplies. Technicians and trainers guided the “how to” and maintenance of the computer terminals. More than 1000 contractors deployed to Somalia and remained an additional year in support of the United Nations even after the United States redeployed its forces from theater. Bosnia was a unique situation due to the land mass surrounding the country. Air and rail operations were the only viable means of moving personnel, equipment, and supplies into operation. Nearly 500 commercial rail systems moved supplies. Each system cost more than \$125,000 each. Civilian contracted buses and trucks at a rate over two to one against the military transportation system; this ensured continuous support of personnel movement.

### **Global War on Terrorism Corporation Examples**

Kellogg, Brown, and Root (KBR) first surfaced in 1901 as a fabrication company. During the 1990s, Halliburton purchased KBR and the subsidy began. In April 2007, KBR separated from Halliburton and became a standalone corporation. In 2001, the government awarded a ten-year contract to KBR for the United States Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program. This confirmed the company’s long-term survival. KBR currently operates mainly in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan with combat logistics support for *Operations Enduring Freedom* and *Iraqi Freedom* with more than 50,000 employees. There are numerous examples of contract costs for KBR in combat operations however, there is no “total costs” or financial figure available for overall completions. One example of the profit available for organizations is a January 2004 Oil Reconstruction Contract solely awarded to KBR. While this contract had a not-to-exceed amount of \$1.2 billion for the life of the contract, actual costs under the contract totaled about \$722.3 million, pending adjustments based on contract closeout. Approximately \$562.7 million came from the U.S.-appropriated Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, and \$159.6 million from the Iraqi’s Development Fund for Iraq (SIGIR, 2009). Recent figures are nearing \$16 billion in contracts for this company alone. KBR can also continue to draw a large profit margin by listing or hiring employees from foreign countries. These employees are exempt from federal and state taxes along with Medicare wages. Continuing under these circumstances only inhibits America’s economy while filling the corporation’s pockets. Along with civilian logistical support are special operations and force protection companies such as Blackwater.

Blackwater is an amazing organization that came onto the contractor scene since 1997. The company conducts special operations and force protection countermeasures which were not limited to the ground but air and sea also. Since 2000, the government gave the company over \$1.25 billion dollars in con-

tracts. In Iraq alone, Blackwater has over \$800 million in government contracts and maintains a force estimated at 1,000 personnel. These men and women are involved specifically with the security of high-ranking U.S. and foreign officials. This organization has found itself in the news over the years with tragedies such as the four employees murdered in 2004 in Fallujah. In 2008, several of the employees were embroiled in a legal dispute due to an incident that occurred in Baghdad in 2007 with over 17 Iraqis killed after Blackwater workers encountered a complex ambush with improvised explosive devices. Current thoughts in Washington include contracting the organization to procure and train a “quick reaction force” and fielding an elite force to fight the pirates plaguing the seas around Somalia. Only time will tell if the use of this form of contractor will continue.

### **Pay and Outsourcing**

One considers pay as the amount of monies received for a specific job or mission. There is an unprecedented difference between contractor and service member pay. Current estimates are that contractors make an average of ten times the monthly pay of a Soldier. Military pay is one-half percentage point below the annual average American’s income by law. With a voluntary force leading this age of war, it is clear that upon enlistment one would not become a millionaire. However, the individual could receive additional training that would allow for a higher paying job after successful completion of their obligation. This in turn could force retention rates to fall drastically. Private contractors receive additional time at home versus the American military. Military policy averages a 14-day rest and relaxation period authorized during a 12-month tour. Most contractors receive 30 day paid leave every six months. Contractors are not without their problems. Issues are beginning to arise about post-traumatic stress disorders not treated, death and injuries, lack of recognition in the public’s eye, and sexual assaults while in theater not taken seriously.

Outsourcing or hiring contractors to assist the military has become the norm for working on installations, combat operations, and post-conflict operations. The following are examples of why this outsourcing is difficult on the contracting process, commanders, and the military.

*Contract Oversight:* People have a lack of knowledge throughout the ranks on what contractors are required to do and how they are to do it. No one has the formal education or enough personnel to allow oversight on contracts or projects. In Kosovo, DynCorp allegedly filled its contracted portion of the U.S. police force in the UN peacekeeping operations with “unsuitable” (over age and overweight) police officers. (Singer 2003, 153) cost cutting becomes a great possibility and forces the government to spend additional taxpayer dollars to correct. In an Army-commissioned report, the Army raised concerns about the lack of personnel to provide sufficient contracting support to either expeditionary or peacetime missions. In an attempt to alleviate this problem, the DOD has increased the number of oversight personnel in Iraq by shifting existing

oversight personnel from other locations into Iraq (United States Government Accountability Office, 2008).

*Contract Management:* The few contract managers available fail to be in the correct locations and often have a short tour due to conditions. This does not allow the oversight required for correct management procedures. Ad hoc systems are unable to have vision.

*Growing Reliance on Contractors:* Reliance on contractors forces services to delete certain types of units and personnel from their ranks. Currently there are capabilities that contractors only conduct, such as the Army's Guardrail system and detection of biological threats in certain theaters. If these contractors are no longer available the services would find themselves attempting to find other contractors or paying higher funds for the source.

*Dependence and Contractor Failure:* With the government allocating specific functions to contractors there have been many issues with employees not wanting to deploy to dangerous areas thus causing missing services for service members. This also occurs when contractors leave project sites due to increased enemy activities or attacks. Unfortunately, the services must reallocate priorities and time to retake the ground that was once secure and leave forces to protect the contractors.

*Access to Sensitive Information:* Certain information that contractors are privy to is sensitive. Although it is unlikely that a corporation would use this against the United States it is possible that rogue, employees could look for monetary gains.

*Recruiting and Retention Efforts:* Retention efforts have lowered since the Global War on Terrorism. Statistics offer many reasons; however, we fail to acknowledge the lure of excitement and money to work on contracts. The end dollar figure that some of these men and women receive is the small difference.

Despite these drawbacks, contractors play a critical roll in the war on terror and are a force multiplier for our country's military; however, these contractors serving tours in combat zones do not serve without risks. The potential risk of death becomes very aggressive and extremely possible. To mitigate these risks, better training and integration are essential.

### **Training and Integration**

Private companies hire contractors to do everything from cooking meals to interrogating prisoners. The qualifications required for a civilian contractor vary greatly depending on the skill set required. On the other hand, military retirees have the experiences within the service. Though some need training in their particular mission, they also need to be knowledgeable of critical Soldier responsibilities and tasks to ensure survival. Private contractors on a number of occasions work in harm's way when revenue provokes companies to send them into dangerous situations lacking equipment and sometimes training they need. Concerns arise with the quality of the training that these contractors are receiving. For instance, the military does not require these contractors to be prior



military. Their current knowledge is a result of outdated training techniques in comparison to current military doctrine. They often receive vastly different training and equipment than U.S. or even Coalition Forces.

Today the U.S. military training is unparalleled against other developed nations. It has the best resources available. Many operations on the battlefield prove this true in our country's history. The unit measures its success through readiness reports that operational and strategic level commanders review. On the other hand, there is not a similar system to monitor contractor readiness. This can cause doubt in the minds of many regarding whether or not these civilians possess adequate training and preparation similar to the constantly trained and ready U.S. military. Some question their readiness, but their technical knowledge on the other hand is essential.

Our reliance on contractors has substantially increased due to the number of technological systems that augment operations. Civilian contractors enhance logistic and maneuver operations, their battlefield presence is now frequent and widespread. Civilian contracted employees, in fact, help the military. One of the biggest challenges of contracting services in a theater of operation is the integration of the civilian personnel into the military environment. Its completion is in such a manner to minimize operational disruptions.

U.S. forces authority over contractors is different from the way it governs Soldiers. Contractor's duties are based primarily on the conditions of their contract and do not observe military policy or the Uniform Code of Military Justice unless Congress confirms war. The military does however, act in a management role concerning the contracted civilians. Accountability is necessary in everything the military does, but some contracted employees feel they are only accountable to their firms and bypass the military system (J.E. Althouse, 1998). The chains of command become clouded. Not only does this breed conflict but it can place the contractors, Soldiers, and other civilians to latent danger. Different organizational cultures and values add to this complex challenge.

There are two chains of command on the battlefield one military and the private sector. The only link between the two is through the contracting officer who has sole authority over the contractors (Lexington Institute, 2005). The agreement directs the contractor the conditions or stipulations. This situation creates management challenges for military commanders. A commander who needs to change the performance requirements of a civilian contractor is required to work with civilian protocol to change any agreements previously established. This can be a complex situation because forces depend on civilians for successfully completing its mission.

Communication is a big problem. Both the military and the civilian contractors have a misunderstanding about each other's method of operations and the timeline in which they are completed. This results in conflict. The quality of the communication and coordination of projects from some contractors with military commanders is excellent; from others it is poor. This poor communication and coordination threatens mission safety and success. Soldiers and

contractors must train to the same standards so they can eliminate dangerous breakdown in communication. The chain of command through which communication flows must be clear and everyone must adhere and remain accountable for their actions.

The safety of the contractors is another issue. A cook or a supply specialist in the military learns basic battle tactics so that in an extreme situation they are capable of fighting. Outsourced tasks compromise the effectiveness of an operation and place it at risk. Noncombatant contractors are a distraction to Soldiers when they also provide them with needed protection.

Another argument when discussing the integration of civilian contractors working side by side with the military is that it may deteriorate the military's expertise and ability for commitment. "When the U.S. government allocates a substantial amount of money to private companies rather than its national forces, it encourages private rather than public expertise" (Avant, 2000). Although the use of contractors may be a money saver, the independence under which these companies operate is a concern. The Army is becoming more dependent on the private sector. It could be disastrous for our military to become so dependent on the contractors over which the military has little to no control.

The training and integration of civilian contractors into a military environment will continue to be an issue that needs addressing as the reliance on contractor's increases. Allegations of unlawful conduct by contractors dictate the need for additional training in order to allow civilians to work side by side with the military. Officials from DoD projected a modification to centralized gaining policy requiring contractors deploying overseas to understand international laws of wars.

Leaders working hand and hand with civilians who accompany the force during deployments must understand the various rules and laws that apply to those civilians. One must be mindful of the roles in which civilians can and cannot perform. The slightest misunderstanding whether intentional or not can cause harm to everyone within that command. The command must ensure their civilian counterparts do not do anything that the opposing forces can perceive as a threat. Opposing forces will try to charge unlawful civilians with a war crime if they catch them partaking in any hostile activity. Ignorance cannot be the standard-bearer for doing wrong.

### **Legal Stipulations**

What are combatants, noncombatants, and civilians? One must clearly define these elements because the roles they play on the battlefield are crucial to their identity. The rules and laws that govern them are viable to their treatment if the enemy captures them during armed conflict.

#### *The Division amongst Combatants, Noncombatants, and Civilians*

Leaders must know and understand the difference because it will change how the enemy categorizes the civilian's conduct. For example, a Soldier bearing arms and killing an enemy has the rights to prisoner of war (POW) status

should the enemy capture him, but the opposition will charge the civilian with a war crime. When we use unlawful civilians on the battlefield, no matter how great the advantage, we lose focus of the rule of law and place U.S. civilian personnel in jeopardy.

*Combatants defined.* A combatant is a uniformed person who bears arms and actively engages in conflict. For the opposing forces to recognize a combatant as a privileged combatant, they must follow the rules of the law of war. Upon capture, they qualify as a POW under the Third Geneva Convention (GCIII). Combatants have the legitimacy to partake in direct combat. Combatant's rights are in essence a license to kill or maim our adversary and destroy their military objective. No one can prosecute a lawful combatant during war as long as they are performing military operations regardless if the act is a crime in peacetime.

*Noncombatants defined.* A legal and technical term that describes a military person whose role during armed conflict does not allow them to engage in combat. Personnel who fall into this category are medical personnel and chaplains who are regular Soldiers but the Geneva Convention protects them because their function is "hors de combat", which means, "out of the fight". A noncombatant is a Soldier that does not get involved in armed conflict. Noncombatants still fall under the protection of the Geneva Convention and will receive treatment as a POW should the enemy capture them.

*Civilians defined.* A civilian is a person who does not bear arms and must wear civilian clothes. Maxwell (2004) states, "Unlike combatants, civilians do not normally receive or require POW status, as they are protected under a different set of international roles, the Fourth Geneva Convention, relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons. The Hague's regulation and Geneva Convention plus the additional protocol guard civilians against willful attack as long as they do not participate in ongoing engagements or falsely bear arms. Armed or opposing forces should not make civilians the direct intent of attack or an area populated by civilians as the target.

### **Limits on the Use of Force of Civilians Accompanying the Force**

As far back as the 16<sup>th</sup> century, civilians have been accompanying the force. The Revolutionary War relied immensely on civilians to help in the transport of troops. When it came to engineer projects during the Vietnam War, civilians were also in the forefront helping in various construction projects. Communication projects throughout the Civil War, the military depended on the civilians heavily for these tasks as well. At the time of World War II and the Vietnam War, one civilian supported every six Soldiers.

Civilians are on the rise in their partnership with the armed forces. The armed forces rely heavily on civilians to aid in combat operations and to maintain upgraded equipment. Although great advantages may come from this, the down side is the risk of illegal use of civilians in combat and compromising the law of war. For example, during World War II, eight German

naval officers came to the United States in essence to terrorize and disable some of the facilities. They discarded their uniforms to fit into the population. They tried to hide their identity as enemy combatants to evade capture through posing as civilians. Upon capture, the government charged them with war crimes. Military tribunals were the forum the government used. They gave up their right for the government to treat them as lawful combatants.

The enemy should not explicitly target civilians but once in the enemy's custody they should receive POW status, unless shown they were part of the hostilities. One of the biggest issues is ensuring that civilians do not pick up arms and try to work hand in hand with the armed forces. If they cross this line from civilian to unlawful combatant, the enemy will not grant combatant immunity; the enemy will recognize them as an unlawful combatant. This is what happened to the German officers.

### **Regulatory Guidance of Civilians Accompanying the Force**

Civilians are populating the battlefield alongside the armed forces in aid of military operations. Distinction between combatants and civilians while on the battlefield is still unclear. The lack of distinction is unacceptable and the Geneva Convention must do more to bridge this gap. The convention must also make a positive separation because civilians are unable to bear arms and actively protect themselves even in self-defense. The fourth Geneva Convention and the two Additional Protocol cover the protection of civilians. The Law of War needs to have a re-look to make it more viable for everyone as a whole to get this principle of distinction clearly outlined. A person can only maintain or hold one status. If there is any doubt during a conflict if a person is a lawful civilian, then the opposing forces should view them as such. With civilian contractors fighting side by side with our military, the laws and regulations must be clear. Our nation must also put into policy and convention for recognizing the sacrifices our civilian contractors are making on the battlefield.

### **Contractor Sacrifices and Recognition**

Our military personnel are not the only patriots who are willing to make sacrifices; however, the military identifies on-going issues such as post-traumatic stress disorder and provides recognition for superior service. Conversely, contractors are fighting under the same physical and mental conditions but the military, corporate leaders, or our country does not recognize them.

### **Facing Dangers**

According to (Schooner 2005), "This problem was evident on March 31, 2004 when four contractors working for the private security firm Blackwater were ambushed and killed while escorting a convoy in Fallujah." This event presents itself as an extreme case because these men were hung on the bridge leading into the city of Fallujah. The results of what happened led the military to refer to the bridge as "Blackwater Bridge". Contractors run a great risk of

death when providing security or driving in convoys in combat zones yet they still endure the potential harm and risk of life.

In one particular company, Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR), (Kreiser 2006) discovered that, “50 employees killed and 420 wounded by insurgent attacks or improvised explosive devices (IED).” These deaths and injuries originated from a fleet of drivers providing the needed support for the services. The impact of IEDs are greater to the civilian convoys due to the commercial trucks they are driving. These trucks lack the armor the military vehicles utilize. Yet these contractors continue to serve without hesitation. To give an example of deaths, (Broder & Risen 2007) list, “Casualties among private contractors in Iraq have soared to record levels this year, setting a pace that seems certain to turn 2007 into the bloodiest year yet for the civilians who work alongside the American military in the war zone, according to new government numbers.” Running the risk of an ambush or explosion introduces fear, but the thought of falling in the hands of the enemy as a civilian produces horrifying results.

With the amount of civilian contractors almost equivalent to the amount of military personnel in the combat zone, contractors run a greater risk of falling in the hands of the enemy, held for ransom, tortured, or even killed. According to Raghavan & Fainaru (2006), “The hijacking of vehicles is common, and trucks and drivers are often held until security companies pay a form of ransom to get them back, contractors say.” If captured, civilians endure the risk of the enemy torturing and killing them. How does this affect the military? This unfortunately dampens military operations because the military must stop a mission, conduct search, and rescue missions for the civilians. With these deaths, serious injuries and the risk of capture by the enemy, another nightmare manifests with all the traumatic scenes of death and the gore of combat seen by these contractors. These demonic nightmares appear in the form of stress, depression, and possible suicide. This demon is Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).

### **Post Traumatic Stress Disorder**

Serving up to one year at a time, many contractors see death looking at them in the face. Death reveals itself from the front of their vehicle’s windshield as they look out on the road at one of their fellow contractors lying in a pool of blood from an IED. Kreiser (2006) quotes one contractor, “We shed silent tears by day and scream in terror by night.” PTSD affects not only the military community; it affects contractors in the same fashion and possibly worse. These brave warriors head straight from the highway of destruction to the freedom roads of America. The contractors have no opportunities for counseling, no time to reset, and apparently no coverage for the disorder.

The military takes an aggressive role in combating PTSD. What happens to the contractors who see the same chaotic destruction of IEDs and the

enemy riddling their fellow contractors with bullets or some sort of fragmentary device? In one case, medical denied a KBR employee any sort of treatment due to late reporting. Risen (2007) also provided this comment as well, “Many work side-by-side with Soldiers and are exposed to the same dangers, but they mostly must fend for themselves in navigating the civilian health care system when they come back to the United States.” The military believes in treating PTSD as quickly as possible because of the potential affects it has on an individual, their Family members, and possibly the community. Health care must establish improvements in support and guidance from the employers of these warriors serving alongside the military. The men and woman supporting the effort in the war on terrorism earn their right to recognition and support on a daily basis.

### **Recognition to the War Effort**

The military honors those who serve with and for them during combat and in peacetime. What is unfortunate is the lack of recognition the United States gives to those contractors. Unless it is some dramatic event, the acknowledgment given to contractors equals very little. The civilian population of America and our very own government does not notice the deaths of many contractors. Broder & Risen (2007) quoted a very upset daughter in an interview as saying, “If anything happens to the military people, you hear about it right away,” she said in a telephone interview. “Flags get lowered, they get their respect. You don’t hear anything about the contractors.” This sad but true comment impinges on the efforts of the family support to the contractor serving to support the military. The men and women contractors deserve better treatment. The American people need to acknowledge the heroes within the civilian contractor community who served in the combat zone because they deserve it.

The definition of hero according to the online Merriam Dictionary (2009), “a man admired for his achievements and noble qualities **d**: one that shows great courage.” The men and women supporting the military as contractors fit the prerequisites of being a hero. They knowingly and willingly leave their families, give up comforts, and sometimes die while providing the comforts and necessities of the military. Nevertheless, if one of them dies, they do not receive the same honors the military renders to fallen Soldiers. The lives of contractors (Americans) seem vague at most in the eyes of the public. They do not carry the honor of a military unit, but most have served in the military. To the public and even the military, contractors receive monetary compensation, so who cares if they die. The contractors make the choice to generate good money in this fashion and therefore, they opt to put themselves at risk.

### **Opposing View**

Civilian contractors can perform many duties more efficiently and at less cost than maintaining a military during peacetime. The reason for downsizing the U.S. military after the cold war was to save money and resources by implementing a plan to hire civilian contractors to perform many of the duties for our

forces. While it is true that many of the civilian contractors receive up to 10 times the amount of a Soldier, once the mission is complete that expense ends. One must also consider that many of the contractors employ third country nationals at a lesser wage than a U.S. citizen. Conversely, when considering the cost of maintaining a peacetime force, to include facilities, training, benefits, and Family members, contractors save the taxpayers money.

Civilian contractors also provide special skills that may not be readily accessible in the military but critical to the support of full spectrum operations to include the maintenance of some Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) systems. DOD integrates these special skills within the military to form a total force. Relying on civilian contractors to maintain this often complex and technical equipment saves the DOD money by not having to train Soldiers to perform this task.

Furthermore, not having to finance the treatment of PTSD or death benefits to civilian contractors who may become casualties on the battlefield saves the government money. Civilian contractors not only save the taxpayers money, they serve as a force multiplier in supporting the military's mission by allowing military personnel in combat zones to perform their mission of defeating the enemy, as opposed to washing pots and pans in a dining facility.

### **Conclusion**

The DOD hired civilian contractors in an attempt to counter the strain on the U.S. military personnel, so the maximum number of Soldiers on the battlefield is more effective; however, several studies indicate that the contracting process is inefficient and costly. The most significant problems identified in the contracting process are oversight, quality control, training, integration, and the law of war. While DOD has taken steps to improve contract oversight, staffing and training challenges remain. Not only does civilian contracting for the military come with a high monetary cost, without proper oversight and quality control, a security risk may exist. At a minimum, an extensive risk management study to identify and mitigate or eliminate these risks is necessary.

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# Public Affairs Operations

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## Abstract

This essay examines Public Affairs (PA) operations in the Army. It argues that PA fulfills its obligation to keep the American public and the Army informed. The role of PA in the Army is to serve as a conduit of factual information between the commander and the command as well as the public. The opposing view is that PA assets should be used in conjunction with Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) and Information Operations (IO) as a means of disseminating disinformation in order to change public opinion. The essay concludes that PA assets will lose credibility if used in this manner and that it fulfills its obligations despite the challenges of transformation, operating in an interagency construct, and operating in two combat theaters.

## Public Affairs Operations

The First Amendment of the Constitution guarantees, “Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of...the press,” and ever since has created a constant struggle between the government and the people over access to information. (Monk, 2003, p. 127) As American forces became involved in a Global War on Terrorism after the tragic events of September 2001, Public Affairs (PA) assets struggled to fulfill their professional obligation to inform in an environment where they were under intense pressure to become a tactical tool to influence public opinion. Today, it continues to fulfill its obligation to keep the American people and the Army informed.

## Historical overview

We can trace PA operations back through history, but its modern role dates to World War II. General Dwight D. Eisenhower and his staff routinely briefed reporters on highly confidential information about troop movements and battle strategies in order to keep the American public informed. Eisenhower realized the importance of developing a relationship with the reporters based on timely and accurate reporting of factual information and the positive impact that such a relationship would have on maintaining public support for the war effort. This relationship was not easy to maintain, however, as commanders balanced the requirement of disseminating information with their responsibility to safeguard secret information, making the job of PA a difficult one. As technology became more advanced and information became easier to transmit, the PA became not

only a conduit for information, but found itself in the business of controlling which information it released. Public Affairs sought to acclimate to this new role, and as the Army became entwined in additional conflicts the Army realized the importance of a strong media relationship.

In Vietnam, the first war of the mass communication age, the relationship became strained and controversial, leading to a perception that the Army was being less than factual in its reporting. This resulted in an erosion of credibility that severely impacted public support. The Army began to understand that the most effective use of PA was to provide timely and accurate information, within security limitations. The use of these assets in this manner strengthened credibility and bolstered public support.

Public Affairs operations were not all bad during the Vietnam era. “We were Soldiers” is one of the few war movies that depict a PA Soldier in action on the battlefield in Vietnam. In the movie, PA assets served to document the events of battle for future generations as unbiased observers, maintaining credibility through the reporting of unembellished and factual information. As in World War I and World War II, commanders in Vietnam used PA to fulfill the mission of taking pictures, writing stories about events, running radio stations, and publishing “base” newspapers for deployed Soldiers, as well as a means to inform the American public at home.

During the 1990s, as the spread of information became almost instantaneous, PA found its job infinitely more difficult, especially in an environment where media organizations were in competition with each other to break a story first. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, this competition was managed, with PA proving instrumental in mass media briefings, fulfilling the role as conduit of information to inform the American public on successes and progress by providing almost real time information. (Bennett and Paletz, 1994, p. 134) In contrast, the media fiasco on the beaches of Mogadishu, Somalia in 1992 placed American forces at risk, namely due to the absence of PA personnel in the area to coordinate, supervise, and manage the release of information. Despite such instances, for the most part during operations in the 1990s PA assets were on hand wherever American forces were operating, relaying information back to home station and the American public. After the tragic events of September 2001, the Army became involved in a new type of warfare that would create additional challenges for PA operations.

### **Evolution of Public Affairs**

After 9/11, armed forces and the enemy they would fight drastically changed. Today, we are involved in two different wars against an enemy that has advanced technology available to them and who realize the importance of public support and Information Operations. PA must keep a much closer hold on information, considering how it may affect our efforts on the ground before releasing it to the media. The advent of faster computers and satellite technology enable almost instantaneous dissemination to a worldwide audience make the

job of the PA section more difficult to manage. Commanders must understand how and when to use their media assets to protect vital information while allowing them to fulfill the Army's obligation to keep the American people and the Army informed. Transformation and the challenge of operating in two combat theaters against a determined enemy has forced commanders to reevaluate the role of their assets, considering if and when they should integrate them into the tactical realm of Information and Psychological Operations. While this debate raged, PA still maintained its most visible role, that of synchronizing communications with the media.

At the height of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), more than 500 news media representatives and crews embedded within military units. (Johnson, 2005) By contrast, Afghanistan did not see as many embedded media representatives due to the limited number of American military units involved and the secret nature of those that were engaged. Public Affairs played a critical role in the supervision and management of these embeds, balancing operational security with the need to keep the public informed. The assets also utilized the Internet and high-speed communications technology to fulfill their obligations. Back home, PA compiled information for senior leaders and fed factual and timely reports to the Pentagon for their press briefings during operations in Iraq. Simultaneously, these assets coordinated efforts with the Central Command (CENTCOM) operations briefing from Doha, Qatar, providing the most up to date information to the American public and the families of those in harms way. (Bennett and Paletz, 1994, p. 240)

Public Affairs assets also became the focal point for communications with the local populace in both Afghanistan and Iraq, as a means of countering disinformation of enemy combatants in the areas of operation. The importance of these combined missions and the need to synchronize not only the external communications but the internal communications between PA assets of different commands led to the creation of theater specific organizations that combined PA assets with IO and PSYOPS elements. These interagency organizations, meant to streamline operations, had the unintended side effect of damaging the effectiveness of PA operations, namely because it cast a shadow over the credibility of PA. To better understand the dangers inherent in this construct, it is important to understand the role of PA at each level within the Army.

## **The Role of Public Affairs**

### *Installation level*

The PA section at the installation is part of the installation commander's special and personal staff (FM 100-22, 1994, p. 2-6). Their role is to develop a relationship with the local community as a means of communicating the Army story to the public, provide news releases and factual data on issues that affect the Army, provide installation personnel with talking points and official Army and command positions of topics of interest to the Department of Defense and the Army, and to serve as the hub for the dissemination of information for the installation commander. PA assets also provide training on media awareness,

escort visiting media agencies and reporters, and when needed advise the commander on developing stories that may be detrimental to the installation or the Army.

In today's society, it is impossible to avoid the media. Avoidance and inadvertent manipulation often leads to the erosion of public faith and support for the Army. Recently the Army has come under intense scrutiny for altering official photographs for dissemination to the Associated Press. The seemingly harmless alteration of the background of a photo of General Anne Dunwoody, with no ill intent to defraud or misinform, had the unintended effect of shattering the credibility of all official Army photographs released to the media. Public Affairs, as the agency in charge of the release of this information, also suffered a loss of credibility due to this incident. The installation commander uses PA as a capability to provide factual information that tells of the accomplishments of the Army, keeps Soldiers and Families informed, and mitigates bad publicity by the dissemination of facts, with the emphasis on accuracy. The case cited demonstrates the importance of maintaining the credibility and how a benign action can have devastating effects. The commander can prevent further occurrences by using PA in supporting the installation through "educating, training and counseling of Soldiers, family members, and civilian employees on their public affairs responsibilities, rights, and roles." (FM 100-22, 1994, p. 2-6). The emphasis at the installation level must be on truthfulness in order to maintain good faith in the message, and PA is the conduit the commander uses to achieve this.

The PA also serves as the vital link to the families and local civilian community. While many often attribute this role to military operations, the installation PA provides a critical function in other areas, namely during disaster or emergency situations. In these instances, it often serves as the lead for the dissemination of information, situational updates, and shelter and aid location to not only installation personnel, but also the local community. The Public Affairs Officer develops a communication strategy for the installation commander, and oversees its execution during the operation. They also serve as the voice of the command, providing the capabilities to reach large audiences through mass communication. At the installation level, PA assets are indispensable as the conduit of information.

### **Brigade Combat Teams**

Before the Army transformation efforts to change from a division based to a brigade based force, PA assets were part of the division headquarters element. When a brigade under the division deployed, these assets were either attached from home station or from a Reserve PA detachment for the duration of the operation. The assets performed the primary role of liaison between media and Soldiers, often times providing training to units on media interaction. They also managed the hometown news release program and more often than not communicated good news stories back to installation newspapers in an effort to keep the home front informed.

As the Army transformed to a brigade based force, the manning of PA assets

also had to transform in order to meet the needs of the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) commander. Today, Public Affairs assets are organic to most types of modular brigades and provide the Commander a personal staff officer and subordinate Public Affairs staff to address the Commander's Public Affairs needs. Organic public affairs assets provide their commander with a minimal level of public affairs support and require augmentation during deployment ([http://www.forscom.army.mil/pao/INTERNALPAOLINK/FORSCOM\\_PA\\_DetPoliciesProceduresFY081\\_2\\_.pdf](http://www.forscom.army.mil/pao/INTERNALPAOLINK/FORSCOM_PA_DetPoliciesProceduresFY081_2_.pdf)).

The commander's PA needs include the ability to communicate timely and accurate information both internally and externally, while maintaining credibility. The inclusion of organic PA assets at this level indicates the importance the Army places on such operations.

#### *Special Operations Forces*

The role of PA in the Special Operations Force (SOF) community differs slightly from their role in conventional forces. In SOF, due to the secrecy and covert nature of most operations, operational security limits the amount and type of information that is releasable to the American public. This is not to say that PA in the SOF has no role, as its obligation to report accurate and factual information remains unchanged, but the timing of release of such information is different. In this domain, the protection of Soldiers, SOF operators, and the mission take precedence over the obligation of PA to report timely information. Regardless of the limitations on time, the expectation of accuracy remains unchanged and continues to be the cornerstone of the program.

While this may seem problematic to the PA, in the SOF community their operational role is to assist the commander in understanding the variables and perceptions of the population within an area of operations. They also develop strategies and campaigns to facilitate the internal information needs of the unit and the external information expectations of the public. Media assets play a key role in advising the commander on what, if any, information is released for public consumption. The Public Affairs cell in the SOF community is an information asset to the commander, balancing the requirement to safeguard operational security and provide factual information to the public. In the SOF community, commanders "must maximize information operations assets and capabilities ... during both peacetime and contingency operations to enhance ... support to special operations." (Bloom, 2004, p. 3)

#### *Iraq Theater of Operations*

The role of PA in the Iraq Theater of Operations involved the fulfillment of three key functions. First, PA had to achieve a balanced flow of accurate and timely information without violating operational security and exposing forces to unneeded risk. Second, PA supported the commander at the tactical level by providing a means of communicating American intent to the Iraqi people in conjunction with IO and PSYOPS elements. Third, PA provided a strategic ability across two different domains. PA assisted commanders in simultaneously keeping up support at home station and deployed Soldier morale by providing the means to communicate from home station to deployed area. Equally as im-



portant, PA assets developed information strategies and campaigns in support of ongoing combat operations. (Johnson, 2005)

By fulfilling these functions, PA provided commanders and Soldiers with a unified plan that dictated talking points and releasable information, as well as publicity on key operational actions and events that showed progress to the American Republic and demonstrated American intent to the Iraqi populace. Public Affairs also kept the Theater commander updated on issues that would impact their communication strategy. The role of PA in Iraq became strategically important as public support began to erode based on an apparent bias in the media to report only negative news. Abu Ghraib, reports of suspected war crimes by American forces, and increased insurgent activity all pointed to a dismal situation in Iraq. The theater commander used media assets to refine the communication strategy with an increased emphasis on the good news stories such as the building of schools, the transfer of security tasks to Iraqi organizations, and the erosion of the insurgent support base among the Iraqi population. Most importantly, commanders used PA to communicate factual information in regards to the bad news stories, realizing that in the absence of communication there was a risk that the media would speculate as to the facts. The end result of these efforts was that PA fulfilled its obligation without compromising its credibility.

### **Afghanistan Theater of Operations**

Public Affairs operations in Afghanistan also fulfilled three key functions. First, PA served as the conduit of information for the commander to communicate information internally to the command. Second, it served as a conduit of information between the commander and the media to communicate information externally. The third function was as a platform for strategic communications to allow the target audience to make informed decisions.

Commanders understood that their Soldiers required information within Afghanistan, and in turn used PA assets to communicate this information within their command. (FM 46-1, 1997, p. 7) They compiled factual information and official command positions and talking points on key situations and disseminated this information throughout the command. In this role, PA served as the voice of the commander, fulfilling its primary obligation to keep the Army informed. In Afghanistan PA assets continue to keep coalition forces informed of critical information often not passed through the formal chain of command.

Communicating with the media is the role most often attributed to PA. In this role, it serves as the conduit for the commander to provide factual information, within security requirements, to external media sources for dissemination to the American public. The fulfillment of this role has included an adaptation to a changing multi-media environment that balances instantaneous communication to a mass audience with the need to provide “timely and accurate” information. (Scanlon, 2007, p. 6) As the news media portrays the security situation in Afghanistan in a poor light, media opera-



tions become critical in relaying factual information on what the Army is doing to ensure gains are not lost. Media operations are crucial to ensuring public sentiment remains confident in the abilities of the Army. This is a vital function in Afghanistan, and PA often must balance secrecy with their information obligations to ensure public confidence remains high.

The last role of PA was as a means of strategic communications to target specific audiences within Afghanistan as a means of allowing them to develop informed opinions. Media assets do not attempt to influence public opinion by lobbying or stirring up grassroots movements; they maintain the trust and confidence of the populace by ensuring only factual information is released. (Keeton and McCann, 2005, p. 2) In Afghanistan, the Theater commander used PA as a means to communicate with the local civilian populace, often as a counter to insurgent and Taliban disinformation operations, a role that continues to this day. With such an important role, the PA cell must have unencumbered access to the commander

### **Placement of Public Affairs within the command structure**

#### *Doctrine*

By doctrine, the PA cell is a special staff section that is embedded in the headquarters of separate brigades, divisions, and echelons above division that reports directly to the commander. At the theater level, the PA cell has the additional responsibility of providing PA support and guidance to subordinate units deployed in support of combat operations and has operational and tactical control of all PA assets, whether organic, aligned, or attached, of the Army headquarters and coordinates operations throughout the theater. The cell conducts PA planning and analysis for the commander and develops information strategies and campaigns in support of operations. (FM 46-1, 1997) While PA manning may vary depending on the level at which it is attached, this basic placement remains unchanged at each level of operation.

At the BCT, SOF, and installation level, PA is a special staff section that reports directly to the commander in support of conducting PA Operations. They are utilized at all levels of command and are under the command and control of the gaining theater commander. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the PA units are “organized as Public Affairs Operations Centers (PAOC), Mobile Public Affairs Detachments (MPAD), Broadcast Operation Detachment (BOD), and Public Affairs Detachments (PAD). These units are highly mobile, modularly built, and rapid deployment capable.” (Scanlon, 2007, p. 3)

Commanders at all levels rely on PAs to coordinate with agencies prior to releasing information, statements, and news stories to the media. PA is also responsible for assisting the commander in “preparing information relative to unit participation in military operations, world events, and environmental matters.” (Scanlon, 2007, p.2) The PA reviews speeches, articles, and radio and television shows for security violations. Often PAs are in charge of writing speeches for commanders, and inadvertently provide them a certain public persona. Doctrinally, Public affairs have always been an independent special staff section that

reports directly to the commander. Public affairs is the voice of the commander and a conduit of information between the command and internal... and external audiences, including, but not limited to, the media ([http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume4/february\\_2006/2\\_06\\_2.html](http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume4/february_2006/2_06_2.html)).

### *Interagency*

As the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq developed, the PA cell became embedded within an interagency organization that combined PA, Information Operations (IO), and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), a break with established doctrine. Public Affairs maintained their doctrinal responsibilities, however, under this construct there was a danger of losing its ability to directly report to the commander, subjecting it to outside influence and the loss of credibility. (Keeton and McCann, 2005, p. 2) Commanders identified the need to maintain the integrity of this important asset as the voice of the commander and took steps to ensure that their operations were not tainted by the attempts to use PA to manipulate public opinion. For the time being, PA cells retain the ability to report directly to the commander and fulfill its doctrinal role. Losing this capability could have made significant impact on the effectiveness of media operations, specifically in Iraq and Afghanistan, but potentially across the Army.

## **Maintaining the effectiveness of Public Affairs Operations**

### *Understanding the role of Public Affairs*

The most important factor in maintaining the effectiveness of PA assets at each level is for commanders to understand the role of PA in their operations. By understanding the role and using their assets appropriately, commanders will fulfill their responsibilities to keep both the American public and their Soldiers informed. In addition, by understanding the strategic role of PA, commanders will ensure that the local populaces within their area of operations have the factual information to make informed decisions in keeping with strategic interests.

Commanders must also understand that during the Global War on Terrorism the correct utilization of these assets is as important as winning the battles on the ground. This includes winning the hearts, minds, trust and confidence of the people in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the American public, while maintaining the public support for and confidence in the Army. Commanders face the unique challenge of disseminating important information that assists in the ground war with an eye to the grander strategic vision of the Army. By presenting accurate information to the public, they protect U.S. Soldiers from unfavorable public reaction. PA must have a good working relationship with embedded civilian reporters in order to achieve this strategic aim. "Leaders must determine whether media representatives are accredited; if they are, they should be escorted by PAO representatives.... [PAO] provide media representatives access to all aspects of the opera-

tion, within the limitations of operational security” (Bonn and Baker, 2000, pg. 195,196).

#### *Doctrinal employment*

Commanders must ensure that they do not use their assets to influence public opinion else PA will lose credibility. To prevent this, these assets must report directly to the commander and provide timely and accurate information. (Keeton and McCann, 2005, p. 2) Public Affairs assets must not be subject to outside influence or used to create news. Commanders use them as a means of disseminating factual information and serving as their official voice. Once PA loses credibility, the commander loses credibility, alienating the people they serve and jeopardizing mission accomplishment.

Commanders often do not understand how to employ PA forces appropriately and lawfully. Simply withholding information, or releasing inaccurate data, both of which occurred during the Pat Tillman fiasco, can backfire and have a negative effect on the standing of the Army in the public eye. Commanders could have impacted this public backlash by using their PA assets to disseminate public statements in an open manner to preclude the perception that there was a cover-up or that the Army was being less than honest. Additionally, in many instances, commanders are tempted to streamline PA efforts with those of the IO cell. While seemingly similar in function and target, IO focuses on external forces and shaping the hearts and minds of the native populace. Public Affairs’ mission is to relay the truth to the American people and international audiences. The successful accomplishment of this mission relies on a fragile trust with external media which allows commanders a direct link to the American and international community. When PA seeks to shape rather than inform, this trust is shattered and credibility is lost.

#### *Training and professional development*

Public Affairs personnel must possess the skills, experience, and knowledge to maintain effectiveness. Commanders accomplish this through in-service professional development, operational assignments and deployments, service on PA staff sections at different command levels, and cross training with civilian industry. (Keeton and McCann, 2005) Developing a progressive career model that incorporates these measures will alleviate the primary complaint of commanders: the lack of training and skills of their PA personnel. Internally, PA assists the commander in ensuring that all officers and Soldiers within the brigade are confident in talking with the media about their unit’s story. Commanders also integrate this training into the unit’s lanes training or by improvising a media-on-the-battlefield environment to better prepare their forces for interaction with the media.

#### *Adequate manning*

Even though the Army allocated PA at the brigade level, the positions are in such high demand that they are often unfilled until deployment, and even then may not materialize. During current operations, PA is a high-demand, low-density Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). Their customers are the

organization they serve with and the media that comes to them to retrieve information. The shortfall in manning has resulted in a situation where “brigades and battalions are filling PAO slots with untrained personnel. Personnel assigned to these key positions must quickly acquire an understanding of media engagement and begin building relationships with news media representatives” (<http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/07-04/ch-7.asp>). Often, commanders use military intelligence officer or a judge advocate to fill the role of the public affairs officer. Units have also used other alternatives, such as converting back to the older system of using the S1 Adjutant. The inability to adequately man the PA positions in the BCT is reminiscent of the pre-transformation division based concept and results in the same shortfalls and problems.

While the Army is growing smaller but more efficient due to emerging information and satellite technologies, the need for trained PA personnel remains unchanged. To counter the shortfall, the Army must rely more on the capabilities of the Public Affairs of the Army Reserve and the National Guard. Our operations have become spectator events in real time, and these events shape and form public opinion either for or against the Army. The Army must make a concerted effort to man appropriate PA assets at each level to ensure that PA assets can fulfill their obligation to provide timely and accurate information.

### **Opposing View**

The PA field has come under increasing pressure to become part of the Information Warfare domain. The prevailing argument is that PA, as a stand-alone capability, provides no combat capability to the commander, and as such should be merged with IO and PSYOPS to increase its effectiveness. Arraying PA in this construct would work within the interagency organization structure, allowing for streamlined reporting and an already existent means to disseminate disinformation. Using PA in this tactical role would increase the commander’s ability to shape public opinion and achieve success across the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

#### *Merge with Information Operations*

Information is a combat multiplier that increases the commander’s ability to shape the operational environment. (Armistead, 2004, p. 1) Public Affairs should merge with IO assets and used as a means to overtly influence public opinion. The Army should not limit it solely to the obligation of timely and accurate reporting. Instead, commanders should use this structure to disseminate disinformation and fake news if they decide that doing so would be in the best interest of accomplishing their mission. In these situations, mission accomplishment takes precedence over maintaining the credibility of PA.

The shortage of trained personnel also leads many military decision makers to believe that PA should be part of the IO cell within each level. They also believe since PA needs to understand IO tactics, techniques, and

procedures, the consolidation of these cells is more beneficial to the overall mission accomplishment. As the enemy seeks to inform and shape public opinion as a means to further their operational goals, the merger of PA and IO appears to present the only logical course of action. In fact, some in the military at the policy level now advocate that military public affairs should be subsumed by effects-based information operations. To such individuals, controlling the flow of news information and the uniformity of good news messages is the holy grail—the key to ultimately winning the IO war. ([http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_qa3723/is\\_200501/ai\\_n9467730](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3723/is_200501/ai_n9467730)).

#### *Merge with Psychological Operations*

The role of PSYOPS is to “conduct in-depth analysis of foreign target audiences, concentrating on their cultural, historical, political, social, economic, and religious characteristics, for the purpose of exploiting their psychological vulnerabilities.” (FM 3-05, 2006) By merging PA with PSYOPS, the commander can gain the platform to exploit the vulnerabilities. PA assets can provide the commander with a means of achieving reflexive control: the ability to incline an opponent to make a voluntary predetermined decision in keeping with strategic interests. (Armistead, 2004, p. 197) Commanders should use PA to provide only that information that supports the strategic goals of the Army, without regards to the maintenance of credibility. The use of PA, as an established credible source, will increase the likelihood that the message is received in the manner it was intended, thus allowing the commander a means to shape public support and opinion in the most conducive manner for mission success. Under this construct, these assets would cease to be a special staff function, becoming integrated as an operational tool used at the tactical level. Such efforts would transform PA into a combat multiplier that can operate across the full spectrum of military operations.

#### *Combat capability*

The PA cell is not a combat capability in its current form. Since it is such a small organization, it cannot fulfill its doctrinal responsibilities to keep the Army and the American public informed. As a stand-alone asset, they are undermanned and ineffective. Merging them with other organizations that operate within the same operational domain will leverage their expertise and increase their effect on the battlefield. The expertise of PA in dealing with media and their understanding of the dynamics of mass communication will prove crucial in the commander’s ability to dominate the Information Warfare domain by providing outlets for information that may be accurate or inaccurate as the operational situation dictates. Credibility is important only as long as it impacts the message, and concerns of maintaining public opinion and keeping the public informed are strategic missions best left to the Department of the Army. The true role of PA is as a combat multiplier at the tactical level.

### **Conclusion**

Public Affairs assets fulfill their obligation to keep the American public and the Army informed despite the challenges of transformation, operating within

an interagency construct, and operating in two combat theaters. PA serves as the commander's conduit of information and provides strategic communication ability. PA must maintain the ability to report directly to their respective commander to maintain effectiveness. The use of PA assets to create news or influence public opinion through misinformation or reflexive control will result in lost credibility. Once PA loses credibility it will cease to fulfill its obligation, and the loss of credibility could create a perception that causes the public to lose confidence in American forces. (Keeton and McCann, 2005, p. 2) Public Affairs assets perform a critical mission that will be severely impaired by combining them with IO and PSYOPS operations.

When commanders combine PA staff with IO forces, they undermine the inherent trust the media and other agencies place on the PA section. PA at the BCT is a new concept, rife with growing pains that need to be resolved, but the ever-increasing advancements in information technology makes it more important than ever that we communicate information from the battlefield as fast and as accurately as possible. Leaders must endeavor to tell the Army story, utilizing PA to their fullest extent. PA is an important staff section to commanders at all levels, and they must realize that it plays the key role in winning the hearts and minds of the public. They will continue to play a major role in the overall depiction of military activities and the maintenance of public support. The American public has the right to know what its Army is doing and how it is doing it. When we accomplish effective communication and information sharing between the battlefield and the American people, Soldiers will receive the support that they need and return with their heads held high. Abraham Lincoln captured the importance of maintaining public support, and by proxy the importance of PA operations, when he remarked, "With public support, the nation can do anything; without it, it can do nothing."

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# U.S. Coast Guard Is Not a Deterrent in War on Drugs

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## Abstract

The United States war on drugs has been ongoing for over three decades with little success. The U.S. Coast Guard is an asset to the war on drugs entering the U.S.; however it cannot be the main effort. The U.S. Coast Guard has had success in the war on drugs, but is not an effective deterrent as the service lacks the appropriate mission, resources, and interagency coordination to combat drug smuggling. The U.S. Coast Guard is a deterrent for water-bound drug trafficking, but does not possess the appropriate manning or equipment to counter smuggling through the air and land. Finally, the U.S. Coast Guard does not coordinate well enough with other agencies to accomplish counterdrug missions or have adequate technology to keep up with drug smugglers. These issues are difficult to fix, therefore the U.S. Coast Guard cannot be an effective deterrent in the war on drugs.

## U.S. Coast Guard Is Not a Deterrent in War on Drugs

The United States war on drugs is an on-going effort lasting decades. This war is waged on the streets of the U.S., and in the schools and businesses. There are two objectives in this war, reducing the demand of drugs in America and reducing the supply of drugs entering U.S. borders. Law enforcement handles the majority of operations in the first objective, however, the coordination required to succeed in reducing the supply of drugs is much more challenging. Many agencies and organizations stand guard over the skies, land and seas of the U.S. to prevent drugs from entering its borders. One of these assets in the U.S. effort to keep drugs out of America is the U.S. Coast Guard.

As the only armed force assigned to the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Coast Guard provides the expertise and experience necessary to conduct counterdrug interdiction. However, the U.S. Coast Guard is too small and ill-equipped to make a significant impact in the war on drugs entering America. The U.S. Coast Guard is the smallest of the five armed forces and has other priority missions that take precedence over drug interdiction. In fact, the monies provided by the Department of Homeland Security are meant for counterterrorism missions, not counterdrug missions. Additionally, the U.S. Coast Guard does not have the capability to adequately communicate with other agencies. The U.S. Coast Guard is not technologically advanced and is under-funded; therefore it cannot keep up with the advances of the drug traffickers. Since 2001, shortly af-



ter the Department of Homeland Security stood up, the U.S. Coast Guard has made contributions to the U.S. efforts in the war on drugs. These successes are not enough though; too many drug traffickers still make their way into the U.S. nullifying any U.S. Coast Guard successes. The U.S. Coast Guard is not an effective deterrent to the war on drugs entering the U.S. because of its mission, available resources, and interagency coordination.

### **Mission**

#### *U.S. Coast Guard Ineffective in Drug Interdiction*

The U.S. Coast Guard tries to successfully ensure that both security and non-security missions are balanced. The U.S. Coast Guard allocates 46 percent of its mission's resources toward non-security, or traditional, missions and 54 percent to security missions (U.S. House of Congress, Mission, 2006). The U.S. Coast Guard was appointed to the drug interdiction mission because it is a military organization that deals with both military and civilian functions. It is the key player in combating illegal drugs entering the United States via maritime channels. According to James Inciardi in his book, *The War on Drugs II*, "there are over 95,000 miles of land border and coastline in addition to the many internal ports of arrival for international air cargo and travelers" (Inciardi, 1992, p. 268). In attempting to meet this coverage goal, the U.S. Coast Guard must work closely with other federal agencies. One of those agencies is the Department of Defense (DoD). Over the past decade the military has withdrawn many resources it committed to the war on drugs because of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This created a domino effect which has stretched the U.S. Coast Guard manning thin.

The U.S. Coast Guard developed a high operations tempo since becoming the lead drug trafficking organization. This tempo stretched thin its personnel and added additional wear and tear to its own equipment and resources. Even with the additional man hours spent on drug interdiction and equipment used, it is estimated that about 1,000 metric tons of illegal drugs enter the U.S. each year (Meyers, 2007). In an article written by Josh Meyers, he writes even when the U.S. Coast Guard did detect suspected smuggling vessels it had to let one in every five go because the U.S. Coast Guard lacked the resources to chase drug smugglers (Meyers, 2007). Lately, semisubmersibles have been the vehicle of choice to bring illegal drugs into the U.S.. If they are spotted, the semisubmersible is sunk by its own crew. This turns the mission from one of drug interdiction to one of rescue. The drug traffickers do this because they know without any evidence they cannot be punished for the crime. This has frustrated the U.S. Coast Guard leadership immensely. New laws must be enacted, but until then, this cycle will continue.

#### *Funding and Manpower Inadequate for Drug Interdiction*

Information management contributes to organization effectiveness. Outside agencies, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), are reluctant to share their information with the U.S. Coast Guard unless they

are certain that a vessel contains drugs. The majority of seizures the U.S. Coast Guard makes are from tips that they have received from outside agencies (Anonymous, personal communication, September 20, 2008). Additionally, another challenge facing the U.S. Coast Guard is that its communication platforms still do not flow laterally across the Department of Homeland Security. This hinders the U.S. Coast Guard from being an effective tool on drug interdiction because it must rely on outside sources for information.

Within each region under U.S. Coast Guard control, the amount of time the U.S. Coast Guard spends on each mission fluctuates. However, it is evident, drug interdiction missions are substantially below the level of execution existing prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks. The U.S. Coast Guard expended nearly 34,000 resource hours on drug enforcement from 1996 to 1999. The resource hours declined to almost 14,000 hours, which was a reduction of nearly two-thirds from 2000 to 2003 (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003). This decrease points to the higher priority given to security of the ports and inland waterways. Seasonal activity also produces a spike in certain regions where the U.S. Coast Guard mission focus must switch from drug interdiction to those of more importance. Those missions include fishery enforcement, ice breaking, and vessel aid, such as navigation repair and replacement. Also the U.S. Coast Guard mission partners with the Environmental Protective Agency (EPA) on a regular basis. This mission focuses on looking for and cleaning up pollutants in waterways and oil spills. The search and rescue mission of the U.S. Coast Guard, along with the EPA mission, are required missions. These missions must take precedence over drug interdiction.

Funding has increased each year since 2001 for the U.S. Coast Guard. Even with an increase in funding, the addition of new missions has placed a strain on its existing resources. Evidence of this is noted in a November 2002 Coast Guard internal communication to cut back on homeland non-security missions in order “to further compensate for the increased demands of the U.S. Coast Guard’s Maritime Homeland Security Mission” (U.S. House of Congress, 2003).

*Opposing Argument: U.S. Coast Guard Role Perfect for Counterdrug Interdiction*

One of the most difficult missions the U.S. Coast Guard undertakes is stopping the trafficking of illegal drugs being smuggled into the U.S. Over the years the trials and tribulations of these important missions and events are what shaped the U.S. Coast Guard into one of the leading agencies in the war on drugs entering the U.S.

The U.S. Coast Guard is capable of handling the drug war in the U.S. because of its experience with drug interdiction and the capabilities gained by coordinating with other agencies using advanced modern technology. The U.S. Coast Guard is a law enforcement agency and serves as a member of the intelligence community. In the post-September 11, 2001 national security environment, the U.S. Coast Guard’s maritime homeland security operation was characterized as a leading federal agency role, one of the highest priority missions today (Collins, 2002).

As the Nation's principal maritime law enforcement agency for over 200 years, the U.S. Coast Guard is the only federal agency with jurisdiction on and over water adjacent to principal sources, transit countries and in U.S. coastal and territorial waters. The law enforcement mission became a top priority of the U.S. Coast Guard with the increase of illegal drugs bound for the U.S. The U.S. Coast Guard cutters, planes, boats, and helicopters all conduct routine drug patrols and special operations throughout the maritime arena. The program emphasis was the interdicting of aircraft and vessels smuggling illegal drug such as marijuana and cocaine into the United States (Krietemeyer, 2000).

#### *Opposing Argument: Funding*

Due to the U.S. Coast Guard's multi-mission nature, almost every operational unit is involved in law enforcement to some degree. In the U.S. Coast Guard's budget, the law enforcement mission reflects over one-third of all operating expenses going towards the large drug seizures made by Coast Guard cutters in the waters off the southeastern United States (Stanton, 2001). Sufficient annual budgets for the U.S. Coast Guard and other organizations deny accessible funding sources for terrorism, crimes and other illegal activities. For example, in 2008 22 percent of cocaine bound for the U.S. was seized on noncommercial conveyance, such as yachts and leisure vessels, and over 90 percent of cocaine was seized on commercial vessels and aircraft (Skinner, 2008).

Over the past five years, the U.S. Coast Guard continued to receive budget increases allowing it to conduct more effective counterdrug interdiction. From FY 2004 through FY 2007, the U.S. Coast Guard budget increased over 30 percent totaling \$1.6 billion (Skinner, 2008). This significant increase in funding netted over 850,000 pounds of cocaine captured and almost two million pounds of marijuana seized (Skinner, 2008). The budget increases provided to the U.S. Coast Guard ensure that over a period of time drug trafficking will become less profitable for the drug smugglers.

The funding for the U.S. Coast Guard is more than adequate to combat drug trafficking. In FY 2006, the U.S. Coast Guard received a seven percent increase in its operating budget bringing the budget to \$41.1 billion. In that FY alone, the U.S. Coast Guard seized 355,000 pounds of cocaine with a street value of \$4.7 billion (Skinner, 2008). This example of drugs seized equates to over three times the counterdrug budget of \$1.6 billion for the U.S. in 2008 (G. Shaw, personal communication, September 12, 2008). If the U.S. Coast Guard sustains this pressure on drug traffickers, then the U.S. government does not have to allocate as much funding to the war on drugs entering the U.S.

### **Resources**

#### *U.S. Coast Guard Manning Ineffective for Drug Interdiction*

The U.S. Coast Guard is the smallest armed force of the five branches of service. According to the U.S. Coast Guards Careers Web site, there are only 38,000 seamen in the Coast Guard with another 35,000 seamen serving in an auxiliary role (U.S. Coast Guard Careers, 2008). The total number of Coast

Guardsmen is only a fraction when compared to the next smallest service, the U.S. Marine Corps. In addition, the auxiliary seamen operate strictly in a non-law enforcement role (U.S. Coast Guard Careers, 2008). The U.S. Coast Guard is instrumental in blocking the entry of drugs into the U.S. through water bound drug interdiction; however its personnel do not possess the appropriate skill sets for drug interdiction as a primary responsibility.

In the book, *The War on Drugs II*, Inciardi argues that Coast Guardsmen just do not have the appropriate training or force structure to protect the U.S. from drug traffickers. Inciardi states border control is a significant issue as there are over 95,000 miles of coastline and landmass border with numerous ports of entry to survey (Inciardi, 1992). An area this large is impossible for a force of 38,000 to effectively patrol. Additionally, the amount of people and equipment to search is mind-boggling. In 1991, 309 million travelers, 50,000 vessels, 13 million tons of cargo, and tens of thousands of small vessels and aircraft legally entered the U.S. through a registered port of entry (Inciardi, 1992). This does not include the many man hours wasted by Coast Guardsmen searching for people illegally entering the U.S. or drug traffickers. Inciardi points out this futility in a 1989 report stating that the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard sailed for a combined 2,347 ship days and seized a total of seven ships arresting 40 smugglers at a cost of over \$33 million (Inciardi, 1992). A look at the more recent statistics on the amount of drugs interdicted by the U.S. Coast Guard does not further the cause for those looking to champion the U.S. Coast Guard as an effective deterrent in the war on drugs. Coast Guard Admiral Terry Cross stated in a May 2001 article that the U.S. Coast Guard interdicted 11 percent of the total amount of cocaine entering the U.S. in 2000, which equates to approximately 60 metric tons (Stanton, 2001). Although Cross attempts to make this number sound like a success, there is no getting past the fact that almost 90 percent of the cocaine smuggled in the U.S. makes it onto the streets to be sold. This interdiction rate cannot be quantified as a success by anyone.

Additionally, the U.S. Coast Guard is not set up to combat drug trafficking. According to the U.S. Coast Guard Missions Web site, the U.S. Coast Guard has five primary missions and drug interdiction is just a portion of one of those missions (U.S. Coast Guard Missions, 2008). The Web site states that drug interdiction falls under the purview of maritime security. However, the U.S. Coast Guard must train its personnel to properly react and perform in all five of its missions. Mike Krause wrote in a 2006 article on the affect the drug war has on other Coast Guard missions that the drug war is impeding the Coast Guard's mission of port security. Krause stated the U.S. Coast Guard spent more money in 2005 on drug interdiction than the total amount of money spent on port security in four years (Krause, 2006). If the U.S. Coast Guard spends this much time and effort on drug interdiction, it should spend the same amount of time and effort on training its 38,000-strong force on drug interdiction techniques and increase the priority of drug interdiction as a mission of the U.S. Coast Guard. However, the U.S. Coast Guard cannot afford to take such drastic action because

of its charter to protect and defend the U.S. maritime interests.

*Lack of Qualifications for the U.S. Coast Guard*

The equipment the U.S. Coast Guard uses to combat drug smugglers in this war on drugs entering America is not adequate for the drug interdiction mission either. According to a briefing given by the Joint Task Force-North senior enlisted advisor to the United States Army Sergeants Major Academy Class 59, the U.S. counterdrug budget for all agencies and organizations fighting the war on drugs is \$1.6 billion (G. Shaw, personal communication, September 12, 2008). This amount seems sufficient until it is compared against just a fraction of the drug trade budget worldwide. Shaw stated that the Mexican drug trade in 2008 equates to \$60 billion of the \$300 billion spent worldwide in the drug trade (G. Shaw, personal communication, September 12, 2008). This number is as staggering as it is mocking of the U.S. efforts to combat drugs. Essentially, the U.S. uses a fly swatter to kill an elephant with the tiny amount of money it is throwing against its enemies in the drug war.

The \$1.6 billion the U.S. government uses to combat drugs is portioned and pared down by agency and organization until the amount of money budgeted to the U.S. Coast Guard makes it almost impossible for the U.S. Coast Guard to interdict any drugs. John Stanton, in his 2001 article in *National Defense Magazine*, uses comments from former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to state how the drug war's budget should be portioned. "My preference would be for the Coast Guard to have primary responsibility for drug interdiction and ... cooperate with military elements. But I do think one-half of our funds should go to supply reduction and one-half to demand reduction" (Stanton, 2001, para. 9). Weinberger's comments would give the U.S. Coast Guard the primary responsibility to combat drugs, but only a portion of the \$800 million (using the 2008 fiscal year budget to combat drugs) to interdict drugs. Weinberger would have one believe that \$800 million would be more than enough to combat the supply of drugs entering the U.S. until one figured in the cost of equipment into the equation.

Today's drug smugglers are innovative and continually strive to improve upon their techniques to ensure the maximum quantity of drugs reaches America. The U.S. Coast Guard must measure its missions and funding, which it receives from the Department of Homeland Security, to acquire the appropriate mix of equipment for its counterterrorism mission, its maritime security mission, and drug interdiction. However, the U.S. Coast Guard finds this balance increasingly difficult to maintain as it finds itself dealing with better and better drug smuggling equipment. In a 2008 Cable News Network article, U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Thad Allen describes the latest piece of equipment the U.S. Coast Guard must defeat in the war on drugs. Allen talks about the drug smugglers dependence on semi-submersible vessels. "They cost up to a million dollars to produce. Sometimes they are put together in pieces and reassembled in other locations. They're very difficult to locate" (Meserve & Ahlers, 2008, para. 3). The U.S. Coast Guard Commandant states this new technology is hard to combat

and the U.S. Coast Guard does not have the equipment to properly defeat this threat at this time and will eventually have to adapt to meet this threat (Meserve & Ahlers, 2008). However, it will be difficult for the U.S. Coast Guard to justify using its counterterrorism funding to requisition equipment capable of defeating drug traffickers.

*Opposing Argument: Personnel Available Adequate for Drug Interdiction*

A U.S. Coast Guardsman is a unique member of the military. He or she must be a sailor, a policeman, a medic, and a rescuer. However, the Guardsman's training must be unique due to his or her missions. His or her initial training is five weeks long. It is there the proud maritime guardians learn occupational skills and how to live by the Coast Guard's core values: Honor, Respect and Devotion to Duty. The Guardsmen receive weapons training, to include sniper, boarding vessel search and procedure, and law enforcement training (U.S. Coast Guard Missions, 2008).

These skills and knowledge are critical to their profession, especially during drug interdiction missions. In past years, the use of snipers has been especially effective. This is one of the U.S. Coast Guard's adaptive solutions in disabling fast moving boats carrying drugs (Kerr, 2002). These types of boats are called "go fast." Additionally, the men and women of the U.S. Coast Guard are trained in law enforcement protocol and procedure. It is the Guardsmen's awareness of law enforcement that often prevents mishaps during prosecution. Personnel are also highly-trained in maritime and aerial radar. This allows the U.S. Coast Guard to identify aircraft and vessels coming into the United States. By identifying the type of carrier, the Guardsmen are able to interdict or distribute information to other agencies. In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard's ability to cross communicate with other agencies has proven to be beneficial. In 1982, a small team Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET), deployed with a U.S. Navy (USN) ship in the Pacific Ocean, in support of counterdrug law enforcement. Initially, LEDET only boarded U.S. ships enroute to more opportunistic areas, often areas used by drugs runners; this is no longer the case. Operations are now planned, coordinated and executed in conjunction with the USN and other agencies, to include the U.S. Coast Guard.

Due to the success of the LEDET, the U.S. Coast Guard had established three other Tactical Law Enforcement Teams to guard a larger area. One of these teams is the Pacific Tactical Law Enforcement, who in 1995 was responsible for confiscating over 60 tons of cocaine, six tons of marijuana and 17 tons of hashish (Coast Guard, n.d.).

Additional forms of training include education. Not only are the Guardsmen educated themselves, they bring about awareness. The U.S. Coast Guard conveys awareness to American citizens, as well as awareness to other countries. In FY 1996, the U.S. Coast Guard implemented a Mobile Training Team and trained over 2,100 people throughout 45 countries on ways to fight the war against drugs (National Criminal Justice Reference Service, 2008). This not only brought about a first-class working relationship with these countries, it bolstered

their interdiction capabilities and established another source of intelligence. The U.S. Coast Guard's ability to work with, and utilize all available resources to include external assets has resulted in the confiscation of numerous metric tons of drugs coming into the U.S.

The U.S. Coast Guard is able to guard our waterways through the strategic implementation of its vessels and aircraft. Strategic emplacement of stations has also proved to be a contributing factor to its success. Considering drug interdiction was not its primary mission, U.S. Coast Guard stations are often placed in key locations and the U.S. Coast Guard is able to control, deploy units, and interdict at any given time. The U.S. Coast Guard is broken down into 17 districts. District 11, being California, and District 7, which represents Florida, are the two most experienced, and have had the most success with drug interdiction. Their geographical location was taken into consideration when assigning personnel, equipment and conducting tactical missions (D. Kolstedt, personal communication, September 5, 2008).

Another contributing factor to the U.S. Coast Guard's success is its ability to conduct multiple tasks simultaneously. During U.S. Coast Guard routine patrols of America's water ways while enforcing maritime laws, which encompasses boating safety, fishery enforcement, alien migrant interdiction and counterdrug prohibition, it also concentrates on specific laws and remains vigilant for other violations that tax the Guardsmen on a daily basis. Boarding parties often take apparatus capable of detecting minute and minuscule amounts of drugs, even on board the vessels or in sealed containers. These types of tactics are often utilized and yield a substantial amount of illegal drugs.

#### *Opposing Argument: U.S. Coast Guard's Equipment Suitable for Drug Interdiction*

The equipment the U.S. Coast Guard uses during the majority of its drug interdiction missions are its vessels and aircraft. U.S. Coast Guard water vessels are classified as two separate entities, boats and cutters. Any vessels in length of 65 feet or more are considered cutters, anything less are regarded to as boats. These vessels are a major asset for maritime law enforcement in the interdiction of illegal drugs. (Krietemeyer, 2000).

U.S. Coast Guard aircraft consists of helicopters and fixed wing airplanes (D. Kolstedt, personal communication, September 5, 2008). There are multiple types of aircraft that effectively accomplish the various missions of the U.S. Coast Guard. Four types of aircraft are mission capable and ready to handle the interdiction of drugs on the high seas. These aircraft have the capabilities of targeting out vessels, boats, or semi-sub with a medium or high-range surveillance, which detects illegal drug substance aboard (Krietemeyer, 2000).

These boats, cutters and aircraft conduct routine patrols within U.S. waters. They not only patrol these waters, but provide assistance near known drug routes when outside U.S. waters. These missions are often driven from intelligence received from internal or external informants, such as other U.S. agencies or supplementary foreign law enforcement agencies. Some cutters are able to carry



helicopters, which in turn aid them when pursuing a “go fast”. Crews primarily use nonlethal force when warning boats. If necessary, a crew may disable adversaries’ engines by employing their snipers or door gunners of the aircraft. For example, vessel-to-air integration has been very effective along District 7 and 11 waters. In May 2006, the Coast Guard Helicopter Interdiction Tactical Squadron assisted in confiscating almost 270,000 pounds of illegal drugs valued over \$8 billion dollars (Hancock, 2006). Additional devices employed are the utilization of the Deployable Pursuit Boats (DPB). The DPB is essentially an offshore racing boat. The DPB’s primary purpose is to operate as a counter for the growing exploitation of the “go fast” boats. Drug traffickers often use “go fast” boats as a means to move their contraband from source countries to Mexico, Haiti, Puerto Rico, and for further movement into the U.S. Aircraft, such as the HC-130H cargo plane, conduct routine sweeps of international waters and identify “go fast” boats. The U.S. Coast Guard planned to deploy the DPB to disable known traffickers, thus continuing their efforts to fight the war on drugs.

A common misconception about the U.S. Coast Guard’s lack of resources to fight the war on drugs is its effectiveness. What many do not realize is the U.S. Coast Guard has the ability to extract resources from different agencies because it is the lead agency on maritime drug interdiction and the co-lead for air interdiction. During counterdrug operations, the U.S. Coast Guard acquires manpower, ships, aircraft, and sensors to support the counterdrug detection and monitoring efforts from many organizations. These assets not only provide the U.S. Coast Guard greater combined combat multipliers, but it also gives it a wider range, additional expertise and fiscal funding allowing them to fight the battle, thus making it even more successful in the war on drugs entering the U.S.

### **Interagency Coordination**

#### *Too Many Agencies Involved in the War on Drugs*

The interagency coordination between agencies within the Department of Homeland Security and other countries continues to be a work in progress. The Department of Homeland Security is composed of 16 agencies and each agency had a certain way of handling situations prior to September 11, 2001 (Homeland Security, 2008). Currently, the Department of Homeland Security develops policies and regulations throughout the organization. The sharing of information was a huge obstacle because it presented security concerns and a reluctance to provide timely information to other agencies. Not only does the U.S. Coast Guard deal with agencies within the Department of Homeland Security, it also coordinates with other federal agencies. Some of these agencies include the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and the U.S. Marshals Service (Henderson, 2005). With so many agencies involved in the war on drugs it can be confusing as to which agency has authority over the other and how will the chain of custody be established.

Additionally, other problems affect interagency coordination. One of these problems the U.S. Coast Guard deals with is corruption within organizations



or countries. There have been several reports indicating drug smugglers bribe agents in return for a free pass. The temptation for some to accept the bribes obviously outweighs the moral and legal responsibility which they swore to uphold. Although a detractor to successful drug interdiction, bribery is to be expected when so much money is being invested in the drug business. All of this interagency coordination also conflicts with the primary U.S. Coast Guard missions. In addition to its maritime security mission, the U.S. Coast Guard has four other missions. These missions are maritime safety, maritime mobility, national defense, and protection of natural resources (U.S. Coast Guard Missions, 2008). All of these missions are important and should be emphasized just as much as the drug interdiction mission.

#### *Conflict in Jurisdiction with International Incidents*

Conflict may arise as to what country or what agency has jurisdiction over the other when it comes to drug seizures in international waters. Communication between agencies is vital especially when drug smugglers are being chased and attempting to find refuge in a country where the laws are not as strict as the U.S. In some countries, policies are not enforced and getting the U.S. Congress and the U.S. Senate involved in extradition or prosecution could prove to be more burdensome than beneficial. In the aforementioned case involving semi-submersible ships, once they are indentified by law enforcement the ships would dump the drugs and go underneath the water. When these ships are captured there is no evidence of drugs. Since law enforcement cannot hold them, these drug traffickers are released back to their native country. Congress just recently passed a law making it illegal to operate one of these ships if it had not been registered in a home country but the law is waiting on Congressional approval (Kingsbury, 2008). Although the U.S. Coast Guard has made progress in drug interdiction, it cannot compete with the drug smuggler's resources and technology. In order for the U.S. Coast Guard to be an effective deterrent to the war on drugs, the Department of Homeland Security would have to relook its role in drug interdiction.

#### *Opposing Argument: Information Sharing and Technology Effective*

The U.S. Coast Guard is effective in its drug interdiction mission because its technological advances allows for more efficient interagency coordination. One of these technological advances is an integrated information network known as the Anti-Drug Network (ADNET). ADNET was developed to help better share information across a range of U.S. government agencies whose missions involve fighting drug-related crime. This technology cuts all hindrances between government agencies working against illegal drugs. They can now help each other win the war on illegal drugs. Before ADNET was introduced, each agency kept its information to itself and did not share with other agencies. One of the unique features of ADNET is a home page for each of the lead agencies which allows an agency to post its own information so that it can be distributed to other agencies. These agencies include the FBI, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), as well as many others. For example in

1996, the U.S. Coast Guard had success when information obtained by ADNET led to the capture of a vessel carrying over \$40 million dollars worth of cocaine, weighing many tons (Case Studies: ADNET, n.d.). The U.S. Coast Guard's participation in this program, as well as others, proves it is an indispensable element in the fight against the war on drugs.

Another technological advance for the U.S. Coast Guard in the war on drugs occurred in 2005. In FY 2005, a \$6.3 billion dollar increase for the U.S. Coast Guard was signed and put into effect by President George W. Bush (ICGS Deepwater, 2004). This funding set the stage for the U.S. Coast Guard's Integrated Deepwater System (IDS). Proving that money can make a difference in the war on drugs, the U.S. Coast Guard was able to apply funding into their multi-billion dollar program to modernize and replace its aging ships and aircraft, and to improve command and control and logistics systems. Also, the U.S. Coast Guard requested additional funding to further technology and added land-based unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) and HC-130J aircraft into IDS. In March 2007, the efforts of the U.S. Coast Guard's participation in Deepwater Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (C4ISR) resulted in a record maritime seizure of more than 42,000 pounds of cocaine (ICGS Deepwater, 2004). The U.S. Coast Guard's actions have proven beneficial in the war on drugs through its actions to better furnish its fleet. Another technological advance pertinent to the success of the U.S. Coast Guard includes incorporating Secure Internet Protocol Network (SIPRNET), a secure data network capable of sharing images at a faster rate through satellite communications (SATCOM). Additionally, the U.S. Coast Guard advanced technologically by improving its target identification system using the Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) (ICGS Deepwater, 2004). The U.S. Coast Guard has proven itself to be effective in the war on drugs entering the U.S. in all aspects of its technological advancements.

*Opposing Argument: Jurisdiction with International Incidents*

The U.S. has close relations with other countries through treaties and agreements to eradicate or minimize the production of cocaine, opium and marijuana entering the U.S. For example, the Hague Convention of 1912 gave power to all signatory nations. In Harry Henderson's book, *Drug Abuse*, he explains each nation's obligations when agreeing to this treaty. The Hague treaty allows each signatory nation to restrict the domestic manufacture, distribution and use of prohibited drugs (Henderson, 2005). Bottom line, the U.S. Coast Guard cannot accomplish its mission without the cooperation of other nations. The U.S. has established relationships with other nations to help settle international jurisdiction incidents that arise. The Hague Convention of 1912 played an integral role in establishing key international relations and set precedents for future treaties and agreements.

The U.S. also signed an extradition treaty with Colombia on September 14, 1979. In this treaty, Colombia agreed to extradite all persons, to include Colombians if they committed a narcotic offense which is a punishable act in Colom-

bia and the United States (Inciardi, 1992). This includes the export of cocaine and or marijuana into the United States by Colombians visiting or staying in the U.S. Another treaty, the extradition treaty between the United States and El Salvador does not provide for the extradition of its citizens (Drug Trafficking Report, 2004). However, this treaty was contradicted, and can be nullified, by the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention. The 1988 U.N. Drug Convention states narcotics offenses are extraditable crimes (Drug Trafficking Report, 2004). Diplomatic coordination between the U.S. with countries involved in the war on drugs leads to a sizable amount of confiscated illegal drugs by the U.S. Coast Guard and other agencies. These treaties and other agreements between countries empower the U.S. Coast Guard in its fight against illicit drugs.

### **Conclusion**

In order for the U.S. Coast Guard to be an effective deterrent in the war on drugs it must develop more capable and reliable assets. The U.S. Coast Guard needs new communication platforms and more interagency cooperation to help support detection and monitoring efforts. New laws would have to be enacted to deter the use of semisubmersibles. More vessels will have to be boarded and searched. It was evident after September 11, 2001 that the U.S. Coast Guard was stretched thin. These new missions added additional wear and tear to the U.S. Coast Guard's already aging equipment and technology. Adding to the difficulty of incorporating new missions was the re-prioritizing of existing missions. The Department of Homeland Security changed the U.S. Coast Guard's mission focus from drug interdiction to port security along our coast and inland waterways.

The U.S. Coast Guard's drug interdiction program has made strides with interagency coordination and the service has upgraded its technology. However, the U.S. Coast Guard is still lagging behind the drug smugglers. As the U.S. government attempts to close the gap on drug traffickers, drug dealers are already thinking ahead for new technological developments. The government needs to do a better job of utilizing the resources and assets it has available. Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. Coast Guard has been fighting both the war on drugs and the war on terror. Both missions are important and deserve an equal amount of time. The U.S. Coast Guard cannot do both effectively. Until the Department of Homeland Security clearly defines the roles of all its agencies and conducts proper coordination with federal agencies and other countries, drug interdiction will continue to be a problem.

The U.S. Coast Guard is an asset to the war on drugs entering the U.S., but cannot be the main effort in the war. The U.S. Coast Guard is well-equipped to protect our borders and conduct routine law enforcement, but becomes stretched too thin when given the primary responsibility to be the U.S. command and control center in the war on drugs. The U.S. Coast Guard is a deterrent for water-bound drug trafficking, but does not possess the appropriate equipment to counter drug trafficking through the air and land. Additionally, the equipment the U.S. Coast Guard uses is dated, and drug traffickers spend money faster that

the U.S. government can equip the U.S. Coast Guard. Technologically, the U.S. Coast Guard does not have the equipment to stay in contact with the number of agencies involved in the war on drugs. All of these issues are not easily correctable; therefore the U.S. Coast Guard is not an effective deterrent to the war on drugs entering America.

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# The Role of the Citizen Soldier in Combat

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## Abstract

The United States represents the tip of the spear in fighting the Global War on Terrorism, with the Army shouldering the majority of the burden. Sustained combat operations have strained the active force to a breaking point and requires Army leaders to look for ways of relieving the burden on the active component. In response, the role of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve transformed from a strategic force to an operational force. In the current Contemporary Operational Environment (COE), the Citizen Soldiers are vital in maintaining battlespace, providing specialized/critical skills, and increasing active forces' dwell time. The reserve forces have performed admirably and met the initial objectives of senior leaders in the COE. However, the complexity and demands of an asymmetrical battlefield have exposed limitations on the employment of reserve forces. The Citizen Soldier's versatility will continue to have a place in the national defense of the United States. The Citizen Soldier is no longer the "weekend warrior", but a vital component of today's operational force.

## The Role of the Citizen Soldier in Combat

Citizen Soldiers are doing more today than ever before on behalf of our nation. Throughout history, the United States has relied heavily on these "activate in case of emergency" patriots. Since the Revolutionary War, through two World Wars, the First Desert War, peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sinai, our national reserve forces have been an integral component in the overall success of these campaigns. The National Guard and the Army Reserve exist as a strategic reserve called on as a last resort (Miles, 2009). However, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 leading to the invasion of Afghanistan, followed by the subsequent decision to attack Iraq in 2003 changed everything. In the current Contemporary Operation Environment, Citizen Soldiers are vital in maintaining battlespace, providing specialized/critical skills, and increasing active duty forces dwell time.

Today's National Guardsmen and Army Reserves play a critical role in shouldering the considerable combined loads of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The role of the Citizen Soldier was forced to evolve into an "operational reserve" that deploys regularly in support of active forces in the war on terrorism. Approximately 186,000 Citizen Soldiers have deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq since the attacks on September 11 (Musheno & Ross, 2008). This fact is made more amazing since our military is an all-volunteer force. As the United States heads into its eighth year in the

war against terrorism, the operational tempo is placing extreme stress on both the active and reserve components. Senior leaders have, out of necessity, made reflexive decisions to fill the gap. Accordingly, the present constructs of the national defense forces are unsuitable. Our senior military leaders must now weigh strengths of active and reserve components, and accordingly re-organize, and reconstruct them. To understand how best to re-align today's reserve force it is important to understand the historical perspective and evolution of our national defense force.

### **Evolution of the United States Ground Forces and National Defense**

The organization of our present professional active duty military has only existed since the end of World War I. In all the conflicts prior to the first "Great War," our national defense plans depended on an under-organized and often uneasy conglomeration of regional and state militias. This design was the resultant construct of our founding fathers' distrust of "standing armies." In all the previous European models, large professional military forces (most often sooner than later) turned against their citizenry and legitimate governments. While American presidents varied in their support or opposition in forming a professional military, congress steadfastly dissolved our armed forces following every major American conflict. Then in times of war, Congress would draft resolutions to expand the military in response to national threats. As an example, the United States Army was shrunk to less than 27,000 troops during the era preceding World War I (Stewart, 2005, Vol. I). The year before the United States entered the first World War, President Wilson requested Congress bolster national forces to protect our Southern continental border in reaction to Pancho Villa's 1916 attack on Columbus, New Mexico. Congress responded by "federalizing" approximately 75,000 National Guardsmen (Stewart, 2005, Vol. II). These disparities in numbers exemplify the radical shift in how the United States now organizes the national defense effort. Current manning levels for regular Army and the total national ground force reserves are relatively equal with roughly 512,000 active duty US Army to 555,000 total combined National Guard and Army Reserves (Personnel End Strength, FY2005).

The re-organization and shift to create a professional national military was a significant turning point for the Nation and the United States Army. The technologies which dominated World War I radically changed the dynamics of the battlefield. Ground combat leadership decisions down to the lowest levels became necessary. A small innocuous peacetime army serving as corps cadre for a larger wartime army composed of conscripted civilians became insufficient. This new evolving battlefield required knowledgeable and savvy career Soldiers. Over time, the old four-or five-to-one ratio of conscripts to regulars shifted more to a parity of numbers between reserve forces and active duty. This idea was nothing new; almost all of America's preeminent historical military leaders including a few presidents have espoused the benefits of regular soldiers (Busch, 2006). From the Revolutionary War through World War II, the insufficient numbers of regular troops were always spread too thin throughout the force. This



dilution negated the veterans' practical experience. In all of these early conflicts, America suffered bloody initial (and often needless) losses until the new troopers and officers gained actual combat experience.

### **Designated Roles of Today's Reserve Forces**

During the draw down of all military forces in the 1990s, the Army Reserves disbanded all of its combat military occupational specialty (MOS) troops and shifted exclusively towards combat support (O'Hanlon, 1997). While senior decision makers also streamlined the National Guard during this timeframe, these "state militias" retained the majority of their ground combat MOS units. It is important to preserve this state sponsored ground combat capability, for both the check and balance of military power to the federal government and the increasing number of Homeland Security missions. The security and law enforcement missions during Hurricane Katrina provide an excellent example for this skill set. These missions would be unlawful for federal troops to execute under the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878.

### **Battlespace**

Since the Global War on Terrorism started in 2001 in Afghanistan and 2003 in Iraq, the United States Army is out of balance (Leipold, 2009). The American military is calling on the Citizen Soldier to assist and ease the burden and bring a fresh perspective to the current conflicts. After several Active Divisions and Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) deployed several times to theater of operations the Reserve Component deployed several National Guard BCTs to perform full-spectrum operations to assist the war effort for the weary active duty forces.

### **Afghanistan**

In October of 2001, the United States initialized its assault on terrorism attacking the Taliban government of Afghanistan for their part in the September 11 attacks on America. The Taliban government permitted the terrorists to plan and execute their missions from within Afghanistan's borders. Once again, the Army calls upon the Citizen Soldier in the campaign on terrorism. The Army has focused on two BCTs in Afghanistan from 2001 thru 2008. The President decided that he will commit more BCTs to Afghanistan based on the request of General McKiernan, the ISAF Commander (The Briefing Room, 2009). Today the 33<sup>rd</sup> BCT based out of Illinois is on their second deployment in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Their main task is training the Afghan Security Forces. With the current numbers of active BCTs deployed to Iraq, the Citizen Soldier is taking a larger role in Afghanistan. As the focus of the new administration shifts priorities from Iraq to Afghanistan, so will the role of the Citizen Soldier.

#### *Iraq*

Operation Iraqi Freedom has been our focus on the Global War on Terrorism since 2003. The U.S. Army has assigned the majority of their BCTs to this operation. Currently there are 14 BCTs assigned to this mission that consist of both active and reserve components. The Citizen Soldier assists the force



in maintaining battlespace. Currently in Iraq we have the 50<sup>th</sup>, 29<sup>th</sup>, and 56<sup>th</sup> BCTs of the National Guard providing security and responsible for freedom of movement. Two of the other BCTs currently deployed, the 56<sup>th</sup> Stryker Brigade Combat Team and the 30<sup>th</sup> Heavy Brigade Combat Team, are conducting full-spectrum operations. According to Musial (2007) approximately forty percent of the current BCTs now operating in Iraq are from the Army National Guard. The Citizen Soldier is occupying more battlespace throughout the world in providing forward deployed roles.

### **Other Missions**

#### *Peacekeeping operations*

Currently the Citizen Soldier is occupying more battlespace in other regions of the world. The peacekeeping missions in Kosovo and Sinai were traditionally active duty roles. Due to the current commitment in Iraq and Afghanistan there are no active duty forces to complete these missions. The Citizen Soldier is vital to accomplishing America's foreign policy and strategic goals. The Army Reserve provides most of the Combat support and combat service support units mostly needed for these missions. The Army National Guard provides the maneuver, fires, and effects for the reserve forces. There are approximately 3,800 reserve forces operating daily in the European Command (EUCOM) area of responsibility.

#### *Homeland security*

The reserve forces still have the largest portion in the defense of American homeland. According to Spencer and Wortzel (2002), National Guard units are in all states, they are centrally located and are the first U.S. armed forces to react to an attack on the homeland. National Guard units have the structure, capabilities, and legal authority to respond to attacks on the homeland. The Guard connects local communities to the federal government by law and tradition. D. Wood (personal communication, March 11, 2009) describes how the Air National Guard operates the North American Continental Command for U.S. Northern Command and without the Guard or Reserve U.S. Northern Command cannot execute any of its missions today. The Army National Guard must balance not only its homeland defense role; also, it must meet the state missions required by their Governors as well as federal operations. While accomplishing all of their assigned missions the Citizen Soldiers length of activation is longer, enabling the active force to reset and get some much needed dwell time.

### **Length of Deployments**

#### *Past Ratio for deployments*

The length of deployments has shifted from what they were in the past. The Citizen Soldier has always helped when called upon dating back since the birth of our great nation. It has been a long time since the active Army forces have been at a large-scale war that has gone on for a long duration of time. The last major war the United States had to call upon active duty forces and Citizen Soldiers for a long duration was the Korean War. During the time of the Korean War, the past ideal ratio for active duty forces deployment is a 3:1 ratio (Krepinevich, 2004).

This ideal ratio for deployment dwell time means, that for every one active duty unit deployed, there would be three active duty units ready if needed for combat and peacekeeping missions (Pena, 2006). This means that units would deploy for a year and be back for three years. The active duty forces have continued this ratio until OEF in 2001 and OIF in 2003. These two combat operational wars stretched active duty forces to their limits, and needed the Citizen Soldier to shoulder more of the responsibilities. This would change the ratio in how much dwell time that active duty forces would have in between deployments.

#### *Current/Future Ratio for deployments*

Today's active duty is deploying at a ratio of one year deployment in combat and one year deployment back at home station. Without the Citizen Soldier who knows, what the ratio would be or how long our active duty unit's deployments in combat would last. "The Citizen Soldier has mobilized almost more in 2003 with approximately 230,000 compared to all of World War II's 300,000" (Segal D. & Segal M., 2005, p. 2). When the President ordered the surge of combat forces in 2007, those units that filled the surge were five brigades from the active forces (Wikipedia, 2009). State Senator Ellen Tauscher, a Democrat from California, says that our active forces are stressed too thin and the Citizen Soldier is spread as far as they can to support the active forces (Maze, 2009). To alleviate some of the stress for active duty the future ratio needs to be a 2:1 ratio for active duty forces and for the Citizen Soldier a 7:1 ratio (Gilmore, 2007). This future ratio will help the active force move closer to more dwell time back at home station than in comparison to combat. This dwell time back will allow the active force even more dwell time to reset their units. In order to establish more dwell time, the military needs to implement a policy that addresses the deployment rotations.

### **Dwell Time**

The Army came out with the Individual Time (IDT) Deployment Policy (ALARACT 253, 2007) on November 7, 2007. The IDT was to lower the current 15-month deployment rotations to 12-month deployments. Senior leadership knew that the active duty force would not be able to reset if they did not have adequate dwell time. The active duty force units would be combat ineffective if the dwell time was less than 12 months or less at home station. The Army decided after the surge of forces into Iraq that the 15-month deployments were causing problems within the units and their families. Active duty forces have had a difficult time keeping forces to be able to have dwell time when the Soldiers return home from combat. The IDT will allow active forces this much needed dwell time. The IDT is just the beginning for even more dwell time for active duty forces. The Citizen Soldier will continue to deploy even as active duty forces withdraw from Iraq. General Casey said, "Dwell time is expected to increase from 18 months in 2009 to 24 months in 2011", (Melancon, 2008, p. 1). This will not have an immediate effect on the Citizen Soldier, but will allow active duty forces the ability to have more dwell time and to reset their equipment while at home station.

## **Resetting the Active Force**

### *Shoot, Move, and Communicate*

The active duty force and Citizen Soldiers badly need their equipment reset for future deployments. The Army uses the Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Life Cycle Management Command (TACOM) which started in 1940, but the name TACOM took affect in 1994 with the combining of three other Army Organizations (ACALA- Armament and Chemical Acquisition and Logistics Activity, ARDEC- Armament, Research, Development and Engineering Center, and BRDEC- Belvoir, Research, Development and Engineering Center) (TACOM, 2006). The military has had a reset program for quite some time, but it has not been until recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan that the military needed more time to reset active and Citizen Soldier equipment. This is where TACOM resets active force units with all of their equipment within 180 days from the time a unit deploys back from combat (Coryell and Lenaers, 2006). During the reset program equipment will be replaced, recapitalized, reset, and reconstituted. Our military's two war campaigns have decreased the life span on many of our military systems. The repairing of equipment is fives times the norm, due to the continuous use that the equipment is enduring (Casey and Geren, 2008). The replacement of equipment has increased due to damages and wear and tear. The deployment of Citizen Soldier has allowed active duty forces more time to get back to home station and put their equipment into the military's reset program.

### *Military Schooling/Core Competency*

The two wars have caused the active force a huge backlog in the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) and have caused many seats to go vacant in military schools. This also goes with other Army schools such as Air Assault, Ranger, and Combat Life Saver to name a few. These seats would not normally go vacant if it were not for the Citizen Soldier. The Citizen Soldier allows the active force to continue to catch up on NCOES and military schooling that have been set back during the two wars.

The war has caused many junior and senior noncommissioned officers in numerous MOS to loose some of their core competency and lack knowledge (Keveles, 2008). The mark of the Infantryman is the Expert Infantryman's Badge (EIB). The EIB test happens, but only once a year for Soldiers to earn the coveted badge. Due to deployments and dwell time units have been able to only be tested once every other year or longer. The 82<sup>nd</sup> 2/325<sup>th</sup> Airborne Battalion tested for their EIB in September 2008 for their EIB (Pryor, 2008). It was the first time since 2006 that the unit was able to test for their EIB (Pryor, 2008). The Citizen Soldiers' role of being more active in combat allows infantryman and other MOSs to perform certain testing skills that will promote professional development. Although the Citizen Soldier has helped the active duty forces, there are debates on the effectiveness in battlespace and dwell time management.

## **Opposing View- Battlespace**

### *Command and Control*

Since the end of the Korean War, senior leadership have given only one Na-

tional Guard unit (42nd Infantry Division) battlespace to command and control in combat above the battalion level. Despite the fact that reserve forces have command teams with past combat experience, but are not given the opportunity to lead in OIF or OEF.

The absence of the reserve force in both the Vietnam and Desert Storm Wars, has called into question if they can handle the responsibility of commanding in combat. The no-show from combat in Vietnam led to the Reserves being dubbed “weekend warriors” (Musheno, and Ross, 2008, p. 4).

Reserve force leaders have commanded at the battalion and below level in the COE; however, they are missing at brigade and above level. Reserve force officers serve in duty positions on higher staffs at corps and theater level receiving valuable experience that will prepare them for command. Now in the eighth year of combat, senior military leaders are not affording the opportunity to the reserve force leaders to command and control battlespace in OIF or OEF.

#### *Manning the Force*

The reserve force has provided reinforcement in relieving the stress placed on active duty Soldiers. However, as an institution they have historically performed at lower levels than active component troops in the COE. The complexities of war have exposed weakness and in the preparation of the reserve forces for combat operations. Their failures have created conversation in Congress about reconsidering combat roles for the National Guard in Iraq. Many of the intended purposes for the Total Force Policy have been mishandled to date.

### **Total Force**

Reserve forces have made significant contributions during first three major wars of the twentieth century. They have not had a massive or sustained mobilization since the Korean War, however, the Global War on Terrorism changed that. During the Vietnam War, President Johnson refused to send the reserve forces into the war against the behest of the Joint Chiefs of the military. This flawed mistake was fueled by politics. Military leaders did not gain valuable lessons learned in the use of reserve forces in combat.

Senior military leaders at the end of the Vietnam War decided the United States would never again go to war without using all of its assets. In 1973, the Total Force Policy was introduced as doctrine in the employment of the reserve force. This gave the senior leaders doctrine on how to employ reserve forces in future operations. Total Force Policy issues guidance that reserve forces would be equipped and trained equally as the active forces for operational missions. General Abrams Army Chief of Staff (1973) stated.

Our arrangement was that we would have one Army with certain things in the active force, other in the National Guard, and yet other in the Army Reserve. And if the unfortunate circumstance should occur that...we'd have to use the Army [then we would] use the active, the National Guard and the Reserve together (Musheno & Ross 2008, p. 20).

The reserve forces as an institution has failed to meet training standards and readiness as a whole since the policy took effect. Desert Storm was a great

opportunity for the reserve force and Army leaders to revamp and modify the Total Force Policy. For more than 50 years, the reserve force collectively on a large scale has not seen combat. The learning curve proved to be very steep for combat action in the War on Terrorism.

### **Dwell Time**

The Global War on Terrorism has placed a large strain on the active components. The high operational tempo caused the senior leadership to look for options. The senior leadership of the Army implemented the dwell time policy. Dwell time is the time a Soldier spends at home station after returning from: combat deployment, operational deployment (non-combat), and dependent-restricted tours (ALARACT 253/2007, 2007). Senator Kennedy (2007) stated “The Department of Defense itself has set a goal of two years at home for every year deployed, ... It gives service members time to be with their families, and re-establish the bonds that we all take for granted.”(para. 3).

#### *Dwell Time Policy*

The active force was redeploying with no guaranteed time at home station. The Dwell Time Policy became a necessary evil to slow Soldiers’ frequent re-deployments. The Dwell Time Policy places constraints on unit commanders for manning. It is a benefit to the Soldiers by controlling frequency of deployments. There is no transparent policy for dwell time between active or reserve forces. Each respected component established its own policy on the calculations of deployment/mobilization time. With the current system there are imbalances with the ratio of deployed/mobilized time to dwell time. The Army has a one year of deployment ratio to one year of dwell time policy. (ALARACT 253/2007, 2007). However, the Army wants to achieve a one year of deployment to the two years of dwell time. (Davis and Polich, 2005). The reserve force would like a one year of deployment and mobilization ratio to six years of dwell time policy (CBO 2007). Neither component is able to achieve the ideal policy of dwell time as it would like. The Army is at 1:1, while the Army Reserve is at 1:4.3 as compared to the deployment/mobilization policy.

The Army calculates deployment time at boots on ground (BOG). Dwell time calculation are determined from this factor. Mobilization begins either from the day that individual starts training for deployment. The Army National Guard and Army Reserve can be mobilized within the United States and this qualifies for dwell time. The reserve forces substituting for the Army will not greatly aid in the dwell policy. “Time at home for active-duty heavy-medium brigades remains substantially below two years no matter how hard the reserves are pushed” (Davis and Polich, 2005, para. 18). The Army’s transformation to a modularized more fluid Army that is capable of deploying in smaller autonomous fashion can achieve the dwell policy.

#### *Managing Dwell Time*

The challenges to manage dwell time in the reserve force present a slight of hand trick. The Army and the reserve force are in a constant struggle to balance their dwell time. The reserve forces has had more slots that it could ever fill,

creates the manning struggles. The National Guard pre-war was only manned at 88 approximately percent (CBO, 2007).

The reserve force use a method called cross leveling to get a deploying unit to one hundred percent. This creates a problem for non-deploying units creating more shortages to an already undermanned unit. The non-deployed unit has to borrow Soldiers to fill its shortages for a deployment. Due to Global War on Terrorism commitment the reserve force are not capable of fulfilling their first responsibility which is support of homeland missions. For the first time ever, the US military is deploying an active duty regular Army combat unit for full time use inside the United States to deal with national emergencies, including terrorism, natural disasters and civil unrest.

### **Specialized/Critical Skills Value and Civilian Perspective Brings New Ideas**

#### *Medical Skills and Value*

I cannot think of anything more important than medical care for Soldiers in combat. Medical personnel save lives and they continue to improve the survival rate of Soldiers with their enhanced skills and medical technology such as bandages. When our nation is at war or prolonged conflicts involving combat there is a need for more medical professionals to treat combat injuries. Due to combat injuries, many more medical review boards decide Soldiers' career direction. The review boards require more doctors. After the Spanish-American War in 1908, a few hundred US Army Reserve doctors received commissions. This is where the US Army Reserve began, by filling the need of medical personnel shortages seen during the Spanish-American War (Crossland and Currie, 1997). Now approximately 70 percent of the US Army's medical units are in the US Army Reserves (*US Army*, n.d.). When our nation is not engaged in conflict, there is significantly less need for medical personnel than would be needed to treat combat injuries.

Many of these Reserve Army medical caregivers are professional doctors, nurses, and psychologists who work as civilians. They practice their professions each workday without distractions that the military brings, distractions like formations and training other than medical skill specific. The time that they are engaged using medical skills in their civilian job versus their counterparts on active duty causes their experience to rise quicker. A plastic surgeon at a major civilian trauma center for example, would have many more surgeries than an active duty plastic surgeon at an Army post hospital.

Innovations in techniques increase with number of people working on the issue. In addition, the Army has standard operating procedures to streamline proficiency. Fresh eyes coming in from the large civil work force and dealing with Army issues brings innovations. The more contacts we have, the better chance we can find a solution to a problem. Reservists bring innovations in themselves and from those they know outside the military from whom they can seek solutions for Army problems. This also works in reverse as the Citizen Soldier returns to their civilian work place and discusses problems encountered during their military tour. This lends itself to more minds working to solve



problems and coming up with new ideas. Now that we have seen the vital importance the medical skilled Citizen Soldier fills in the Army, let us look at the critical need the Army has in filling position in the judicial skills.

#### *Judicial Skills and Value*

Civilian law and military law are certainly different in many aspects, however, so are the laws from state to state. There is one thing they all have in common and that is their design to seek true justice. Even though a Reserve Soldier works daily with civilian law, the principals are the same and they must justify reasons to laws or articles. The US Army Reserve has nearly 81 percent of the Army's Judge Advocate General Units (*US Army*, n.d.).

The vital need for more personnel with judicial skills increases immensely as we have Soldiers deploying into long-term combat. Leaders do not need their Soldiers worrying about legal issues while deployed. Many Soldiers who have issues and do not want to deploy will act out in a negative way. Some Soldiers will have hardship issues requiring chapters that do not show up until they face a long deployment. Every Soldier is pushed through processing to update their will and power of attorney that increases the workload of our Judge Advocate General (JAG). Then there are Soldiers who have issues due to deployment such as guardianship, civilian law cases, and work discrimination and need assistance to postpone civilian court dates and their right to return to their civilian jobs. An area that is extremely important, that increases due to combat injuries, is medical review boards. Soldiers need counsel on their rights during review and appeals of medical findings.

Another area in the judicial system that increases is in civilian law. As part of the COE the military is involved in nation building and rebuilding infrastructure. The Army's JAG helps in the rebuilding by working with local judicial agencies to improve their laws and ensure our military works with respect to the laws that are put in place during the rebuilding phase. With the reserve JAG personnel coming from the civilian work force, they have experience in civil law that active duty JAG personnel do not have. In addition, they have seen issues with civil law that enables them to bring new ideas to prevent those same issues in the nation that they build during deployment that their active military counterparts cannot.

With that need to provide vital skills in the judicial system for Soldiers and nation building, the Army brings in the Reserves. Many working as lawyers, judges, and legal assistant in their civilian jobs, just as with the medical personnel, they work daily in their profession without other training distracters that their military counterparts have. The experience they bring is immense and compounded by the years of focused work in law (*Today's U.S.*, n.d.). We have now looked at the vital areas in medical and judicial skills with one other area to look at that fills specialized/critical skills in the area of Combat Service Support (CSS) and Combat Support (CS).

#### *Combat Service Support/Combat Support and Value*

Combat Service Support and Combat Support are areas that the names directly link them to combat. The units that fall under these areas support units

during combat operations. They are vital to the success of combat missions and the critical skills in many of the occupational positions are high. Some of those areas in CSS and CS are in the Engineer, Chemical, Civil Affairs, and Transportation.

The Army Reserve transformed after Desert Storm to its current state that is in a CSS and CS role with other supporting realms that are outside the CSS and CS roles. The Army Reserve structure design is to support units primarily, not as combat units, and is part of the operational force (GAO, 2006). The Army Reserve has nearly 100 percent of the Army's Training & Exercise Divisions, Railway Units, and Enemy Prisoner of War BDEs; 97 percent of the Civil Affairs Units; 85 percent of the Psychological Operations Units; 80 percent of the Transportation Commands; 75 percent of the Chemical Brigades; 64 percent of the Chemical Battalions; and 50 percent of the Transportation Groups (*US Army*, n.d.).

The skills in the Army Reserve fill a vital role that supports the COE with an enormous amount of experience. Look at their Civil Affairs units; many of these Soldiers are civil support professionals in their civilian jobs, serving in positions building their own communities as county counsel members, city mayors, and education counsels. The experience they bring is vast. They solve and work through issues daily in their civilian jobs building their communities that translate to nation building as military civil affairs personnel. This gives them insight to short term and long-term issues. Look at transportation experience of civilian truck drivers and delivery personnel. Many of the Reserve personnel do those jobs every day driving thousands of miles every year and delivering thousands of goods. Postal workers form the US Post Office bringing their experience to the US Army postal units. All of these skills directly translate into military jobs that are vital to support our troops.

The Army National Guard has long been the primary source for reserve combat forces (Doubler, 2001). As they have been restructuring through the 1990s and continuing that transformation today as a combat force, they are taking on more of a role in the CSS and CS areas. The National Guard just as the Army Reserve is now part of the operational force. The National Guard's structure has nearly 52 percent of their force still as combat, 22 percent in CSS, and 17 percent in CS (*Army National*, n.d.).

The Army Engineers is the area that jumps out at me from the National Guard. Many of these Soldiers work in the civilian construction fields and bring dynamic experience with them to the COE. Many of these Soldiers work everyday building homes, grading roads, laying pipes for water and sewer systems, etc... in their civilian jobs. Their experience compared to their military counterparts with the same years of experiences is not equal. The National Guard Soldier does not have the training distracters in their civilian jobs. They work in their skill day in and day out gaining critical skill and solving problems in their skill field. These skills are vital to the Army's mission success during reconstruction in the COE. We have now reviewed specialized/critical skills in the medical, judicial, and combat service support/combat support areas that Citizen



Soldiers are vital in filling in the COE. There is always a different perspective as to what constitutes critical skills. Some Soldiers would argue ground combat MOS skills are the most critical skill set and are best filled by active duty forces.

### **Opposing View- US Reserve Forces in OIF and OEF**

#### *US Reserve Forces in OIF and OEF*

It is not the intention of this author to besmirch or tarnish the reputation of any reserve units. To report a list of specific failures of any national military component would be criminally unfair. Professional Soldiers do not judge another's actions under fire; violating this rule is volatile at best, as there are precious few times it yields a positive outcome. Since combat never waits for a recorder to tally and grade all the participants' actions, the only definitive and objective information are the names of the friendly casualties. During 2004, arguably one of the bloodier years in Iraq, National Guard troops suffered a casualty rate over a full third higher when compared to their active duty counterparts (Moniz, 2004). To those who would consider this an overly harsh use of statistics, consider the meaning of dismissing these facts. Does a lower casualty rate mean active duty troops are simply "luckier?" I would argue an assumption of chance or fortuity is a very harsh denigration of the active duty ground combat MOSs. The present decisions and future planning for our national ground combat forces illustrated this insulting hypothesis. Instead of acknowledging the absolute necessity of career professional men-at-arms, senior military leaders have simply extended National Guard activations an additional three months (Associated Press, 2009). Arguably, this action is a positive change in short term policy to allow more train up time for our reserve forces, however, this would appear to be the long-range solution as well. Essentially, this initiative reinforces a pervasive false premise that part time training is somehow commensurate years of leadership and combat experience. Especially dangerous is the underestimation of complexity involved in today's battlefield operations and its relation to effective mission accomplishment. Our most senior military leaders seem singularly focused on increasing Soldier survivability. True, a higher mortality rate is indeed an indication of inadequate training. However, properly planned and executed operations are the best avenue to avoid unnecessary casualties. Multiple ineffective operations increase the risk and exposure. Effective operations, which achieve true second and third long-term effects, are the definitive answer. Quite simply, we must rely on the constant professional experience of our active duty troops, rather than hope and the intermittent training of the reserves.

#### *Challenges of the Current COE and Asymmetrical Threats*

While regular troops will never eliminate all failures on the battlefield, the historical reliance on reserve forces has been ineffective for many years. As early as the Civil War, our most talented military leaders recognized the challenges associated with the shift from old massed "linear" tactics to the new "dispersed" model supported by advances in war technologies (Busch, 2006). Suddenly, the individual Soldier became a decision maker. In all of the world's prior wars, effective commanders massed their troops and directed maneuvers to

counter the machinations of the opposing leader. Ground combat elements simply executed orders and were treated as pieces on a great chessboard. Where the bow and arrow had disrupted old massed infantry formations; the new projectile technologies of artillery and machine gun fires ended the reign of linear tactics. The new model of dispersed tactics required initiative from the lowest levels of combatants. New technologies continue to add complexity: unmanned aerial vehicles, air power, smart munitions, personal and satellite communications, digital imagery, computers, night vision and thermal devices, GPS navigation systems, etc. The coordination, integration and the effective use of this myriad of modern warfare technologies requires years of experience to truly master. An asymmetrical enemy further adds to the seeming overload of complications facing our Soldiers and combat leaders today. Our warfighters must be thoroughly versed in counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, and urban combat operations, all the while, mitigating the risk of fratricide to American troops as well as our international and host nation partners. These are not simple tasks to be mastered in a twenty week pre-mission train-up.

While the ultimate human cost of unnecessary casualties is the most obvious negative aspect of ineffective operations, consider the longer-term effects to our national will and the will of the enemy. Historians have characterized armies of the past to the swords of diplomacy or the coarse tools to implement national will when mediation and negotiations have failed. Today's forces need to be connoisseurs experts with scalpels, surgically removing a dangerous cancer and causing minimal harm to the surrounding healthy issues. Singular military actions, which appear clumsy or haphazard, erode this critical global endorsement essential in accomplishing our strategic goals. Yet this operational mission success is only half the equation. Americans react very strongly to "needless" deaths of Soldiers and civilians alike. Any incidents of avoidable casualties act as poison to the collective popular national will and as fuel for enemy propaganda. In this new information age of international communications and media, it is impossible to hide missteps or failures. As our world continues to grow increasingly "connected," international acceptance or ratification for our national actions becomes more and more important. These complex demands require dedicated professional

In America, history has shown us that the patriot Citizen Soldier has answered the call many times for our nation. In each major conflict, the Citizen Soldier has proven to be vital to the success of our military. Our leaders today have seen the vital role the Reserve and Guard forces have filled during the recent military history of our country. Due to their success, the nation's leaders have changed the strategic role of the Reserve and Guard to become part of the operational force with continued success. They will continue to mobilize and fill the roles needed during times of conflict with their specialized skills, combat service support, and combat support that brings new ideas for mission accomplishment.

It is undeniable our national reserve forces have played an integral part in securing the nation. However, their overall performance record has never been

commensurate to their “regular” counterparts. As technology and asymmetrical threats continue to add complexity to the lowest levels on the battlefield, experience and dedicated professional men-in-arms become more critical. Specifically, the national defense plans in many opinions should not task reserve forces in filling ground combat MOS positions. Our reserves will continue to provide a valuable supporting role, however, the most critical skills of ground combat MOSs are best filled by active duty units. Senior Military Leadership continues to define and redefine the roles of the reserve forces in the modern era of the operational Army. The failure to fully use the reserve forces to their maximum capability in past and current combat operations has hindered their reputation and confidence in the active component. The Army has failed in establishing one policy for a total force addressing dwell time, and management of manning Senior leaders in battalion level and above are non-existent in command and control of battlespace. The Total Force Doctrine has yet to fully reach its intended purpose in aiding in combat operations; being a strategic multiplier in an operational force.

Without the critical battlespace the Army Reserve and National Guard occupy America would not meet its strategic and operational goals. In every theater of operation, the Citizen Soldier is occupying more positions and terrain typically held by Active duty forces. The Citizen Soldier’s role in combat provides much relief to the active duty forces. This relief in the current COE is where the Citizen Soldiers are vital in maintaining battlespace, providing specialized critical skills, and increasing dwell time of the active forces.

The Citizen Soldier shortens the active duty’s length of deployment and adds to their dwell time. The Citizen Soldier allows the active duty forces the chance to have a better deployment ratio comparing time in combat to time at home station. While the active duty forces are at home station, they will be able to reset and get back into the fight. The Citizen Soldier enables the active duty forces to have the time to attend NCOES schooling and other military schools that have gone unfilled the last few years. By being able to attend military schooling, active duty forces are able to build core competency, which have gone unchallenged during combat. The Citizen Soldier plays an active role in providing this needed dwell time. They will continue to mobilize and fill the roles needed during times of conflict with their specialized skills, combat service support, and combat support that brings new ideas for mission accomplishment. The Citizen Soldier is no longer the “weekend warrior,” but a vital component of today’s operational force.

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## Ethics Essays

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# **Ethics and a Functional Alcoholic in the Coast Guard**

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April 20, 2009 Ethics*

## **Abstract**

Members in the military have been known to use alcohol to cope with stress and issues. They have also been known to use alcohol for recreation. This use of Alcohol can and does have adverse effects on mission completion and unit success. To deal with this the military has many programs available to leaders and personnel to deal with related alcohol problems. The Ethics of where the professional and personal responsibility, to require the use of these programs by military personnel can be vague. This paper explains my personal experience with this ethical dilemma in the Coast Guard.

## **Ethics and a Functional Alcoholic in the Coast Guard**

Functional Alcoholics have successfully served in the United States Coast Guard. Alcohol may be used to repress or cope with feelings from a past event. Drinking may be the result of a habit formed when they were adolescents. Over time it has become a normal part of their life and they are able to function as normal adults but still be Alcoholics. They will join the military and be superb Sailors yet be under the influence of alcohol everyday to cope or feel “normal”. Senior leaders have to make a decision on how to deal with these Sailors. The Coast Guard guidance on Alcohol is lined out in Chapter 20 of the Personnel Manual, Commandant Instruction M100.6. This policy covers almost every aspect that one will face with Alcohol except that of functional Alcoholics. Responses to situations that result in incidents with driving drunk, fights in bars in the civilian sector or failure in a duty at a unit are all very clear. What is not clearly stated is what to do with a person who is obviously an Alcoholic, admits they are alcoholics, but does nothing wrong. As a senior leader, a person has to decide where the ethical line between professional duty and personal responsibility lies.

I supervised the Coast Guard Communications Center (COMMCEN) that was responsible for monitoring all Search and Rescue frequencies for more than 220 miles of US coastline. This included dealing with the American boating public with routine and emergency communications. Additional duties included communications with local Coast Guard boats and helicopters on training and rescue missions.

To complete this mission, I supervised six active duty Petty Officers and one Reservist. Erik Hannover was one of the five. He was a Second Class Officer. Although junior to two other people in regards to time in service, Erik excelled



at his job. He advanced in rank quicker than the others and asked for more responsibility. Because of his motivation and drive, made him Communication's Center Training Petty Officer. This position had to maintain the training records and organize monthly training for the COMMCEN personnel.

Additionally, he volunteered to be the collateral duty Computer Administrator for the whole unit. This included 80 users and more than 60 computers. He was very active on our unit's morale committee, serving as the COMMCEN's representative, he assumed the role as boat keeper the unit's 22-foot morale boat. When the 2-year-old Border collie, that had been the unit's mascot, could no longer live at the unit, he offered to take her home and bring her in when he had duty to sit the crew. Erik was an all star Coast Guardsman.

As the COMMCEN Supervisor, I decided to make him the Assistant Supervisor. He had proven himself more than capable. He executed his duty with noted excellence. The Rescue Helicopter pilots, Search and Rescue controllers, and the Command in general often praised his excellence in all of his duties. As my assistant, I expected the same excellence and a person I could count on to fill in for me. Erik Hannover surpassed my expectations.

The only downfall that I found was that Erik was an Alcoholic. He drank every night. He admitted this to me after I had asked him about his drinking one evening. He stated he had been drinking since he was 11. His father and uncles drank and when he turned 11, he was invited to join them to "become a man." He stated he knew how to drink responsibly and was not "stupid" about it. His wife just confirmed this. She said it was the way he had always been. She drank occasionally, but not like him. Yet she was never concerned and just accepted it. So did I.

Erik was not only my assistant but he was also my friend. As my assistant we had to work together to meet the command goals and expectations. Because of this, we developed a close relationship. He and his wife were 22 when they reported to the unit. They didn't get married until after their first year at the unit and I served as best man and witness at the courthouse in front of the Justice of the Peace. I was 26 and a divorced father of a 6 year old. I spent many evenings with Erik and his Ethics and his wife. on the weekends my son went to my ex-wife's house, Erik and I played pool at the local bar, He always seemed to be the life every party and very outgoing, which I enjoyed being around since that was the opposite of my personality. In many ways, I did not want to ruin my friendship or my great fortune such an excellent assistant supervisor by worrying about his alcohol consumption.

Ethically I was torn as what to do. As his Supervisor, I had spoken to him once about his constant drinking and he told me it was none of the Coast Guard's business if he did nothing wrong. According to Coast Guard regulations, he was technically correct. One clause of the Coast Guard's Alcohol policy (COMDTINST 1000.6, 2006) states that the command can refer a member to Alcohol screening if concern or suspicion abuse believed to exist.

At many of official unit functions and at unofficial gatherings with unit per-

sonnel in attendance, he drank and was noticed by others at the command. After the second year of his tour, was common knowledge that he was an Alcoholic. Everybody talked about but nobody did anything about it. The command and I benefited from his superior efforts. He received numerous awards and recognition during his tour. The command and I did not pursue the issue.

After completion of his six-year tour, he separated from the service and moved home with his wife and dog to Colorado. He got a good job with a computer company. I received an occasional email from him checking over the years since then.

Four years after his separation I received an email from his wife. Erik had died in a Motorcycle crash. He was returning home after a night at the bar. He had been drinking and was racing a buddy at excessive speeds when his motorcycle missed a turn and he went off the road. He was not wearing a helmet and died on impact.

Ethically I feel torn about my past decisions. Professionally, as his supervisor and leader I had an ethical responsibility to recognize a problem, use the Coast Guard program and get him help that could have saved his life. Personally, I feel that every person has right to choose their vices. Some over eat, others smoke, and others drink. For Erik, it was a normal part of life in his family. He never let it affect his duties while in the service. Part me even believes that the respect that the command and I showed him by not forcing the issue of his alcohol consumption, made him confident that he was responsible with his vice. Had I made different choices in application of command enforced alcohol programs his life in civilian world may have been different.

### **Conclusion**

The military has a responsibility to care for its members and ensure a good quality of life is available. The completion of this responsibility will ensure military has an effective and productive member. Ethically I believe the command had a professional responsibility to recognize Erik's alcoholism and treat to prevent an incident that could have resulted, although it never did. Ethically the military also must respect people's rights to be adults, make adult decisions, to be a leader of others and of their own person. In Erik's case, this was done and he completed six excellent years of service to his country. Had he been forced into treatment his service and future in civilian life may have been very different. Ethics are guidelines and tools that every senior leader must decide how to effectively apply to life situations along with personal experience and values to accomplish the missions and goals of military service.

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# **Accomplish the Mission or Soldiers' Welfare: A Leader's Conflict**

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## **Abstract**

Leaders will always face conflict in taking care of their Soldiers while accomplishing the mission. This conflict becomes even more evident when the life of the Soldier is at risk. A leader's responsibilities are laid out in numerous Army publications and creeds. The Army Values and Warrior Ethos fully support a mission first attitude. For those who fail to live up to their responsibilities, the Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) may apply. There are many examples throughout military history of mission success and mission failure involving Soldier welfare.

## **Accomplish the Mission or Soldiers' Welfare: A Leader's Conflict**

One of the greatest conflicts that a leader will face is how to take care of his Soldiers and still accomplish the mission. Most Soldiers are taught at an early age that life is precious. However, the Army is founded on sacrifice to accomplish the mission. Sometimes it involves the sacrifice of Soldiers to reach the objective. Army publications are full of creeds, values, and principles that clearly state "the first obligation of the leader of every organization is to accomplish his assigned mission" (The Soldier's Guide Field Manual 7-21.13, 2004, pp. 1-21). Following orders to accomplish the mission is supported by both oath and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Incidents throughout the history of our Army show what happens when the mission is placed first and when the welfare of the Soldier is placed first.

## **Leader Responsibilities**

Leaders must always be concerned for the welfare of their Soldiers. However, this concern cannot override a leader's responsibility to accomplish the mission. As stated in the oath of enlistment: "I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice" (Army Leadership: Competent, Confident, and Agile Field Manual 6-22, 2006, pp. 2-2). This implies that not only are leaders required to obey legal orders given them, but to also ensure those orders are accomplished to the best of their abilities. Should a Soldier or leader fail to obey the order given them, they can be punished under the UCMJ.

The “Creed of the Noncommissioned Officer” specifically lays out an NCO’s responsibilities: “ My two basic responsibilities will always be uppermost in my mind – accomplishment of my mission and the welfare of my soldiers” (The Army Noncommissioned Officer Guide Field Manual 7-22.7, 2002, p. back cover). I’ve overheard from numerous leaders a twist on the NCO Creed: mission first, troops always. This implies that the two are intertwined: if the Soldier is taken care of, the mission will always be accomplished. Usually this is true. However, when loss of life is involved, the Soldiers’ welfare is secondary to mission accomplishment. A good leader will ensure that the Soldier has everything they need to set them up for mission success, with the understanding that there is risk involved. As stated by SGM Tommy L. Marrero (2008), “In combat, ethical choices are not always easy. The right thing may not only be unpopular, but dangerous as well.”

### **Army Values**

The Army Values set the stage for the development of discipline and the fulfillment of a Soldier’s obligations. They provide guidance in any situation as to which course of action is correct. The Army Values are all linked together, overlapping in places. They inspire trust between Soldiers and between Soldiers and their leaders. (The Army Noncommissioned Officer Guide Field Manual 7-22.7, 2002, pp. 1-22). There are two of the seven Army Values I would like to discuss: duty and personal courage.

#### *Duty*

The definition of duty is “to fulfill your obligations” (The Soldier’s Guide Field Manual 7-21.13, 2004, pp. 1-7). For leaders, it means that they are expected to “carry out the requirements of the position to the best of their abilities” (The Soldier’s Guide Field Manual 7-21.13, 2004, pp. 1-8) An NCO, by virtue of his grade and position, must take care of his Soldiers, ensuring they are well trained, have what they need to do any task, assisting in any personal issues, and providing guidance and supervision. The NCO will also have to ensure that his Soldiers accomplish the mission to the best of their abilities. When an NCO tries to compromise mission accomplishment with the excuse of looking out for his Soldiers, that NCO has failed to fulfill his duty and is compromising one of the Army Values.

#### *Personal Courage*

Personal Courage is the ability to “face fear, danger, or adversity (physical and moral)” (The Army Noncommissioned Officer Guide Field Manual 7-22.7, 2002, pp. 1-25). Leaders are paid to make tough decisions in the face of adversity. One of the toughest decisions a leader can make is to send Soldiers into harm’s way. It is critical that the leader choose the best option that ensures the conservation of manpower and equipment. But, above all, that leader still has to accomplish the mission. A good leader will not like placing his Soldiers at risk, but he has the personal courage to overcome his fears and take “the hard right over the easy wrong” (Chaplain (MG) Carver, 2008, p. 1) in accomplishing the mission.

### **Warrior Ethos**

The “Warrior Ethos” is closely linked to the Army Values (The Soldier’s Guide Field Manual 7-21.13, 2004). “I will always place the mission first. I will never accept defeat. I will never quit. I will never leave a fallen comrade.” (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006, p. 4-10) gives Soldiers and leaders guidance when times are tough. The first line in the “Warrior Ethos” fully supports my position of mission first. A leader must accomplish the mission regardless of his personal feelings or how tough the situation is. To do otherwise is to accept defeat and to quit. The leader quits not only the obligations of their position, but also fails to look out for their Soldiers by allowing them to fail. To me, the Warrior Ethos says to find a way to accomplish the mission. Think outside the box. Take care of your Soldiers, but accomplish the mission.

### **Uniformed Code of Military Justice**

When a leader allows the mission to fail due to concern for his Soldiers, both the leader and the Soldiers may be recommended for punishment under the UCMJ. Article 90 “Assaulting or willfully disobeying superior commissioned officer” (Manual for Courts-Martial United States, 2008, pp. A2-26) states that a Soldier is guilty if they willfully disobey a lawful order given by a superior commissioned officer (Manual for Courts-Martial United States, 2008, pp. A2-26). A Soldier violates Article 91 “Insubordinate conduct toward warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, or petty officer” (Manual for Courts-Martial United States, 2008, pp. A2-26) if they willfully violate a lawful order given by a warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, or petty officer (Manual for Courts-Martial United States, 2008, pp. A2-26). Article 92 “Failure to obey order or regulation” (Manual for Courts-Martial United States, 2008, pp. A2-26) states that a Soldier is “derelict in the performance of his duties” if they “violate or fail to obey any lawful general order or regulation” (Manual for Courts-Martial United States, 2008, pp. A2-26). A Soldier is guilty of Article 94 “Mutiny or sedition” (Manual for Courts-Martial United States, 2008, pp. A2-26) if the Soldier “with intent to usurp or override lawful military authority, refuses, in concert with any other person, to obey orders or otherwise do his duty or creates any violence or disturbance” (Manual for Courts-Martial United States, 2008, pp. A2-26). Punishment for these offenses ranges from an Article 15, confinement, discharge, court martial, or possibly death, depending on the circumstances of the incident.

### **Examples of Incidents**

Throughout military history, incidents have arisen place which leaders in the difficult situation of deciding what is more important: mission accomplishment or Soldier welfare. One assumes that leaders react in accordance with their orders and accomplish the mission, using their Soldiers within their capabilities. The two situations below show examples in which the leaders either accomplish their mission or fail to accomplish their mission.

#### *Battle of the Bulge*

In the later stages of World War II, “the Germans launched their greatest of-

fensive of the war in the west” (Colonel Marshall, 1946, p. 1) on December 16, 1944. Brigadier General McAuliffe, the 101<sup>st</sup>’s Division artillery commander, was tasked with moving the Division into position to stop the German assault. The Division was in France, refitting and recuperating from the airborne assault into Holland. Ammunition, cold weather clothing, basic equipment, and blankets were in short supply (Colonel Marshall, 1946, p. 15). As orders were passed down to the units, the lack of critical equipment was brought up to the leadership of the Division. However, due to the Soldiers’ training and quality leadership, the units moved out and set up a defensive perimeter around Bastogne. The mission was obviously accomplished, as the Germans were denied access to Bastogne. Although the Soldiers suffered severe hardships and loss of life, a critical mission was accomplished that eventually led to the defeat of Germany.

### *343<sup>rd</sup> Quartermaster Company, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) II*

On 13 October 2004 23 Soldiers from the 343<sup>rd</sup> Quartermaster Company, stationed at Talil Air Base, Iraq, were tasked to convoy to Taji with a load of fuel. According to NCOs in the unit, the vehicles were unarmored, vehicle maintenance was not up to standard, and the fuel load was contaminated. According to an NCO in the unit, the issues had been brought up to the chain of command and disregarded (Associated Press, 2004). This caused the leadership in the convoy to decide it was a suicide mission. When the time came for the convoy brief, none of the Soldiers showed up and the convoy didn’t depart. When ordered to accomplish the mission, the Soldiers refused. Another unit in the company ended up completing the mission, suffering some damage to vehicles and a few casualties (Croke, 2004).

The numerous leadership failures in this example are obvious. First, the immediate leadership failed to ensure their equipment was properly maintained to support missions. This led to the Soldiers having no faith in either their equipment or their leaders. Next, the NCOs in charge of the convoy decided on their own that they wouldn’t do the mission because they were concerned for their Soldiers’ safety. They forgot their responsibilities as NCOs and placed Soldier welfare over mission accomplishment. The Soldiers were safe, but the fuel did not get delivered. Finally, the leadership placed other Soldiers in jeopardy by neglecting their duty. It’s unknown how critical the fuel supplies were at Taji, but it would add to the negligence of the NCOs if Soldiers died due to lack of fuel.

## **Conclusion**

While good leaders value the lives and wellbeing of their Soldiers, the mission must be accomplished. The NCO Creed, the Warrior Ethos, and the UCMJ fully support the mission first attitude. Disobeying orders to bring home all of your Soldiers may win praise from the Soldiers involved, but places other Soldiers at risk. These leaders are trying to make the right decisions, but they are the easy right. The leaders have failed to live up to their basic responsibilities. Leaders throughout the Army’s history have made strategic victories possible by living up to their responsibilities. There are also many examples of leaders who failed to accomplish missions, placing the welfare of their Soldiers first. Letting

a mission fail is not taking care of Soldiers. Mission first is Army doctrine.

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# The Trouble With Loyalty

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## Abstract

This essay examines the misinterpretation of loyalty in the military culture. It argues that there are two competing loyalties within the military: loyalty to persons and loyalty to the institution. Soldiers often relate to the concept of loyalty to a person better than loyalty to an institution. Fear of reprisal, negative connotations, and the social stigma of disloyalty are factors that shape Soldiers' loyalty. Soldiers must understand their obligations in order to better determine their loyalties and make the right choice. The essay concludes that Soldiers who understand that their first loyalty is to the Army will make appropriate ethical decisions.

## The Trouble With Loyalty

Loyalty is a strong word, one that invokes powerful emotion in most people. Loyalty implies faithfulness and trustworthiness, qualities that we as leaders hold in high esteem. In fact, loyalty is so important that the Army identified it as one of the seven core values it expects all Soldiers to possess. The problem with loyalty is that it is often misunderstood and used in ways that are contradictory to its intended meaning and may lead to unethical behavior. Personal relationships, negative connotations, and the stigma of disloyalty often cloud the judgment of Soldiers and leaders, creating the opportunity for unethical decisions. Soldiers and leaders must understand the dynamics of loyalty in order to make appropriate ethical decisions.

Loyalty is faithfulness or devotion to a person, a cause, obligation, or duties. As Soldiers, we understand that our faithfulness and devotion is to the Constitution, the Army, our unit, and our fellow Soldiers. One can assume that each Soldier understands their obligations to each of these individually. The ethical dilemma arises when a Soldier or leader must decide between two or more competing loyalties. Soldiers, when faced with this situation, must determine the value that they place on each one and choose which one is most important to them. If the Soldier's values mirror the Army's then there is no ethical dilemma. Inappropriate ethical decisions are made when there is a discrepancy between the Army's values and individual values. This discrepancy may be the result of flawed personal values, but for the purposes of this essay I will assume that it is because the individual Soldier will often value loyalty to a person higher than loyalty to an organization or institution.

The Constitution, the Army, and our units are all real, however in the context of this essay I will assume that many Soldiers perceive them as intan-



gible things. They are ideals without a unique identity. Soldiers cannot relate to them as easily as they would a person. We often refer to these entities as they and them, the reason for frustration, and the source of oppression or difficulty. While there are exceptions, this general description fits. Soldiers may feel a bond with these entities, but it is my opinion that many Soldiers see such abstract concepts as less deserving of their loyalty. These concepts do not occupy a foxhole, they do not share hardships, and they do not stand next to you in formation. I would submit that while they are important to our sense of being, many Soldiers and leaders rank them lower than faithfulness and loyalty to a person.

The institutional value of loyalty is the direct opposite. As Soldiers, our reason for being is to protect the United States and our Constitution against all enemies, foreign or domestic. This statement implies that our most important loyalties are to these, and not to individuals within the institution. Loyalty in this sense requires our faithfulness to the laws and regulations that govern our institution. It also requires us to put the best interests of our country, our Constitution, our institution, and our organizations before our own. This is our duty as Soldiers, and as such we are bound by oath and regulations to fulfill it. Our institutional values dictate that when differing loyalties come into ethical conflict, our loyalty to the nation and our institution must prevail. This dictating of loyalty is the basis for our military justice system and enables the institution to maintain good order and discipline.

The reality of loyalty is far more complicated than these two competing views. Our society and our institution send mixed signals on loyalty. As a society, we collectively place great importance on personal loyalty. We ostracize those who are disloyal, for a loyal and true friend would not turn a friend in for an infraction. The dangerous nature of the military and the closeness of our organizations rely heavily on trust, a component of loyalty. We often exclude Soldiers we view as disloyal from our groups; a situation that creates tension among the members and is detrimental to teamwork and mission execution. Superiors often view disloyal Soldiers as self-serving, rebellious, or individuals who fail to comply with the organizational identity or culture. Words such as traitor, narc, and tattletale all invoke negative connotations and describe the collective social feeling toward disloyal behavior. In this context it is easy to see how one's judgment can become confused in regards to ethical decisions that pit loyalty to the institution against loyalty to a person.

The daunting task for leaders is how to maintain an ethical climate in an organization that balances these competing loyalties. Our Soldiers must first understand the institutional definition of loyalty and the legal and moral obligations this definition requires. Leaders can accomplish this through education and reinforcement at each operational level. The leader must address the dynamic of personal loyalty in the context of ethical decision-making and the moral and legal ramifications of poor ethical decisions. To be effective, we must drive home the point that the institutional definition of loyalty includes loyalty to each other, but in the context of doing what is right regardless of the ramifications

and not placing another Soldier in an ethical dilemma to cover up for individual transgressions. The training should progress to situational exercises that create ethical dilemmas which force Soldiers to choose between conflicting loyalties, and conclude with in depth discussions of the decisions and their consequences.

We must also alter the culture of our organizations to understand the difference between disloyal behavior and fulfilling moral and legal obligations. The bottom line is that we must redefine disloyalty to exclude covering up illegal, immoral, and unethical behavior while enhancing the emphasis on doing what is right at all times. We must maintain open lines of communication with our Soldiers while enforcing the chain of command, but most importantly we must foster a climate that encourages learning from mistakes and shies away from a zero-defect mentality. In addition, we must take care to protect those who demonstrate the personal courage to step forward and report unethical behavior. Lastly, we must create a climate that rewards and reinforces ethical behavior and punishes unethical conduct. Through these efforts, we can solve the problem of misplaced loyalty and remain true to our institutional values.

### **Conclusion**

Each week there are new reports of unethical conduct by Soldiers and leaders. Many of the incidents include others who are implicated when they chose loyalty to a person over loyalty to the institution. These individuals faced an ethical dilemma that forced them to choose between competing loyalties, and as a result of either fear of reprisal, misunderstanding, or the social stigma of disloyalty, they chose to make a poor ethical decision. Soldiers who understand that their first loyalty is to the institution and not a person will make appropriate ethical decisions. We as leaders must educate our Soldiers on the legal and moral obligations of their service and the implications of unethical behavior. We must alter our culture in such a way that we maintain loyalty to people without sacrificing loyalty to the institution. All Soldiers must understand that their ultimate loyalty is to the nation and the Constitution.

# Cultural Awareness in the Military

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## Cultural Awareness in the Military

The United States military's inability to understand the cultural implications in foreign conflicts is not new. The wars in Vietnam, Korea, Bosnia, Kosovo and the first Iraq conflict reflect this shortfall. But the lessons from the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have caused a cultural revolution in the U.S. armed services, and have led the military to undertake what just a few years ago was unfathomable to them; cultural awareness training. Although the latter wars are being fought in different countries, the implications are the same: lack of cultural awareness will lessen the chances for a quick victory. The notion that the world's most modern and powerful military machine would end up struggling against a few scattered insurgents is unconceivable to the U.S. military (Fichtner, 2006). The failure of the U.S. military to prepare for these culturally changed conflicts lies in the fact that the Pentagon continues to see cultural understanding mainly as a civilian matter (Fichtner, 2006). This paper includes the definition of culture and cultural competency; a discussion of differences in culture and their implications; and a review of what the military is doing to improve this important aspect of military operations.

## Culture

The Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2005) describes culture as "the customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits of a racial, religious, or social group (p. 120)." The army's field manual (FM) 6-22, Army Leadership, (October 2006) defines culture as "shared beliefs, values, and assumptions about what is important (p. 6-7)." The army emphasizes sensitivity, awareness and consideration of different cultures regardless of the country where the organization operates.

Inasmuch as these definitions encompass mostly accepted principles, they lack a solid foundation such as the understanding of ethnography. Ethnography is the study of an intact cultural group in a natural setting over a prolonged period of time by collecting, primarily, observational data (Cresswell, 2002). Therefore, there needs to be an equilibrium of understanding in these areas if the military is to succeed in future conflicts.

## Cultural Competency

Competency in the military should not rely exclusively on the technical and tactical roles of Soldiers. Rather, it should include the concept of cultural understanding on the military areas of interest. Inasmuch, the military must undertake

the arduous task of becoming competent within its own culture. One single bullet on FM 6-22 states that army leaders be “sensitive to the different backgrounds of team members to best leverage their talents (October 2006, p. 6-7).” Beleaguered by continuous deployments, incredible human resource demands, mounting casualties, and political and public outrage, the military is just now beginning to understand the ethical implications of cultural awareness. McFarland (2005) explains that cultural competency is the common vision of leaders and their subordinates (p. 23). Military leaders must first understand the division of cultures within their units before they establish frameworks to understand other cultures. The adaptation to other communities, international or local, demands adequate leadership. Leaders must also understand how historic distrust affects current conflicts, realizing that one might misjudge others’ actions based on learned experiences (McFarland, 2005).

### **Differences in Culture and Their Implications**

The military lacks the resources and time to study all the different cultures around the globe. However, its primary center of attention should be the different areas where future conflicts may arise. The art of handling multiculturalism and practicing tolerance and respect for foreigners should be the Army’s core issue (Fichtner, 2006). Leaders and Soldiers must comprehend and become more aware of the differences in cultures, but they must explore their similarities as well. Different aspects of culture such as the American way of Egalitarianism, where Americans believe that human equality in social, political, and economic forms are the norm, may contrast with the hierarchical way of other nations, where persons or things are organized into ranks or arranged in a graded series (Merriam-Webster, 2005). Other obvious differences such as language and communication, dress, beliefs, attitudes, eating habits, work, and values and norms must be addressed as well.

The implications are enormous since understanding cultural differences is crucial to the success of current and future operations. Pundits argue that the military is becoming “soft” and is afraid of public and official scrutiny. The US military counters by offering that everything is rapidly changing in combat environments and that cultural awareness is now an important element for success. But this implication is real: lack of cultural understanding will undermine future combat operations.

### **Military Cultural Education**

The army has developed a cultural awareness program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In it, students are asked to discuss fundamental ethical problems, explain their answers, explain their explanations, and then dissect their reasoning once again (Fichtner, 2006). This new army program suggests that better cultural awareness and ethical climate actually contributes to its organizational success by enhancing a better understanding among leaders and their subordinates. These courses reinforce research by exploring relationships among cultures,

ethical considerations, and conflict success.

This program is the start point of new doctrine. However, other models are necessary to achieve the warranted results. Expanding this educational base by stimulating cultural awareness from the start of Soldiers' careers in the military is fundamental. The military should expose Soldiers to case studies and models early in their training. Gardenswartz and Rowe (1998) suggest that awareness of culture, history and its impact, perspective, stereotyping, bias, and tolerance, must be included in the cultural education for the beginner, proficient and advanced (p. 164).

### Conclusion

The U.S. military lags in cultural awareness education for its members and it should move at a rapid pace to remedy this situation. Current conflicts demonstrate the need to educate Soldiers from the beginning of their military careers. Cultural, educational awareness must include the definition of culture, cultural competency, differences in culture and their implications, and what the army is doing to mitigate this problem. The military should learn from previous mistakes and should not circumvent this issue. And if the military does not understand its own culture, it may find it difficult to understand others.

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# Recruiting in New York City During the 9/11 Era

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## Abstract

The ethics of recruiters are tested on a daily basis due to the nature of the job, but after the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 recruiters' ethics were pushed to the limits. After the attacks on our country there were thousands of civilians living in America who wanted to join the military to protect our freedom and our way of life, but many did not meet the entrance qualifications. While Americans mourned the deaths of over three thousand people who died during the 9/11 attacks, the military prepared for war. Many recruiters believe that not being able to attain their quotas in a time of war can impact the battlefield. As a result, to serve our country in the best way possible is to put as many people in the Army to dominate the combat zone.

## September 11, 2001

While attending the Advanced Non Commissioned Officer Course (AN-COC) on September 11, 2001, two airplanes crashed into the World Trade Center (WTC) and one aircraft torpedoed into the Pentagon. We must not forget the heroes of the fourth aircraft, Flight 93, who took action by overpowering the terrorists and forcing the aircraft to crash away from its intended target, the United States Capitol. I was in my room when my brother, who worked in the World Trade Center, called me to tell me that a plane had crashed into the (WTC), and because he was running late he was not in the building. He also mentioned that he was supposed to meet my wife for breakfast earlier in a coffee shop under the WTC, but my wife canceled the night before. By this time I had turned the television on and was watching one of the buildings on fire. My brother was standing outside when he started yelling that a rocket had just hit the other building, at the same time I was watching it on TV. The newscaster was reporting that a second plane had just hit the other building and I relayed that to my brother. As we were watching the buildings on fire and I was repeating what was being reported on TV, I watched in horror as one of the buildings began collapsing and the call with my brother was disconnected. I repeatedly tried to call back but all circuits were busy, and I could no longer reach my brother. By this time my class had already started and I ran into the academic building, straight into my classroom to inform everyone of the situation. We huddled around the television after my instructor turned it on, and to our dismay the second building went down. We saw everyone in the city running from the smoke and debris that was

chasing them through the streets. I could not get in contact with my brother so I thought he was buried alive or hurt in the road. To make a long story short, my brother ran for cover inside a building until it was deemed safe to come out. For the duration of ANCOG, approximately four more weeks, Fort Lee stayed on high alert and the members of my class had to guard the Garrison Commander's Headquarters.

### **Returning to New York City**

The first day at the recruiting station, after my return from ANCOG, I witnessed an unusual amount of civilians inquiring about enlisting in the Army. The station commander mentioned that people were extremely upset about the terrorist attacks and they wanted to join the Army. He told me to take time to go see the activities that were transpiring at the site of the World Trade Center. I was driving my government vehicle to the site and I noticed hundreds of American Flags hanging from window sills, cars and buildings. I was getting a sense of the patriotism that the city was undergoing and the support of all the service members in the military. As I approached downtown New York City, police cars, government vehicles and construction vehicles were behind guarded police barricades. I'm sure that they let me through because I looked like I was on official business, because I was in Class B's with awards, and driving a government vehicle. I was permitted to go as far as my vehicle would allow, and from there I walked through the rubble to the center of the devastation. Dust, smoke, debris, and especially death lingered in the air, and there was a tremendous sense of despair on everyone's face. Men clearing metal from the ground, welders taking apart the building structure, and construction vehicles moving, but not a word could be heard. It was as if everyone separated themselves from reality and was working on a project that had nothing to do with the attack. My station commander knew that I needed to see the site for myself so I would have an understanding on the feelings that New Yorkers were going through. I took the rest of the day off and proceeded to go home and get a sense of how my wife was feeling. Anger, resentment, hatred, and sadness were just a few emotions that she was experiencing.

### **Recruiting during the Aftermath**

The next day I was prepared to stay late and break records by doubling my quota for the month, and do my part to contribute to The Global War on Terrorism. After the first five walk-ins I realized that a large number of applicants entering the station were not qualified to join the Army. Many of them were illegal immigrants who wanted to defend the country they were living in. These applicants naturally assumed that we would waive certain criteria's because we were at war, and those who wanted to volunteer would be allowed to enter. The ethical dilemma would come in when applicants who were a couple of pounds overweight; couple pounds too light; an unpaid ticket; or admitted they had asthma at one year old, and other disqualifiers that seem minute when you are a country at war. Do I send the applicants with weight problems to the Military

Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) to join the Army and let the doctors decide whether to ignore the weight problem or disqualify them? If a young, strong, well educated man says he wants to join the Infantry and fight for his country, but his mother told him that when he was one year old the doctor told her that he has asthma, do I start to probe him to see if he has any symptoms? Tell him not to tell anyone else because he can be disqualified? The obvious answer is “no.” As a Soldier I must abide by the rules and regulations governed by the Army and I am bound by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). My point is that the answer is not as easy when you are placed in the position of a recruiter who loves his country and wants to do whatever it takes to help his fellow comrades on the battlefield. Does the end justify the means? For example, if a recruiter assists an applicant to join the Army by not disclosing information that would disqualify that person, and that same individual saves someone’s life on the battlefield, does that justify that recruiter’s action? Of course we would say “no,” but what if the life that was saved was your son or daughter? Would it justify it now? Maybe, it is just a little bit harder to say “no” now. Let me go a bit further, if the person who saved your child’s life was two pounds overweight when he joined, but since has lost five pounds and he is 100% eligible, how easy is it to say “no,” he should not have joined? What if the applicant was not heavy enough and since joining he or she had gained five pounds and met all the criteria to join the Army? Also, the same person became an interrogator and extracted vital information pertaining to a bombing attack on the United States Army Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA), that saves the lives of hundreds of Soldiers and civilians. Make sure you include your life and your significant other’s life came to see you on the day the bombing was supposed to take place. Is it still easy to say “no,” the recruiter’s actions are not justified? Recruiting in Harlem New York was not an easy assignment because there were many applicants who were not qualified due to law infractions, lack of education, no residency or citizenship, and raising a child on their own. This is another factor that made it even more of an ethical dilemma when an applicant came in with a minor infraction of the eligibility criteria. This is not a hit on anyone who lived in Harlem because these were the same individuals who were knocking the station’s door down trying to join the Army in order to defend our great country. I was born in the slums of New York and watched my mother struggle to raise three of her children without my father. I am not trying to pass judgment on any race, creed or social class, but growing up in hardship gives me firsthand knowledge on living in a poor environment and the day to day struggles. I just wanted to bring out some of the ethical dilemmas that a recruiter faced every day, but on a larger scale during a time of war.

### **Conclusion**

The pressure for the station commander and the field recruiter to meet their quota was enormous during that time, and when you did not meet your numbers you felt as if you let your country and Soldiers down. This is not an admission of any wrong doing on my part or any recruiters whom I knew, but as a patriot



to our country I cannot say that it never came across my mind. There were many people who I felt had insignificant disqualifiers who could have helped my fellow Soldiers in the front lines, but because it would be a bigger scandal for a Soldier to lie, and without our belief and discipline, we would just be another organization in a corrupt society. These ethical dilemmas were not new to recruiters, but what was new was the horrific terrorist attack on the United States that affected the lives of individuals throughout the world.

# Argumentative Essays

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History, Theory, and Doctrine

The Importance of Cultural Understanding in Military Operations

Failure to Achieve Cultural Awareness and its Defeating Effects

Special Forces Successful Incorporating Counterinsurgency Tactics in Afghanistan

Unprepared Military During the Outbreak of Hostilities

# History, Theory, and Doctrine

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## Abstract

The art of war cannot succeed unless you first reflect on past successes and failures. Drawing conclusions about the past and formulating theories for future conflicts is imperative if we are to excel in developing doctrine for future use. The United States Army must learn from past battles, conflicts, constabulary actions, and wars if we are to maintain our position as a superior, deadly, global force. Applying what we learn in a fluid environment is sometimes tricky. However, over time there are certain constants incorporated in doctrine that we must adhere to if we are to gain the upper hand and achieve success on the battlefield.

## History, Theory, and Doctrine

Throughout military history, great leaders and warriors have had examples or tried and true methods to base their decisions on when it came time to applying tactics in battle. Many times these decisions evolved from a historical battle, personal experience, or doctrine derived from theories put into practice. We can learn and apply many Soldier battle skills if we study and learn from past military operations. In order to formulate effective doctrine, the United States Army (USA) must study and understand military history and at the same time ask the question, “What if...?”

## History

The USA throughout history has worn many hats. We have worn the hat of battle, the hat of constable, and the hat of peace. Immediately following the Civil War, we removed our battle hat and put on our hat of peace, reaching out to the South and helping them to rebuild their homes, businesses, farms, and in general helped them put their lives back together. At times during reconstruction of the South, we had to change hats and put on our constable hat to quell violence or settle disputes. It was a trying time for our country, but especially trying for our military. Constabulary actions were outside of the Army’s usual doctrine of war. Because of these changes in applied theory for the Army, Soldiers now had to adapt to new methods of dealing with civilians as opposed to wartime enemies.

As time passed and our nation began to grow, expansion to the West became inevitable. Many unanswered questions arose as discussions turned into application of actions. Who in our country, and how would our country monitor or control this westward expansion? What challenges lie ahead for us as a nation

and how would we deal with or overcome the inevitable obstacles? Scouts, trappers, and glory-seekers came back from the West with wild stories about savage Indians. If our country was to progress west, certainly trouble awaited us on our journey.

The only answer for all of these issues was for the USA to once again bear the brunt of this expansion by entering into a constabulary action with the Indian tribes of the West.

### *The Indian Wars, 1865-1898*

The Indian Wars fall in a period of our history spanning from 1865-1898, referred to as the Constabulary Years (Birtle, 2004). The Indian Wars were not really defined or declared wars as we understand war, but rather were a case of settlers encroaching on land that the Indians lived on for centuries. There were no real battle lines or fronts because the area involved spanned from the Canadian border south to Mexico and from settlements in the southeast westward to yet unknown boundaries (Stewart, 2005).

Once again, as in the past, the U.S. Army began imposing the will of our government on the often-nomadic Indian tribes of the West. The Army's job was to pacify and attempt to convince the indigenous people of the West that we, the new white settlers, wanted to get along with the tribes. The Army quickly learned that this would not be an easy task. Unlike the mostly sedentary Eastern woodland tribes, the Indians of the Western Plains were nomadic hunter-gatherers, conditioned to the hardships of long treks and uncertain food supplies. They also possessed an uncanny knowledge of the terrain and mobility that permitted them to escape easily and avoid pursuit or discovery (Birtle, 2004).

To complicate matters even more, Congressional cuts reduced the size of the Army to 27,442 in 1874. Now the Army had to cover the vastness of the West with fewer Soldiers, which exacerbated the situation. The Army could not rely on lessons learned from past actions because the battlefield environment was drastically different from anything they had ever experienced.

### *Effective Tactics*

As the Army moved west to aid and protect new settlers, the overwhelming task that lay before them became reality. The Army established 116 Posts on the new frontier but was only able to staff these posts with skeleton crews. This made them susceptible to attack from Indians and made life difficult.

As time wore on, Soldiers began to adapt to the new surrounding and study the ways of the Indians. The Army had no formal documentation from fighting Eastern Indians, so applying developed doctrine from theory was not feasible. The Soldiers had to rely on the experience of senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and officers to learn tactics and methods for fighting this elusive enemy. The Army never developed a formal doctrine for Indian warfare, but rather combined conventional and unconventional techniques. They discovered that if they, the Army, could destroy or severely cripple the Indians social or economic resources, the Indians would have to negotiate a peace settlement through a treaty. The Army applied these tactics during winter when the Indians were isolated in

their villages. Once the Army found a village, it was a simple matter to muster a pre-dawn attack. This tactic was extremely successful, partially because the Indians did not post night guards.

The Army also learned to travel lighter. Rather than carry several weeks worth of goods in wagons, mules would carry enough supplies for a few days. The mules traveled much faster and were less troublesome than a wagon thus enabling Soldiers to cover more ground in the vastness of the West. These newly applied techniques or theories coupled with historically proven methods, allowed the Army to achieve success on a battlefield that was not only new, but also extremely harsh. In 1859, Captain Randolph Marcy, under the authority of the War Department, published *The Prairie Traveler* as a guidebook for Soldiers and Western Emigrants. It was a manual describing the ways and means of traveling across the Great Plains. This book, as well as other books began to reveal to uneducated Easterners, the mysteries of the West, in particular the habits of Western Indians and their cultural differences.

Eventually, the Indians were subdued. The last battle was in October 1898. Treaties became law and Indians began living on reservations where they learned the ways of the white man.

### **The Philippine War, 1899-1902**

Shortly after the Indian Wars, the Army had good success at nation building in Cuba and Puerto Rico. When Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States (US) in 1898, the only city the Army actually controlled was the Capital City, Manila (Birtle, 2004). Filipino revolutionaries controlled the remainder of the islands and did not want to give up control to the US government. The revolutionaries surrounded Manila and started an uprising inside the city of Manila. The Philippine war had begun; a war that would last over three years, cost \$400 million, and record more than 7000 casualties.

#### *Applying Lessons Learned*

Under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo, the revolutionaries initially opted to fight a conventional war. This was a short-lived tactic as the Army crushed Aguinaldo's Armies and forced them to retreat into the mountains. The Army was again in the position of having to track down, roundup, and subdue an indigenous people against their will. The Filipinos wanted independence and the freedom to live their own way of life.

As Army leadership began to study and understand the situation in the Philippines, some similarities began to emerge from the Indian Wars. The Filipinos began to deploy hit and run guerrilla warfare tactics. The Filipinos were also able to use the locals in various functions to assist Aguinaldo. Filipino leaders did not hope to defeat the Americans militarily, but wanted to undermine their will to continue the fight. In 1899, Brigadier General Theodore Schwan wrote that the Filipinos are in much the same position that the Indians were for years, and as such, we should subdue them in the same way, by convincing conquest and then win them by fair and just treatment (Birtle, 2004). In order to accom-

plish this, the Army must demonstrate adaptability and use irregular warfare in much the same way as they did with the Indians.

#### *Adapt and Overcome*

One such method was to conduct small unit constabulary operations from dispersed posts. Using this tactic, units could adapt methods for their particular battle space. Leaders also realized they must keep the locals separated from the militants as much as possible. Using these two methods in conjunction, the goal was to hit the militants hard and frequently which reduced the enemy's ability to rest and rearm. These methods worked well in the Indian Wars, but met with limited success in the Philippines.

As in the Indian Wars, part of the pacification plan involved attraction policies. The United States began building schools, roads, and upgrading living conditions for the locals. The people began to understand that the US wanted to help them succeed in their everyday life. As the militants began to diminish, the local populace saw marked improvements in their lives. Living conditions improved and the United States was slowly but surely winning the hearts and minds of the Filipino People.

#### **Conclusion**

United States Soldiers did a remarkable job in the Indian Wars and the Philippines. When you consider the obstacles and the difficulty of these missions and then realize the pressures of limited supplies, untrained Soldiers, and the vastness of the battle areas, it is amazing they did so well. The Army officer effectively recognized historical similarities and applied this experience to develop theory and later doctrine to subdue and pacify indigenous people in the Indian and Philippine Wars. Without competent NCOs to carry out implied and directed tasks, success is unlikely. NCOs throughout history have and will continue to lead the way in battle. They will always adapt and overcome. In order to formulate effective doctrine, Army officers and NCOs must continue to study and understand military history and continue to ask "What if...?"

# The Importance of Cultural Understanding in Military Operations

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## Abstract

This essay explores the importance of military forces achieving cultural understanding in order to attain strategic goals in their area of operations. The study compares the United States Army's failures in the post-Civil War south during reconstruction and their success in pacifying the Moros during the Philippine insurrection. The reasons for failure were an inability to understand the cultural environment in which they were operating and a lack of preparedness in dealing with the monumental task of rebuilding a country. The successful operations against the Moros were directly linked to an understanding of the cultural view of the use of force and its proper application in the area of operations. The study concludes that the success of military operations in the contemporary operating environment is dependent upon achieving cultural understanding in the area of operations.

## The Importance of Cultural Understanding in Military Operations

Throughout its history, the United States Army has spent the majority of its time in the performance of either post-combat military operations or operations other than war. The success or failure of these operations is dependent upon Soldiers and leaders achieving a cultural understanding of their operating environment. The majority of doctrine and organization literature focuses on conventional battlefield tactics and strategy and often overlooks this vital area. Cultural understanding aids in attaining military goals by providing a frame of reference for the dynamics of the operating environment. Understanding local customs, demographics, hierarchy, and social norms are key to effective post-conflict rebuilding and reconstruction efforts. Failure to achieve cultural understanding will derail operations and feed dissent among the populace, creating a breeding ground for insurgent activities. Soldiers, as the point of the spear and those most able to gauge the pulse of the people, must achieve cultural understanding to achieve success.

Many years of these types of operations have provided lessons learned for Soldiers and leaders to draw upon. An examination of failures in the post-Civil War south and the success of pacifying the Moros in the Philippines demonstrate the impact of cultural understanding on post-conflict operations and operations other than war. In the first, the failure of Soldiers and leaders to fully under-

stand the culture of the south, aided by a lack of training and a volatile political atmosphere, derailed reconstruction efforts and had national strategic implications for almost 100 years. The second demonstrates how Soldiers understood the Moro culture and used a policy of chastisement to successfully pacify them. While these two studies differ, most notably because the former was a police action against Americans, they illustrate how success or failure depends on cultural understanding at the tactical level.

In the aftermath of the Civil War, an occupation force of 200,000 federal troops took up station as the main source of law and order in the defeated south. (McPherson, 2001, p. 533) The army placed the south under martial law and established military courts to deal with lawlessness and set about providing humanitarian aid and rebuilding and restoring the region. Military commanders took on additional roles as administrators at the local and state level, with Soldiers providing critical functions in law enforcement and civil support operations. The Soldiers also found themselves as the lead in enforcing the abolition of slavery and monitoring the inculcation of former slaves into the southern society. This task proved difficult for the force, due to the lack of training and the explosive political atmosphere, but mostly because of a lack of cultural understanding of both the southern people and of the former slaves. The Southern Public saw in the federal Soldiers a constant reminder of the humiliation they had endured by defeat. The Soldiers failed to grasp the deepness of this resentment, as well as the long held view of the black race, but more importantly failed to understand that the freed slaves became “surrogate victims of attacks by southerners who did not dare assault the real symbols of their humiliation, Yankee Soldiers.” (McPherson, 2001, p. 534-535)

The Soldiers were unable to deal with the challenges facing them in the south during reconstruction. The abolition of slavery had irrevocably alienated southern public support, and the sudden introduction of over 4,000,000 former slaves into a social structure that did not want them increased the burden on the occupation force. The political overtones of this environment were not important to the Soldiers, but a basic understanding of these divisions and their impact in establishing a self reliant post-war society by their leaders would have aided them in the accomplishment of their mission. In reality, the majority of Soldiers made little effort to understand the social and cultural norms of the south, resigning themselves to stay neutral and merely survive the ordeal of their assignment. The failure to act, except in extreme circumstances and under orders, created an environment where the freed slaves felt betrayed and the defiant southerners felt emboldened, further making the task of reconciliation and reconstruction difficult. (Foner, 1988, p. 432-433) A darker aspect of occupation duties was the enticement of Soldiers to forage and loot without authorization as well as other acts of petty criminality that further alienated the southern population. (Birtle, 2004, p. 27) Further, Soldiers detested this type of assignment because it was difficult, unrewarding, and highly political. (Birtle, 2004, p. 48) The Soldiers’ inability to deal with these challenges was a result of a failure to prepare and an overall dislike of occupation duties that led to actions that further complicated their mission.



The failure to grasp cultural understanding had strategic implications. Most notable was the impact the Soldiers' actions had on southern public opinion, but the failure to embrace the needs and goals of the freed slaves aided in creating a sense of hopelessness in blacks. It also helped create a social structure that effectively kept blacks relegated to a lower class destitute of civil rights in the majority of the south through the 1950s and 60s. Army officials and the Soldiers in charge of helping the freed slaves in achieving economic independence, land ownership, and social mobility did not view them much more favorably than the southern population. In fact, "most army officials in charge of wartime labor relations assumed that the emancipated slaves should remain as plantation laborers." (Foner, 1988, p. 58) When the former slaves refused to embrace plantation labor as a viable economic option, it created a sense of failure among the military leaders, who incorrectly attributed it to laziness on the part of the black race. Southerners capitalized on this, using it as justification to enact harsh vagrancy laws to force labor onto plantations. The end result was a series of legislative measures throughout the south that made it almost impossible for blacks to rise above menial farm labor and led to the oppression of black civil rights in the south for almost 100 years. Military leaders had intended plantation labor as a means for freed slaves to enter into the labor market, but they failed to understand the deeply held aversion to this form of labor that was the byproduct of a culture enslaved under similar conditions for over 400 years. The failure of leaders and Soldiers to embrace the cultural impact of their efforts, coupled with the incorrect assumptions based on racial stereotypes led to an oppressive environment that had long lasting implications in the white and black society.

Lessons from the U.S. Army's failures to grasp cultural understanding in the post-war south proved important to later operations. In the early part of the twentieth century, American forces found themselves attempting to instill a democratic government in the Philippines, a country composed of many different tribes that had suffered oppressive rule at the hands of the Spanish. Initial experimentation with benevolent acts and conciliatory measures resulted in increased insurgent activities and attacks on Soldiers. The Moros, an extremely violent warrior tribe, were responsible for the most serious activity and became the focus of the American effort. Astute leaders realized that understanding the Moro culture would provide the means to pacify and stabilize the country.

The American Soldier quickly learned that a policy of attraction would not solve the problems facing them in the growing insurgency. Leaders realized that the Moro people "regarded American leniency as weakness and were overawed by the guerrilla's ability to strike down their foes." (Birtle, 2004, p. 127) In light of this realization, American forces adopted a policy aimed at burning crops and villages, concentrating the indigenous population, destroying the enemy's logistical bases, and punishing the hostile population. Soldiers and leaders understood that their enemy viewed violence and the application of force as strengths to be respected and admired, and used this understanding to form a doctrine that the Soldiers ruthlessly enforced. The new policy proved effective in crushing the Moro insurgents, and within a little more than a year had

resulted in the surrender of one major guerrilla commander after another, and the installation of a civilian government in the Philippines. (Birtle, 2004, p. 132) The American's ability to understand the Moro culture enabled the successful application of force to meet the desired goal.

While the unrestrained use of force against enemy supply bases and civilian supporters proved crucial, it was not solely responsible for American success in the Philippines. Force broke the back of the resistance, but positive measures undermined it and helped reconcile the insurgents to their defeat. (American Military History, Vol. 1, 2004, p. 359) Soldiers and leaders realized that a single policy of coercion or benevolence would not be completely successful in pacifying the region. Successful operations relied on a mix of force and good works derived from an understanding of the culture in which the force was operating. Looking back, it is clear that benevolence only became a viable option once American forces made "war distressing and hopeless on the one hand and by making peace attractive." (Birtle, 2004, p. 135) American Soldiers transitioned back to building infrastructure and other peaceful nation building operations to demonstrate that once the insurgents submitted they would have a stable society in which to re-enter.

Cultural understanding is vital to post-conflict military operations. The U.S. Army's failure to grasp the cultural intricacies of the post-war south resulted in actions that did much to derail reconstruction efforts. Soldiers and leaders did not understand the deep-seated resentment that the southern population harbored, nor were they trained and prepared for the multitude of administrative functions that reconstruction required. Occupation duty in the south was less than ideal and thankless duty in a highly political atmosphere where the defeated white population despised them and the black population thought they could solve every problem. This no-win situation created a sense of apathy among the Soldiers that reinvigorated southern defiance and stifled reconstruction efforts. In contrast, American forces, through trial and error, used cultural understanding to their advantage in the Philippine insurrection. They learned that the application of force and coercion would make war unbearable and smother support for the insurgency. This understanding also enabled Soldiers to use the one thing that in the Moro culture invoked respect and admiration. Soldiers transitioned to benevolence after the application of force to make the pill of defeat easier to swallow, and this combination resulted in a swifter transition to a civilian government and mission accomplishment.

### **Conclusion**

Cultural understanding dictates the relationship between the populace, the government, and the military force. History shows that rarely does a strict policy of chastisement or attraction work on its own merit. The most successful operations are the result of a mixture of these approaches based on an understanding of the culture and society of a specific area of operations. Soldiers must understand cultural dynamics and their impacts. Knowing the culture enables the proper application of measures that will build confidence among

the population, instill security, deprive insurgents of safe havens, and ultimately achieve strategic goals. A small miscue at the tactical level can have devastating and far-reaching effects on strategic operations. Most importantly, understanding the cultural domain is vital to success and is not solely the realm of the strategic leader. Cultural understanding by Soldiers is a force multiplier that is the key to successful post-conflict operations.

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## **Failure to Achieve Cultural Awareness and its Defeating Effects**

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### **Failure to Achieve Cultural Awareness and its Defeating Effects**

Throughout military history, it has been important for military forces to have a thorough understanding of the local culture and its customs within their area of operations. This understanding, or lack of, contributes directly to the success or failure of the mission. Additionally, failure to be cognizant of local customs and culture is shown to be a direct contributor to any mounting insurgency. Achieving a cultural understanding of the indigenous inhabitants can have a direct effect on the military's ability to lead a successful campaign as seen in US actions in both the Philippines and Vietnam.

The role of people in war is one that is often overlooked. Quite often, military commanders see victory as simply defeat of the conventional enemy forces and holding the ground at the end of the day. An early recognition of the importance of people in warfare came in the writings of Carl Von Clausewitz, a Prussian General. Clausewitz wrote the theory of the Trinity which stated that warfare consisted of three aspects: the people, the commander of the military, and the government (Bassford, 2003). His theory held that any plan that didn't include all three of these aspects would ultimately fail (Bassford, 2003). This theory has a direct relationship to achieving a cultural understanding. By failing to realize the importance of the local people in any military operation, their culture and customs get largely ignored. This in turn can lead to anger and resentment towards the military force and quite likely, fuel an insurgency. Even though this theory was written by Clausewitz in the early 1800's it was often overlooked. In fact, prior to the American debacle in Vietnam, no one writing in English had paid any serious attention to the trinity (Bassford, 2003).

The involvement of the American Army in Vietnam is a strong example of a military failing to achieve cultural understanding of a people caught up in its operations. When the U.S. Army came to Vietnam, it was at a time when the country had just gained its independence after 70 years of French rule and was struggling to modernize a very traditional population (Fitzgerald, 1972, pg. 5). At the time, few realized that our involvement would span nearly ten years and cost billions of dollars (pg. 3). The people of Vietnam are very rooted in tradition and hold their family and the land they live on as some of the most important things in their lives. There were numerous failures on our part to understand and embrace this part of their culture. One example can be seen in our construction

of free fire zones so that our artillery could engage the enemy. In one such event in 1968, Soldiers were evacuating the people from a village in the Quang Nam Province (pg. 9). During this evacuation, one of the villagers refused to leave because he was the only one left to protect the land of his ancestors (pg. 10). Ultimately his refusal to leave would result in his death by artillery fire. Policies such as this pried at the heart of the people, as it completely ignored some of the most important values in their culture.

Another example of our ignoring the value they place on land can be seen in Operation Cedar Falls. This operation began on 8 January 1967 with the objective of destroying enemy forces in Military District Four (Center of Military History, 2005, pg. 316). During this operation, US Forces surrounded, forcibly evacuated, and destroyed the village of Ben Suc (pg. 316). Numerous other hamlets were also evacuated during this operation however, most of the Viet Cong escaped (pg 316). In yet another incident, this one criminal, US Forces who had endured numerous casualties from enemy snipers and booby traps, entered the village of My Lai and killed approximately 200 civilians (pg. 349). While these types of incidents examine only one aspect of the Vietnamese culture it is an extremely important one. The people as a whole highly valued their land and our failure to find other methods to defeat the enemy without removing the population from the land served to build resentment of the US forces. This as well as other failures to understand the culture of Vietnam fueled the insurgency within the country and pushed the population into the arms of the forces we were trying to protect them from.

Similar failures to understand culture can be seen in the incidents involving the US Army on the Philippine Island of Mindanao. From the time we landed there, the Army Soldiers were resented for their religion, manners, and appearance (Course Reader 2, pg. 167). The Moros, the local population, assumed they would be just like the Europeans who had come before them (pg. 167). The Taft administration in Manila wanted to bring modern conveniences to the Moros (pg. 167). While we desired to modernize these people, unlike Vietnam, we tried to preserve their cultural heritage. Brigadier General Davis, the military commander for US Forces on Mindanao, was aware of the Moro's culture and felt that any change brought to them should be done slowly and not rely primarily on force. Major General Chafee, Commander of the Division of the Philippines, wrote that the Army should govern the Moros with patience and understanding, not interfering with their customs or religion (pg. 168).

Early on, as the Army began to work on a road lining the Port of Iligan to the North Coast of Mindanao Course Reader 2 (pg. 168). Despite our initial intent not to use force to pacify the locals, the situation rapidly deteriorated. In the Spring of 1902, the Moros began to attack and kill American Soldiers causing Captain Pershing to conduct a punitive expedition to punish and pacify the locals (pg. 168). This approach was temporarily effective at pacifying the Moros (g. 168). Meanwhile, Major Bullard and his unit took up the responsibility of constructing the road (pg. 169). While constructing the road, Major Bullard worked to improve relations with the Moros by showing them how to boil water

to prevent illness, passed out quinine and other medical aid, and even employed thousands of Moros to work on the road (pg. 170). While not all Moros were peaceful at this time, a majority seemed to embrace the peaceful offerings of Major Bullard. This effort to understand and embrace the culture may have been successful had it not been for additional punitive expeditions lead by Captain Pershing. Unknown to Major Bullard, Captain Pershing's expeditions were not over, just delayed and in spring of 1903, Captain Pershing launched an expedition to destroy a hostile Moros settlement (pg. 170). Shortly after, the situation would deteriorate and more violence would occur (pg. 171).

Ultimately, the Moros would be pacified by force, not cultural understanding. While the Army's intentions early on seemed sincere, an unbalanced use of force to punish any aggressive groups preyed upon the warrior like culture of the Moro's and made them more defiant to the Army's presence. Like Vietnam, a general desire to help the locals by brining them modern ways only served to uproot their culture. As a result, both actions would suffer a tragic insurgency. These examples of the military ignoring the culture and applying force to the wrong places directly affected the Army's ability to wage a campaign. As the US Marine Corps Warfighting Publications asserts, sometimes the more force is used, the less effective it is (Richards and Vandergriff, 2008, pg. 56). With insurgencies being a reality of modern conflicts, there is much we can learn from these earlier experiences of our Army. Maintaining a cultural understanding of indigenous people and working to help them achieve what they want, not what we think they should want, will be a crucial part of any future operations. If we are to be successful as an Army, we must learn to embrace cultural awareness in our operations. After all, in the types of conflicts we are likely to be engaged in, the struggle is not to defeat another military but to establish a government that the vast majority of the people will find to be legitimate (Richards and Vandergriff, 2008, pg. 56).

### Conclusion

In conclusion, as we have discussed above, quite often it is a lack of cultural awareness about the local population that contributes to and fuels the insurgency. Evidence of this can be seen in our failures to understand culture in both Vietnam and the Philippines. The lessons learned in these campaigns are very relevant to situations we face today in Iraq and Afghanistan. Developing an atmosphere of cultural awareness can have a direct impact on not only these but future campaigns as well.

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# Special Forces Successful Incorporating Counterinsurgency Tactics in Afghanistan

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## Abstract

The United States military caught completely unawares by the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 needed to respond with action to appease the national will of the U.S. people. Although a relatively small force in the onset of Operation Enduring Freedom, U.S. Special Forces succeeded in its counterinsurgency campaign against the Taliban by educating themselves on lessons learned; disciplined application of force; and collaborating with the Northern Alliance. Special Forces units participating in OEF understood the necessity of disciplined applications of force when combating the Taliban. Special Forces units succeeded in their counterinsurgency campaign by working with the Northern Alliance, not against them. Special Forces units learned from the mistakes made by U.S. forces in the Victorio Campaign incorporating cultural awareness, bringing the fight to the insurgents, and operating with Afghan military units to accomplish U.S. objectives in the beginnings of OEF.

## Special Forces Successful Incorporating Counterinsurgency Tactics in Afghanistan

In 2001, the United States military was largely a peacetime force experienced in peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance missions. The military had not fought a large-scale engagement since 1991, during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and had undergone a drawdown of massive proportions following that conflict. Additionally, the U.S. military still trained using unrealistic scenarios facing off against a mythical superpower. Although service men and women served admirably in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and numerous other locations worldwide, they were not prepared to fight a war against terrorists. The U.S. military caught completely unawares by the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 needed to respond with action to appease the national will of the U.S. people.

The U.S. government turned its attention to the small country of Afghanistan. The Taliban, the operating government at the time, harbored terrorists within the borders of Afghanistan. Additionally, the terrorists who attacked the U.S. on September 11, 2001 had trained in Afghanistan for their mission. The Taliban refused to meet President George Bush's demands to turn over the leader of the Al-Qaeda terrorist group, Osama Bin Laden, and Bush gave the world an



ultimatum for how the U.S. would handle nation-states harboring terrorists. “The Taliban must turn over al-Qaeda organization living within Afghanistan and must destroy the terrorist camps. And they must do so, otherwise there will be a consequence” (Asian Political News, 2001, para. 4).

Immediately after determining Al Qaeda was responsible for the terrorist attacks, the U.S. military began staging its forces in neighboring Uzbekistan for a possible invasion of Afghanistan. This was a unique force called Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – North (CJSOTF-N). CJSOTF-N comprised of 5<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group, 160<sup>th</sup> Special Operations Aviation Regiment, other elements from U.S. Special Operations Command, and a battalion from the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division. The CJSOTF-N commander, Col. John Mulholland, planned and executed the opening engagements in the Global War on Terrorism, thus launching a war against extremists that started more than seven years ago. Mulholland pinned the success of the entire operation on counterinsurgency tactics. These counterinsurgency tactics disrupted the Taliban’s military forces and won the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. Although a relatively small force at the onset of Operation Enduring Freedom, U.S. Special Forces succeeded in its counterinsurgency campaign against the Taliban by educating themselves; disciplined application of force; and collaborating with the Northern Alliance.

### **Special Forces Units Avoided Mistakes Made in Previous Counterinsurgency Campaigns**

One reason for the success of the CJSOTF-N units in the early phases of Operation Enduring Freedom was they avoided mistakes made in previous counterinsurgency campaigns. U.S. Special Forces practice counterinsurgency operations in every mission they undergo. It is part of their doctrine, and the reason Special Forces units are so successful with counterinsurgency operations is due to their emphasis on understanding the history of counterinsurgency operations. The U.S. Army field manual on counterinsurgency recognizes the expertise of Special Operations forces in counterinsurgency techniques by stating they are the subject matter experts in training and advising foreign armed forces (Counterinsurgency, 2006). Since the creation of the Office of Strategic Services, the forefathers of today’s Special Operations units, one of their core tasks has been working with foreign nation militaries and populace. This is a critical component of counterinsurgency tactics and one the U.S. military recognized over 70 years ago as necessary when fighting an insurgency. The U.S. Special Forces trained and fought using counterinsurgency tactics since its inception in the early 1960s. This focus also includes learning from past mistakes the U.S. military has made during counterinsurgency operations from as early as the Indian Wars in the 1880s. For example, U.S. Special Forces troops used horses and pack mules to move themselves and their supplies through the rough Afghanistan terrain much as the U.S. troops did in the Indian Wars. U.S. Special Forces traditionally adopt unusual tactics such as pack mules to better adapt to its sur-

roundings and to build rapport with the foreign nation militaries.

Necessity of Disciplined Applications of Force when Combating the Taliban

Additionally, CJSOTF-N understood applying appropriate force was paramount when fighting the Taliban. The U.S. military could not afford to hurt innocent Afghans when conducting combat operations in Afghanistan. Therefore, careful consideration was necessary when planning combat missions. Robert Kaplan in his article “Imperial Grunts” wrote that the U.S. military won in Afghanistan through a combination of technology and field craft. “It took fewer than 200 men on the ground from the Army’s 5<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group, in addition to CIA troops and Air Force Special Ops embeds, helped by the Afghan Northern Alliance and friendly Pashtoons (sic) to topple the Taliban regime” (Kaplan, 2005). Additionally, Mulholland gave his troops liberal license when determining what force to use in accomplishing their mission. This lack of micromanagement from multiple layers of command above CJSOTF-N allowed the Special Forces trooper on the ground to determine how to defeat his enemy. Kaplan noted that all the guidance the Special Forces trooper received was to figure out the details on his own as he went about his mission of supporting the Northern Alliance and the friendly Afghans in their battle to defeat the Taliban (Kaplan, 2005).

CJSOTF-N troopers needed to understand the amount of force necessary to defeat their enemy to follow counterinsurgency’s maxim of winning hearts and minds. One cannot win hearts and minds if the counterinsurgency is killing innocent foreign nationals haphazardly during operations. Kaplan wrote about how the Special Forces troopers on a combat patrol were carefully looking over intelligence papers trying not to wake up sleeping children in the same room. The rest of the force did not retaliate to having grenades thrown at them with equal or greater harm, but instead looked for the unexploded grenades outside and gathered information peacefully from the people in the compound (Kaplan, 2005). Other conventional forces may have fought fire with fire and thrown grenades into the compound in retaliation, thus destroying the intelligence they could have collected and angering the foreign populace. Ultimately, using the appropriate disciplined action against the Taliban worked for the Special Forces troops. They were able to accomplish their mission using the appropriate force for each particular mission.

### **Working with the Northern Alliance, Not Against Them**

At the onset of Operation Enduring Freedom, the counterinsurgency campaign worked well since CJSOTF-N troops understood they had to work with the Northern Alliance. Failing to work with them could have delayed combat operations for months and may have resulted in the national will of the U.S. turning against a retaliatory strike in Afghanistan. Mulholland understood the mission and knew his troops had the proper training to interact and ally with the Northern Alliance. The U.S. military originally predicted it would take two years to win the ground campaign in Afghanistan; the CJSOTF-N troops ac-

complished this goal in less than three months (Briscoe, 2003). Key to this success was the strong relationships between the small Special Forces Operational Detachments and their Northern Alliance allies. The Northern Alliance was not an organized fighting force, but rather a group of tribes united in their efforts to drive the Taliban out of Afghanistan. “Most of those leaders were Tajik, Uzbek, or Hazara” (Briscoe, 2003, p. 154). Pairing the Operational Detachments with these leaders was a precarious situation and it was not obviously clear how the relationships would work. However, since the Special Forces units specialize in training foreign forces this was an ideal situation for the U.S. military to exploit.

### **The Victorio Campaign**

The Special Forces units learned from past mistakes made by the U.S. Army in counterinsurgency campaigns. The Victorio campaign in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century provided numerous lessons learned that Special Forces units adopted when they prepared for combat in Afghanistan. Specifically, Special Forces units learned from the mistakes made by U.S. forces in the Victorio campaign incorporating cultural awareness, bringing the fight to the insurgents, and operating with Afghan military units to accomplish U.S. objectives in the beginnings of OEF.

Kendall Gott, the author of *In Search of an Elusive Enemy*, states today’s Special Forces units have much in common with the U.S. Army chasing Victorio in 1879 through 1880. Gott equates Victorio and his Indians to Bin Laden and al-Qaeda with the ease that both cross international borders to prevent U.S. military strikes (Gott, 2004). Though this comparison does exist, one can see how being culturally sensitive to the populace can assist today’s Special Forces troops in the fight against terror. By co-existing with the foreign populace, today’s Special Forces troops build a rapport and can use intelligence from the populace to determine if terrorists from other nations are launching strikes in Afghanistan. Additionally, today’s Special Forces troops built a trust with the Northern Alliance leaders that still exists. Therefore, they have many resources to use when attempting to block insurgent activity at the borders.

Gott also writes today’s terrorists in Afghanistan have the advantage of terrain. Terrorists use the harsh weather and barren, rocky terrain to their advantage when fighting the U.S. military (Gott, 2004). However, the U.S. military effectively uses its superior technology and firepower to its advantage. This lesson learned from the Victorio campaign leveled the playing field for the U.S. military. The Special Forces units successfully brought the fight to the enemy in Afghanistan, calling in airstrikes and using precision-guided munitions to leverage their technological advantage over a larger enemy force. These small units, partnered with Northern Alliance forces, were able to sway the balance of the ground war in the U.S. favor in a short period.

The final comparison between the Victorio campaign and the war in Afghanistan deals with the logistics. Gott wrote of the Victorio campaign, “Soldiers were a long way from home, and supplying them with food, forage, and ammunition was a constant endeavor across the vast tracts of the frontier” (Gott,

2004). Those words could be applied just as well to the war in Afghanistan. However, again the technological superiority of the U.S. military worked in its favor. Using airborne resupply, air insertions, satellite communications, and electronic mail, the Special Forces units were able to sustain their resources to keep the pressure on the Taliban. After the Taliban was defeated in the summer of 2002, there were numerous logistical support areas in Afghanistan to push supplies out to the troops on the ground.

Special Forces units used these lessons learned from the Victorio campaign to their advantage when fighting the Taliban. Special Forces units used their superior firepower and technology to smash the Taliban quickly, without regard to the terrain. Additionally, the Special Forces units learned to embrace the culture they operated in to establish better relations with the populace. Finally, Special Forces units kept and maintained a successful logistics chain capable of reinforcing themselves and their allies anytime and anywhere.

### **Conclusion**

The U.S. Special Forces won the first campaign in Afghanistan for the U.S. military. At no other time in history had the efforts of so few made such a difference in a war. Approximately 200 U.S. military forces allied themselves with an indigenous force and in three months conquered an enemy that by some estimates should have taken two years to defeat. Special Forces troops could not have accomplished this tremendous feat without applying lessons learned from previous counterinsurgency campaigns.

CJSOTF-N troops used lessons learned from the Victorio Campaign to defeat the Taliban in rapid succession. These Special Forces troops learned from previous U.S. Army mistakes in the 1879-1880 campaign by applying appropriate force against the enemy and using the harsh terrain to their advantage denying the Taliban a safe haven to flee. Additionally, the Special Forces troopers brought a piece of history with them using pack mules and horses to move quickly through the mountainous regions just as their predecessors had done more than 100 years before them. Finally, Special Forces troops used technology to their advantage ensuring their supplies could reach them no matter where they were in the world. These troops challenged the logistics system, but by using electronic mail, satellite communications and aerial resupply and insertions they always managed to get sufficient supplies for them and their allies.

The war on terrorism started with a monumental surprise attack against the U.S. The U.S. national will was high and retaliation against the terrorists who attacked was a must. The U.S. military could not have picked a better course of action than using the Special Forces units to win the opening salvo of the Global War on Terrorism. U.S. Special Forces units are masters of the counterinsurgency fight. These units became masters by learning from mistakes made in previous counterinsurgency campaigns and applying those lessons learned in combat. Though the Global War on Terrorism continues to this day, the U.S. Special Forces will continue to be a factor until the war is over.

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# Unprepared Military during the Outbreak of Hostilities

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## Abstract

Historical accounts from the Korean War reflect Army units were not prepared to conduct combat operations during initial stages of the conflict; in large part, due to unit readiness preceding the deployment. This was the case with the 24<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division stationed in Japan after World War II. Conversely, historical accounts from the Vietnam War show that despite the short time given to the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division to prepare its men for armed conflict the unit's actions during the Ia Drang Valley demonstrated the resolve of the American Soldier. Moreover, the policies of Washington apparently crippled some of the options Army leaders had to execute their wartime mission.

## Unprepared Military during the Outbreak of Hostilities

The world views the U.S. Army as one of most technological armies on the earth; however, U.S. Army units have been historically unprepared to perform their primary fighting function during initial stages of combat. This was the prevailing case of Task Force Smith. Poor training and the lack of equipment contributed greatly to the failure of this operation. However, an arrogant Army unit coupled with disregard for its enemy and high levels of complacency combine for a sure disaster. This was the case for Task Force Smith.

*Task Force Smith and the 24<sup>th</sup> Division: Delay and Withdrawal, 5-19 July 1950*

Task Force Smith, led by LTC Smith, consisted of members of the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 21<sup>st</sup> Infantry Regiment and members of the 52<sup>nd</sup> Field Artillery. The unit was performing occupation duty in Japan following World War II. Its primary mission was to occupy the island of Kyushu, Japan. Its secondary mission was to train. Most of the battalions in the division were under strength and ill equipped. Task Force Smith was representative of the same scenario. The unit did little training. Whenever training took place; it resorted to individual and some team and or squad level training. Additionally, the unit was under strength. The 21<sup>st</sup> Infantry regiment had only one battalion and a headquarters companies from the other two battalions. Most of the NCOs were combat veterans of World War II and officers in the grade of Lieutenant and above were rich in combat service. This proved invaluable during the delay and withdrawal of July 5, 1950. Con-

trary to the combat service of NCOs and officers, junior Soldiers were a mixed bag, mostly young Soldiers who had been lured into the Army by the G.I. Bill.

Another aspect of the failure of this operation was the lack of equipment. The unit had old worn equipment dating to World War II. The battalion lacked .30-caliber machine guns, spare machine-gun barrels, all of their 90-mm antitank guns, and many radios. When Task Force Smith assembled for its move to Korea, other units of the 21<sup>st</sup> Infantry regiment gave up weapons and equipment to fill the 1<sup>st</sup> battalion. According to Roy K. Flint, “when company K arrived in Korea a week later, it carried two 81-mm mortar base-plates and two tubes but no bipods or sights” (Flint, p. 274). He further accounts that, “the company had no recoilless rifles either; the jeep taken to Korea by the weapons platoon of company K was privately owned by one of the privates in the platoon” (Flint, p. 274).

Finally, and perhaps the most important factor that contributed to the failure of Task Force Smith was their complacency and arrogance. Most Soldiers, NCOs, and officers believed that going to war was impossible. They believed that the unit’s mission in the Island of Japan would not change and that garrison duty was in fact their primary mission. The unit suffered greatly as a result of this attitude. The other factor that affected the outcome of the first American battle in Korea was the unit’s arrogance. Again, NCOs and officers believed that North Korean Soldiers would retreat at the sight of American forces. They believed that their superiority was the key to win this fight. They thought that they would get it over with in little time and would be back to life in Japan as normal.

On 1 July 1950, Task Force Smith arrived in Korea, and at approximately 1100 it began moving north. Maj. Gen. Dean ordered LTC Smith to move his task force as far north of Osan as possible to stop the advancement of the North Korean Army. Once he arrived at the objective, LTC Smith ordered his unit to prepare for a defense. Task Force Smith positioned itself with B and C companies abreast and a platoon each covering the east and west flanks. LTC Smith placed his artillery battalion approximately two kilometers south of the defensive positions. On 5 July at approximately 0745 LTC Smith spotted elements of the North Korean Army’s 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division. The 4<sup>th</sup> ID had over 30 tanks and roughly two battalions of infantry Soldiers. LTC Smith called for indirect fire and began the attack on the 4<sup>th</sup> ID. The 4<sup>th</sup> ID endured the attack and broke through the defensive positions of Task Force Smith.

The North Korean’s response was so impressive that the American forces destroyed only four tanks and caused minimal losses. Conversely, the U.S. casualties numbered some 20 killed or injured; more importantly Task Force Smith lost its will to fight. Soldiers of Task Force Smith were shocked to see the North Korean’s resolve and dedication. No longer were the Soldiers under the assumption that North Koreans would run at the sight of American Soldiers. A sense of urgency began to settle-in. Task Force Smith’s leaders knew that the following actions would create history in America. At approximately 1145 hrs LTC Smith spotted the North Korean main. With North Korean Soldiers advancing on both flanks, ammunition running low, and without communications to his higher HQ,



LTC Smith ordered a withdrawal.

On 6 July 1950, Task Force Smith had lost almost half of its Soldiers. In all, Task Force Smith had 148 Soldiers and 5 officers missing in action. Task Force Smith would ultimately withdraw all the way to Taejon where it would rearm, reorganize, and prepare to return to the fight.

*The 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry and the Ia Drang Valley, 18 October-24 November 1965*

Perhaps the major weakness of the U.S. Army on the eve of its involvement in Vietnam was its lack of intensive preparation for the type of war in which it would become engaged. However, the leaders and Soldiers of the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry division showed the new breed of fighters the Army's latest doctrine would create. Their adaptation, tenacity, and resolve proved invaluable during the initial stages on the Vietnam Conflict.

After the Korean conflict, the U.S. government along with leaders from the U.S. Army decided to create an organization whose lethality would be the envy of the world. In doing so, they created the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division also known as "First Team." The division's biggest asset was its mobility. First Team designed a concept with the intent of transporting infantry Soldiers anywhere in the battlefield by helicopters. It was an elite force in the U.S. Army; its leaders were among the best the service had to offer.

Although 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division had little time to train for combat in Vietnam, the training conducted was of high quality. Officers and NCOs were for the most part veterans of the Korean War and knew the high price their comrades paid for a lack of combat preparedness. Furthermore, the formation of this unit marked the first time the United States adopted a regimental frame for its units. The 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division trained together, deployed into combat together, and would eventually redeploy together. This concept espoused the team development concept in which teams, squads, platoons, and companies all trained together; it build a strong team and enhanced esprit de corps among the organization.

Therefore, on 27 October 1965, General Westmoreland ordered the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division into combat. The division's mission was to begin search-and-destroy operations in the area west of Plei Me. One of the division's subordinate units, 1<sup>st</sup> Squadron, 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry, led by LTC Harold Moore received the daunting mission to land on Landing Zone (LZ) X-Ray. This landing produced some of the most intense firefights of the Ia Drang campaign. The commander chose his battle ground wisely. Unknown to LTC Moore, the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) had approximately 500 to 600 fighters awaiting the Americans. Soon after the landing on LZ X-ray the Soldiers of 1<sup>st</sup> Squadron, 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry received fired from the enemy. 1<sup>st</sup> Squadron, 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry's response was heroic. The men reacted to enemy contact precisely how they had previously trained. George C. Herring accounts General Marshall's comments; "The big yellow patch does something to an individual that makes him a better Soldier, a better team member, and a better American than he otherwise would have been" (page 324).

### **Conclusion**

In closing, the actions of the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division are indicative of an



organization who took pride in its combat preparation. Leaders remained loyal to their subordinates and it showed in their combat actions. Even though First Team sustained significant casualties, their successful campaign paved the way for the rest of the U.S. Army. Conversely, the results of the actions of Task Force Smith on 5 and 6 July 1950 are indicative of an organization that remained complacent up until the point the unit was deployed. Although the leaders of Task Force Smith were combat veterans, the majority of the Soldiers were part of an Army that focused on garrison tasks associated with an Army of occupation. This, coupled with the arrogance of an Army who had just won World War II, left the organization in a state of disaster.

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## History Essays

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The Importance of Studying Military History

History of the Noncommissioned Officer

SSG Timothy Nein and the Convoy 678N Engagement

History and the Military Leader

# The Importance of Studying Military History

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## Thesis

In reading military history, we gather information that gives us a better perspective on the reason why we do the things we do. It also has a more profound objective in educating us in what not to do. Military history provides leaders the resources that may assist them in their decision-making process.

## The Importance of Studying Military History

The study of all history subjects such as American history and military history is critical to success. One must analyze and come to understand the actions, reactions, and end-results of historical events in order to learn from that event, improve upon our actions, and in some cases prevent a reoccurrence of that event.

Studying American military history is especially vital to our military leaders since they must make decisions regarding the security of our nation and the wellbeing of our soldiers. These decisions are influenced by the outcomes of certain significant historical events. These decisions also affect the day-to-day operations, training, and modernization of America's soldiers and its military equipment and as well as the manner in which we prepare for the ever-changing battlefield. In order to remain effective as a military force, military leaders must analyze successes and failures of each battle and each training evolution. This analytical approach provides a breadth of knowledge and experience not gained by any other means. There is no better way to anticipate an outcome than to take specific and true-to-life experiences from our past.

What should our goals be when studying our military's history; learn from our mistakes, prevent a repeat of certain events, make improvements? The answer is all of the above. In the early summer of 1951 in the midst of the Korean War the United Nations passed a resolution recommending "the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea [South Korea] as may be necessary to repel the armed attack [by North Korea] and to restore international peace and security to the area."<sup>1</sup> Thus, "Task Force Smith" was created.

Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith, the commanding officer of 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 21<sup>st</sup> Regiment, 24<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, was tasked to set up a defensive position covering the road between the cities of Suwon and Osan in order to delay the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) advancement to Pusan. According to General Douglas MacArthur, "That arrogant display of strength" would fool the North Koreans into believing that they were facing a larger force. Some officers

were overconfident and believed the Task Force (TF) would delay the NKPA advancement simply because they (NKPA) realized who their opponent was. Together with part of the 52<sup>nd</sup> Field Artillery Battalion, the total number of soldiers, most of whom had no combat experience, equaled 540 soldiers. Compared to the 1,100 North Korean soldiers, Lt. Col. Smith was vastly outnumbered and ill equipped. Peacetime cutbacks after World War II that prevented equipment upgrades along with supply shortages rendered some equipment useless.

On July 5, 1950 at 0700 Task Force Smith began to see enemy movement and by 1430 on that same day Lt. Col. Smith was forced to withdraw. Ineffective ammunition had little to no effect on the NKPA-owned Soviet tanks, and shell and machine gun fire forced TF Smith soldiers to abandon their positions, equipment, and their fallen comrades. On July 6, 1950 Lt. Col. Smith arrived at Ch'onan and realized 186 of his soldiers had been killed, wounded or missing, or captured.

A further assessment of TF Smith and the Battle of Osan brought to light significant deficiencies that led to the failure at Osan. After World War II, vast cutbacks in funding and military personnel left Lt. Col. Smith and the Far East Command (which 24th Infantry Division fell under) with major personnel shortages, including trained soldiers. Reductions in funding led to outdated and unserviceable weapons and vehicles. Shortages were so considerable that some men did not have boots. It was later found that training both at the unit and at individual troop level was not emphasized.

Furthermore, arrogance by senior officers led to the underestimation of the strength and capabilities of the NKPA. The lack of credible operational and strategic intelligence combined with poor operational planning led to the failure at Osan.

The analysis of events that took place at TF Smith have since led to changes throughout the ranks of our armed forces. Individual and unit training now take precedence over occupational duties. In addition, the importance of adequate logistical support is emphasized. Even with the military downsizing that occurred in the 1990s, senior officials utilized the basic principles learned from TF Smith, and President Clinton vowed in his inaugural speech to maintain “the best-trained, best-equipped, best-prepared fighting force in the world. To fulfill that pledge, we must keep it the focus of our effort throughout the planning, programming, and budgeting process.”<sup>2</sup> However, the most memorable reference to the impact of the events at Task Force Smith was the frequent use of the quote by General (Retired) Gordon R. Sullivan during his tenure as Army Chief of Staff. His deliberate use of the “no more Task Force Smiths” statement was to drive home the importance of proper operational planning (in peacetime and wartime) and accurate assessment of the enemy in order to prevent a repeat of the tragedies.<sup>3</sup>

Another objective that is met when we study military history is that we are able to improve upon past actions. In today’s Army, the improvement process is a daily, recurring event encompassing everyone from the private to the most senior levels of leadership at the Pentagon.

Progress is not made strictly from failures. Each training evolution, each battle scenario, each battlefield objective can be broken down to its most basic components in order to determine what can be improved upon. We have built the most powerful military in the world on that foundation.

In 2003, the United States and the United Kingdom convinced that the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD), sought for United Nations support of an attack on Iraq. By March 2003, US and UK forces began an aerial attack on the city of Baghdad, Iraq and thus began Operation Iraqi Freedom. American and UK troops rapidly overtook the Iraqi military and by April of 2003, the city of Baghdad had fallen. Throughout Iraq, the American and British military successes were swift and numerous. By May 2003, President Bush (though regrettably), announced that the war in Iraq was a "Mission Accomplished."<sup>4</sup> In the years that followed, there would be spikes in regional conflicts within Iraq. Due to US and Coalition troop draw downs and the asymmetrical war waged by insurgents on Coalition Forces, the result was an all-time high number of attacks and deaths of American soldiers and Iraqi civilians.<sup>5</sup>

It was necessary for the Bush Administration to rethink its strategy to continue the fight in Iraq. In January 2007, President Bush announced his intention to surge 21,500 troops back into Iraq. The objective had evolved from the protection of Iraqi civilians and training the new Iraqi military to defend itself, to a long-term goal of enabling the Iraqi government to sustain itself and to create an ally in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). There was no possibility of meeting those goals without the addition of more troops.

Due to the unconventional nature of the Global War on Terrorism and the characteristics of the enemy, it is now recognized that meeting short-term goals alone will not guarantee success. Long-term goals of stabilization and sustainment by local governments and its allies must be well thought out and executed in order to facilitate future victories. This philosophy continues to be carried out today. The United States has actively and methodically increased its dialogues and cooperation with host nations where the enemy is known to reside in order to equip those nations to eliminate the enemy in the short-term, to prevent its reappearance in the long-term; a hard lesson-learned from the struggles during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Throughout our lifetimes, we immerse ourselves in history, sometimes by choice. Sometimes we are immersed in history by fate. During our school years, we are forced to study the actions of our Nation's fathers and the outcomes of famous battles. However, to what gain? Peter N. Stearns put it best when he stated, "Major aspects of a society's operation, like mass elections ... or military alliances, cannot be set up as precise experiments. Consequently, history must serve, however imperfectly, as our laboratory...and people need to have some sense of how societies function simply to run their own lives."<sup>6</sup> In other words, we must understand where we came from before we can understand where we are going.

As we analyze the history of our military and the epic battles we have waged, the most common points scrutinized are the mistakes, failures, or chal-

lenges. Despite what we as Americans would like to believe about our history, not everything we did as a military force was right. What is best recalled about the Battle of Little Bighorn or the Battle of Mogadishu? The most common answer is lost battles or flawed invasions. In the Battle of Little Bighorn General George A. Custer refused to take the advice, or the aid, of his peers and was massacred by the Lakota-Cheyenne combined force. Today, military panels and boards consisting of top military officials convene to ensure checks and balances and to remove any wiggle room for senior military leaders to “refuse” advice or aid. The Battle of Mogadishu taught us the significance of knowing the country, the culture, and the language as necessities for military operations.<sup>7</sup> It is with these and countless other lessons learned that military leaders can evaluate and anticipate battle outcomes and the challenges therein, and what makes us a better force today.

It is safe to say that opposition or disdain for war is a common theme. However, there is strong evidence that war can produce peaceful or positive outcomes. Despite the ongoing conflict, the US-led war in Iraq has ended a decades-long tyranny of torture and genocide carried out by Saddam Hussein’s regime. World War II brought about the liberation of hundreds of thousands of Jewish and Polish citizens from “death camps” aimed at the genocide of their race by the Nazis. World War II also produced enormous technological advances, including advances in American military aircraft and created new opportunities and views of women in the workplace.<sup>8</sup> The American Civil War led to the abolition of slavery.<sup>9</sup> Therefore, in conjunction with the study of the reasons for conflict in our military history it is just as important to study the outcomes, both positive and negative.

Are there negative consequences to studying American military history? History lessons in the classroom are forever changed. The technology that exists today has enabled us to remain informed of events in our history and current events as never before. Our society is engulfed in news tickers, internet blogs, and newsworthy events have become media sensations. Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrated unprecedented levels of press coverage and put viewers on the front lines with the troops. However, the sanitized images presented on millions of television screens did not accurately reflect the brutality and gruesome events that took place on the battlefield. Manufacturers of video games that simulate World War II battles and such have made hundreds of millions of dollars and cause impressionable young Americans to develop a false sense for what combat really entails, and they fall victim to the glamorization of war.

Studying the great battles in America’s history can be easily misinterpreted into arrogance concerning our victories in combat.

Technological advances have also allowed for the quick and accurate documentation of our military actions. While generally seen as progress, these advances also make it more difficult to carry on military operations with any sort of secrecy. Media networks are able to broadcast live from remote locations and can expose or disrupt military operations. Internet connectivity allows for worldwide coverage in a matter of seconds. It is difficult for a government to dispute

the occurrence of a covert military operation when it is aired on television and computer screens across the globe. Students across the globe rely on the internet and what is classified as “history” can be taken out of context especially when actual photos of the event are posted on public websites. Negative views of the military and its actions can be propagated throughout the world with the greatest of ease and can be manipulated into propaganda as being “history.”

However, regardless of anyone individual’s perception of our military history, it is difficult to dispute that there is no greater contribution to our future successes than the study of our military past. By studying history, we are able to gain knowledge about how our society and those societies around us were formed. Guidelines and principles of warfare based on those societal and cultural relationships can then be generated in the event that war is inevitable. Lessons learned from past battles are taken into account and new policies are put into place to prevent repeat mistakes. History also reveals how soldiers will react in battle and has generated a society of military leaders consumed with concern for the well-being of the modern soldier. It also demonstrates how citizens will act in response to war. As a citizen, military history broadens your appreciation for what it has taken to become such a great nation. As a soldier, military history is what shapes you and what defines what you will become. However, more importantly, the life that a soldier leads and the great challenges that he/she faces and overcomes are what the annals of history are filled with.

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# History of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps

*Michael P. Ordets*

## Contributions of individual NCOs to mission accomplishment or battlefield

### *MSG Gary Gordon*

Most Soldiers currently serving in the Army are familiar with the combat which took place in Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993, and many have even read a book or watched a movie that depicted this combat action. During this combat operation many Soldiers distinguished themselves through their heroic actions and some Soldiers paid the ultimate price for freedom: their lives.

Two of the Soldiers that paid the ultimate price for freedom in order to stop thousands of Somalis from starving and bring corrupt warlords to justice were MSG Gary Gordon and SFC Randall Shughart. It is impossible to tell the story of MSG Gordon and his heroic actions without telling the story of SFC Shughart as well. Mission success and accomplishment would not have been possible without the individual contributions of both NCOs.

MSG Gordon was born in Lincoln, Maine on August 30, 1960. He was assigned to the 1<sup>st</sup> Special Forces Operational Detachment Delta. During the summer of 1993 MSG Gordon was assigned the duties of Sniper Team Leader as part of Task Force Ranger in support of Operation Gothic Serpent. SFC Shughart was also assigned as a Sniper Team Member to Task Force Ranger. Operation Gothic Serpent was a result of an ambush on Pakistani troops in Mogadishu and resulted in United Nations Security Council Resolution 837. UN Resolution 837 called for the arrest and trial of those who were responsible for the Pakistani troop's ambush. General Mohamed Farrah Aidid was the leading warlord in the region and his capture was the primary objective of Operation Gothic Serpent.

Based upon intelligence gained from an informant, a mission to capture two of General Aidid's top lieutenants was initiated on October 3, 1993 by Task Force Ranger. These lieutenants were to be arrested at a clan meeting held at the Olympic hotel, one of the few structures that had not been destroyed as a result of the recent civil war in Somalia. The Olympic hotel was located in the heart of Mogadishu and was next to the busy Bakara Market.

MSG Gordon, SFC Shughart and SFC Hallings were all assigned as snipers firing from helicopters in support of the assault on the Olympic Hotel. After the hotel was secured and both lieutenants were captured, a ground convoy evacuated the prisoners. The helicopters supporting the assault came under intense small arms and rocket propelled grenade fire. One helicopter supporting this assault was shot down and a rescue team was dispatched to the crash site. Before the rescue team could secure the first helicopter crash site, a second helicopter had also been shot down. There were no additional rescue forces immediately available to secure the second crash site. The rescue force sent to the first crash site



was fully engaged with the enemy and could be of no assistance to the second crash site.

MSG Gordon's sniper team provided cover fire from the air for the four wounded crewmembers of the second downed helicopter. They continued to provide cover fire for the helicopter crew members as the number of armed Somali militia members kept increasing. MSG Gordon requested permission to be dropped off at the second helicopter crash site to protect the crew from the ever-increasing number of Somali militiamen. MSG Gordon's request was determined too dangerous for the sniper team and denied by mission commanders. MSG Gordon continued to repeat his request to be dropped off at the second helicopter crash site. After his third request he was granted approval for the voluntary mission. The first attempt at being dropped off was unsuccessful due to debris and heavy fire from the enemy. A second attempt was made, and MSG Gordon along with SFC Shughart were successfully dropped off south of the second crash site. SFC Hallings remained on board the helicopter and continued to provide sniper support fire. Once on the ground, the two NCOs began to fight their way to the crash site where the four injured crew members awaited rescue. MSG Gordon and MSG Shughart had no way of knowing when help or reinforcements would arrive. They were armed with only the weapons and ammunition they had brought for their sniper support duties. MSG Gordon was armed with a CAR-15 rifle and a .45 caliber pistol and SFC Shughart was armed with an M-14 rifle and a .45 caliber pistol.

Having fought their way to the helicopter crash site, MSG Gordon and SFC Shughart immediately pulled the crew members and pilot, Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durant from the downed aircraft and placed them into positions providing the most cover and concealment available. Both NCOs then established a defensive perimeter around the remains of the crashed helicopter. By placing the crew members in the positions providing the most cover and concealment, both NCOs fought from positions with the least amount of concealment from enemy fire. Both MSG Gordon and SFC Shughart showed an incredible sense of discipline and selfless service as they put themselves into the path of enemy fire in order to protect the helicopter crew.

Both NCOs continued to fight with their sniper rifles and pistols until they had nearly exhausted their limited ammunition supply. In a brave attempt to secure desperately needed weapons and ammunition, MSG Gordon went back into the wreckage of the downed helicopter. MSG Gordon successfully recovered some of the weapons and ammunition that belonged to the crew from inside the downed helicopter. MSG Gordon then radioed for help and provided the injured, but conscious, pilot with some ammunition for his weapon. MSG Gordon continued to defend the perimeter of the crash site protecting the injured crew. Both NCOs continued to fight and kill the enemy until MSG Gordon was out of rifle ammunition. MSG Gordon returned to the downed helicopter again and recovered a rifle with five rounds of ammunition. MSG Gordon gave the rifle and the last five rounds of rifle ammunition to the pilot, Chief Warrant Officer Durant.

MSG Gordon continued to protect the injured crew with his pistol; his only remaining weapon with ammunition. The Somali militiamen continued their frenzied advance upon the crash site, eventually killing both MSG Gordon and SFC Shughart, while taking the pilot prisoner.

Chief Warrant Officer Durant was held prisoner for 11 days before being released and has credited his survival to the actions of MSG Gordon and SFC Shughart. These two NCOs were highly trained and experienced members of the Special Forces. They had to have known that their chances for survival were slim, but still selflessly jumped into harm's way to protect their fellow Soldiers.

For their bravery and heroic acts of selfless service, both MSG Gordon and SFC Shughart received the highest award for valor that our great nation can bestow: the Medal of Honor. In keeping with tradition, the Medal of Honor was posthumously awarded to both NCOs by the President of The United States on 23 May, 1994. Although many Soldiers fought fiercely, and some even paid the ultimate price for freedom during Operation Gothic Serpent, only MSG Gordon and SFC Shughart were awarded the Medal of Honor. Although the Medal

Honor has been awarded more than 3,400 times since its inception in 1861; MSG Gordon and SFC Shughart were the first to receive this honor since the Vietnam War.

To further honor MSG Gordon for his heroism and his valor, the U.S. Navy officially named a ship in his honor – the USNS Gordon (T -AKR 296), a large medium speed cargo ship. The USNS Gordon was officially named on 4 July, 1996. This ship is a special kind of cargo ship designed to transport military equipment such as artillery, trucks and tanks across the world to where the Army needs them. Once the ship has reached its destination, the cargo can simply be driven off the ship and into the fight.

The U.S. Navy also paid tribute to the bravery and heroism of SFC Shughart by officially naming a ship after him as well. The USNS Shughart (T -AKR 295), was officially named on 13, April 1996. The USNS Shughart (T-AKR 295) is also a large, medium speed cargo ship with the ability to drive cargo on and off without disassembly. Both the USNS Gordon (T-AKR 296) and the USNS Shughart (T-AKR 295) are currently serving the Navy and our nation during combat operations in support of the war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan.

While doing research and gathering information to write this essay on MSG Gordon it became clear to me that MSG Gordon and SFC Shughart were two NCOs that had extensive training and experience in tough and difficult situations. The Army NCO Training Model had prepared them for this moment on the battlefield. From Basic Combat Training, to Special Forces Training the Warrior Ethos were clearly instilled in both NCOs. I am confident they fully understood the consequences of their actions.

The original mission of the Task Force was to apprehend two senior lieutenants of the warlord General Mohamed Farrah Aidid. This was their primary mission, but the mission changed during the heat of combat. The mission to seize two lieutenants suddenly became a mission to protect and rescue four fallen

comrades being attacked and surrounded by an angry crowd of Somali militiamen. These two NCOs were aware there was very little chance of help arriving to save these Soldiers before they were either captured or killed by the Somali militiamen. These NCOs knew that they were the only hope these four Soldiers had of survival and their fates truly rested in their actions.

MSG Gordon asked multiple times for permission to be inserted and was denied until the third request. How many Soldiers would have repeated that request knowing their chances to survive were bleak at best?

Were they successful in this mission when their mission changed to protecting their injured comrades until more help could arrive? Even though Chief Warrant Officer Durant was captured, after he was released by the Somalis, he attributed his survival to the actions of MSG Gordon and SFC Shughart. In the Medal of Honor citations for MSG Gordon and SFC Shughart they are both credited with saving the life of Chief Warrant Officer Durant. The individual actions of both NCOs contributed not only to the success of their primary mission, but to the success of their secondary mission; protecting the life of the only remaining survivor.

MSG Gordon and SFC Shughart are heroic examples of what selfless service means to the NCO Corps. Their actions will forever motivate Soldiers in combat knowing their brothers in harm's will never leave a fallen comrade.

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## SSG Timothy Nein and the Convoy 678N Engagement

*SGM C.J. Montag*

For his actions just before noon on March 20, 2005, SSG Timothy F. Nein was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, the second highest military decoration in the United States Army. His actions as an NCO prior to March 20, prevented the deaths of United States Army Soldiers and civilian contractors from two convoys that were caught in the kill zone of one of the largest and most complex ambushes of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The tactic of attacking an enemy's supply lines has been around for long as there have been armed conflicts and Operation Iraqi Freedom is no different. What is different are the reasons insurgents attacked Coalition supply lines. Traditionally, supply lines are attacked in an effort to cut off logistic support. This causes a withdrawal of forces due to the lack of provisions needed to continue the fight. However, current attacks are aimed at cutting off popular support for the military participation by the countries that provide support for military action in Iraq. Attacks are also utilized to bolster the insurgents' appearance of strength to the local populations, allowing for continued reign of terror and intimidation.

After two years of conducting convoy operations in Iraq, the US Army developed new defensive tactics in the struggle to maintain secure supply lines. Sometimes Army tractor-trailers were interspersed among the civilian trucks. Oftentimes Army gun trucks, up armored high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) or larger armored trucks, escorted the convoys, keeping an eye out for ambushes and roadside bombs, known to the military as improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The enemy, recognizing the growing American proficiency in resisting ambushes, shifted tactics. This led to the proliferation of IED attacks across the country. Now when insurgents launched an ambush, small groups of 7 to 10 men made the attack, inflicting as many casualties as possible, and then hastily retreating, often in prearranged vehicles.<sup>1</sup>

The 617<sup>th</sup> Military Police (MP) Company of the Kentucky Army National Guard replaced another MP unit shortly after their arrival in Iraq in November 2004. The 617<sup>th</sup> MP Company was assigned to Fort Bragg's 503<sup>rd</sup> MP Battalion (BN), 18<sup>th</sup> MP Brigade (BDE) and was responsible for route security for the main roads southeast of Baghdad. Most mornings found SSG Nein and the three HMMWVs that comprised his 2<sup>nd</sup> Squad, 4<sup>th</sup> Platoon, known by the call sign Raven 42, patrolling their 15-25 mile stretch of assigned highway. They would patrol searching for signs of insurgent activities from the night before. Threats consisted of possible ambush sites or the overnight placement of IEDs. SSG Nein's squad had several encounters with armed insurgents during the month of January. On January 27, 2004, Raven 42 became involved in a brief nighttime firefight resulting in zero casualties on either side, when the enemy broke contact and disappeared into the darkness. While performing routine patrolling duties

on January 29, SSG Nein's squad discovered a squad-sized element of insurgents setting an ambush in the early morning. The enemy opened fire and after a 15-minute firefight the MPs captured two insurgents, one of them wounded. The rest got away by running through the canal system and heavy foliage in the area. Even though the Americans took no casualties in the action, they were disappointed in their efforts that day. Team leader SGT Justin T. Morris recalled they had horrible communications which threw off all of their actions: "We didn't attack as soon as we should have and I don't think we were forceful enough. That was a big issue in a lot of insurgents getting away and us only capturing two of them."

The lessons were clear, "be better organized, attack as soon as you can dismount when you need to dismount, stay in the trucks when you need to stay in the trucks, and not have everyone do their own thing as much."<sup>2</sup>

SSG Nein instilled in his Soldiers the discipline necessary to close with the enemy on the battlefield and win. The steps SSG Nein took to prepare his Soldiers for victory sound simple enough, but the realities of a combat zone at times challenge even the best attempts at preparedness. "From the very first engagement in January, SSG Nein continued to train and develop his unit into a lethal unit." said Joseph Shelley the Command Sergeant Major of the 18<sup>th</sup> MP BDE. "That started with getting the crap out of his vehicles and loading all of the vehicles in the same manner. He re-looked the amount and type of ammo and weapons mix he carried. During one of my talks with his squad, he mentioned that during all of his previous pre-combat inspections (PCI), he always checked to be sure the squad had a three-day supply of food and water. But from the date in January, he also ensured the squad had a three-day supply of ammo. He also made squad members clean the ammo and weapons daily" Shelley added.<sup>3</sup> SSG Nein experimented with mounting additional bandoliers of ammunition in their vehicles. He decided the best set up would be to have his squad members mount the bandoliers behind the front seats of each vehicle. A second basic load of ammunition was loaded into magazines and placed into the bandoliers that were identically mounted in each HMMWV to allow access to the additional ammunition regardless of the circumstance. Preventative maintenance checks and services (PMCS) were conducted after every mission regardless of the type of mission, the conditions the missions were accomplished in, or the duration.

SSG Nein continually trained his squad for the fight he knew was coming. Just because they were deployed and conducting daily missions did not stop SSG Nein from improving the proficiency of his Soldiers in the areas of first aid, weapons, and battle drills. SPC Jason L. Mike, a medic assigned to the squad, was made to train with the AT-4 rocket launchers. As a medic, SPC Mike did not believe he would ever use one.

SSG Nein studied the terrain and road networks in Raven 42's area of responsibility (AOR) to aid in determining the most likely ambush and IED sites. Squad members were required to thoroughly study the routes, maps, and the ter-

rain for every mission. They rehearsed both on the road and in front of dry erase boards. SSG Nein and his team leaders, SGT Leigh Ann Hester and SGT Morris would note intersections that were likely ambush sites, discussing what to do in the event of an attack. The squad ran through every scenario they could think of: when to attack, when to get out of the kill zone, when to dismount, when to stay in the vehicle, who would provide covering fire, and what to do if they lost a vehicle.<sup>4</sup>

After a routine, uneventful, morning patrolling their stretch of Iraq Route 6 or Alternate

Supply Route (ASR) DETROIT as the U.S. Army had named it, east of Salmon Pak, Raven 42 made radio contact with a southbound convoy named Convoy 678N. The convoy which consisted of 30 civilian tractor-trailers, an Army Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) bus, and two Ford trucks were escorted by three HMMWV gun-trucks from 1<sup>st</sup> BN, 623<sup>rd</sup> Field Artillery (FA) Regiment. SSG Nein's squad fell in behind the convoy to shadow the vehicles as they made their journey south on the paved four-lane highway with an earthen median. Raven 42 maintained a following distance that kept them out of sight from any would be ambushers.

"We observed the convoy we were trailing starting to make erratic movements," recalled Nein. "We saw a lot of dust being kicked up by the convoy vehicles, as if they were being engaged by an IED or an ambush, so we knew something was wrong. My gunner said he could hear shots being fired, so we picked up the pace."

The lead AAFES bus had been hit by RPG fire. The squad drove straight into the ambush site and moved into contact. Not only was Convoy 678N halted by disabled vehicles, but a northbound convoy consisting of 22 civilian tractor-trailers and seven Army trucks happened to be passing by the ambush point at the exact moment the southbound convoy also passed the ambush point. The insurgents could not believe their good fortune.

"We got the vehicles on the contact side, in between the convoy and the insurgents. As we got up on the side of the road, we realized through previous reconnaissance of the area that there was a road that paralleled the field going south," Nein said.

In an example of decisive leadership, SSG Nein led the three vehicles south on ASR DETROIT and made a right turn onto the access.

"We noticed seven vehicles the insurgents had ready. Doors open, trunks open, ready for a quick escape. Once we turned down the road, the insurgents didn't have a choice but to stay and fight. We had cut off their escape route."

During previous rehearsals, Raven 42 assumed they would face an enemy force of no more than 12-15 men. Once the squad made the turn onto the access road, the insurgents adjusted fire and it was evident the force was much larger than what they previously rehearsed for. A group of insurgents were moving forward toward the halted convoy, and there was an L-shaped trench line to the north of the access road that provided cover for the insurgents who now shifted their fire to the three MP HMMWVs blocking their attack. Machine gun and



automatic rifle bullets along with a rocket propelled grenades (RPG) impacted the vehicles. The lead vehicle had two flat front tires and oil spraying from the engine before it even came to a stop. SSG Nein directed the turret gunners to engage targets to the north of the access road with the M2 .50 caliber machine gun, M240B machine gun, and MK 19 automatic grenade launcher. Three members of SSG Nein's squad were wounded; even they had taken cover behind their vehicles. It was then that they realized they were also taking fire from the south side of the access road. Several insurgents had made their way to the second story of a house on the south side of the access road and had opened fire on the Soldiers. Nein ordered the MK 19 gunner to fire the grenade launcher into the house, but it did not silence the enemy's fire. Realizing the dire situation his squad was in, SPC Mike, the squad's medic who was tending to the wounded in the trail HMMWV and returning fire at the same time, decided to fire an AT-4 rocket into the house. Almost simultaneously, SPC Mike and SPC Casey M. Cooper who was 175 yards away in the gunner's turret of the lead vehicle, fired into the house ending the threat. It now became apparent that Raven 42 had driven between two groups of heavily armed and determined fighters who were rolled up behind 6- to 10-foot high berms with trenches on both sides of the access road.

Concerned that he had to do something to get his squad out alive, Nein thought), "We need to go on the super offensive. We need to start going into the canal system; we need to charge these guys."<sup>75</sup> SSG Nein called out for someone with an M203 grenade launcher. SGT Hester was the closest so she jumped in the canal alongside SSG Nein moving down the canal firing grenades. The grenades, however, were ineffective at the close range of less than 50 meters, so the NCOs just kept moving down the canal firing their M4 rifles and throwing hand grenades until the insurgents who had taken up positions were killed.

SSG Nein and SGT Hester now turned their attention to the trench system north of the canal. Once again, SSG Nein and SGT Hester worked in tandem either killing the enemy or flushing them out of the trenches where they were engaged by MP or convoy support personnel on ASR DETROIT. It had 30 minutes since the first RPG destroyed the AAFES bus. Now the gunfire had ended. Searches through the insurgent positions south of the access road found only shell casings including some in the two-story house near the highway where a smaller group of insurgents had been during the fight. The trenches and field to the north of the access road were a different story. Insurgent bodies were scattered all over the field, many carrying handcuffs to be used in the taking of prisoners from the convoy. The motive to take prisoners explains the size and complexity of the ambush. During the engagement, 24 insurgents were killed and nine more were injured. Two of the injured later died of their wounds. Twenty two AK-47 assault rifles, 13 RPK light machine guns, 6 RPG launchers, 16 RPG rockets, and 40 hand grenades were recovered along with 2,700 rounds of ammunition.

After the ceremony in which he received the Distinguished Service Cross,

SSG Nein was pressed for details by the media. SSG Nein downplayed his heroic actions of Palm Sunday, March 20 2004. He made the point that, “With the right equipment, the right training, there’s nothing we can’t get done.”

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# History and the Military Leader

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## Abstract

It is of vital importance that the military leader be versed in the study of military history. By studying history, the military leader uses critical thinking, grounded in military history, as the basis for operational decision making. Military history provides the leader with an understanding of military concepts, the evolution of War-fighting doctrine, supplies an understanding of leadership actions, provides the tools to learn from past experiences, and while broadening ones knowledge of military subjects. Military history is the Army's institutional past and provides the patterns, trends, and relationships necessary for the development of current and future war-fighting doctrine. Philosopher and writer George Santayana one said, "Those who do not know history are doomed to repeat it." (United States Army Sergeants Major Academy, 2008). Military history provides a means of looking to the past in order to look to the future.

## History and the Military Leader

Military history is a discipline within history that focuses on armed conflict, its impact on nations, and the art and science of leading and training military forces. Since the beginning of written history it has been argued that the study of military history is a vital piece of a military leader's education in the profession of arms. It provides the leader with a view of past operations so he or she may not repeat past mistakes; it broadens one's tactical knowledge and provides a picture of the past to help shape future doctrine. The United States Army, in understanding the importance of military history, has incorporated history in all aspects of its training. General George S. Patton once stated, "To be a successful soldier you must know history. Read it objectively." (Department of the Army, 1985). The Army focuses on three domains of training: operational, institutional, and, self-development. All three domains are steeped in military history. Current operations are conducted through lessons learned from the past and from theory. Institutional learning uses history to teach today's leaders how to perform effectively through the study of past leadership actions. Lastly, the military leader is encouraged to study military history as a means of self-development.

## Purpose of Military History

It is argue, to the civilian or scholar, that military history serves three purposes. First, it serves as a study in humanity by exploring the universal truths about human nature and man's attitudes, values, and behaviors as related to

warfare. This serves as a means to understand the social and economic impacts of war on society as well. Second, it serves to define the nature of the military culture or what it means to be a Soldier. There is a fascination from someone on the outside looking in on how a person could lay down his or her life for another, how one could function in such a structured environment, and how the military functions as a collective community. Third, for many, military history serves strictly as a means of entrainment. There is a love, world-wide, of the material goods the military possesses; such as the fascination with military equipment, reenactments, parades, and military movies.

In contrast it is argued that to the tactician, military history serves different purposes. First, military history legitimizes the military. The need for a common defense is established, through past actions of a country's military and its ability to maintain liberty, control, and safety of its people. Second, a military uses history to record the actions and exploits of its organization, subordinate units, and individual soldiers. Third, a military uses history as a means of education and training of its forces and in the development of policy and doctrine. The American poet and writer Archibald MacLeish argued this fact by stating, "There is only one thing more painful than learning from experience and that is not learning from experience" (Charlton, 1990). Lastly, a military uses the study of war as a pathway to peace. Understanding what causes a conflict can lead to measures to prevent it in the future. B.H. Liddell Hart, an English military historian, in arguing this point once said, "If you want to understand peace, understand war." (Charlton, 1990)

### **Relationship between history, theory and doctrine**

When studying military history, it is imperative to identify the relationship between history, theory and doctrine. Stewart (2005) argues, "Military history is the story of armed conflict, of campaigns and battles; it is the story of how societies form their institutions for their collective security and how those institutions operate in peace and war. It is the story of soldiers and the subculture of which they are a part. It includes the entire range of economic, social, legal, political, technological, and cultural issues that arise from the state's need to organize violence to preserve its existence and accomplish its national goals." Military history shapes one's actions; an organization's actions shape their doctrine; an army's doctrine shapes who they are as a military.

Theory is the study of the cause and effect of history. While examining the theory of warfare, strategy and tactics are often studied and need to be understood. Stewart (2005) argues that strategy as both the preparation for and the waging of war and has often been defined as the art of projecting and directing campaigns. Tactics, according to Stewart (2005), are defined as the art of executing plans and handling troops in battle. It is reasoned that when studying theory, a military leader imagines how using a specific tactic or strategy might have a predicted impact on the battlefield.

Doctrine is the understanding of the principles of war and applying those principles into the way the Army fights and conducts operations. It can therefore

be argued that doctrine is the common behavior of the Army as a living, breathing organization, and is the basis for all military actions.

So, how are history, theory and doctrine related? First, it is argued that the purpose of history is to capture what happened during a specific time or event. Second, it is reasoned that theory takes the happenings of history and tries to capture what those events mean, such as why a particular unit was defeated during a battle. Lastly, it is argued that as a military organization determines what happened and why it happened; the Army can then adjust or develop doctrine to ensure events can either be repeated for the same anticipated results or *be* avoided to prevent future failures. The late President John F. Kennedy in supporting this argument once said, “You must know something about strategy and tactics and logistics, but also 1 economics and politics and diplomacy and history. You must know everything you can know about military power, and you must also understand the limits of military power. You must understand that few of the important problems of our time have, in the final analysis, been finally solved by military power alone.” (United States Army Sergeants Major Academy, 2008)

### **Views of history**

Since the beginning of written language, scholars and historians have argued about various thoughts, views, and beliefs of history and its importance to mankind. While the importance of history is understood by military leaders, what views do others have toward history? Herodotus, who lived during the 5th century BC, was a Greek historian and is often regarded as the “Father of History.” He is recognized for writing *The Histories*, a record of his inquiries into the cause of the Greco-Persian Wars in 490 BC. He was the first person to travel around the known world in an effort to write an accurate account of the Persian Wars.

On the subject of Herodotus, GEN Robert Kingston wrote, “Over 2,400 years ago, the “Greek Historian Herodotus wrote a ‘History of the Persian Wars’ so that “men’s actions may not be effaced by time nor the great and wondrous deeds of the Greeks be deprived of renown. Since that time countless writers have attempted to capture the essence of the great captains. In virtually every case great leaders have been those who gave extra effort and sought out challenge in all forms. There are no short cuts and sadly no easy ways to selfless leadership. Leadership is to be learned from experience and from study, toil, trial and error. The good things in life are worth striving for and nothing is more rewarding than leading soldiers.”(Department of the Army, 1985) Herodotus once argued, “The only good is knowledge, and the only evil is ignorance.” (Charlton, 1990) He understood the importance of written history and made it his life’s work to record the events of this time.

Thomas Jefferson, the third president of the United States and the principle author of the Declaration of Independence was an avid historian. Throughout his life, he read and collected books on history and various other subjects and advocated the first Library of Congress. Jefferson once said, “I cannot live without books.” (Library of Congress, 2008) He argued that everyone should read and

be well versed in the history of the world. He believed deeply in educating and learning from the past as a means to look to the future. After leaving office, this love of learning led Jefferson to create the University of Virginia so that others might study history as well.

Mark Twain took a more sarcastic view of history and argued there is more than one side to history. In *The Secret History of Eddypus*, Twain wrote, “One of the most admirable things about history is, that almost as a rule we get as much information out of what it does not say as we get out of what it does say. And so, one may truly and axiomatically aver this, to-wit: that history consists of two equal parts; one of these halves is statements of fact, the other half is inference, drawn from the facts. To the experienced student of history there are no difficulties about this; to him the half which is unwritten is as clearly and surely visible, by the help of scientific inference, as if it flashed and flamed in letters of fire before his eyes. When the practiced eye of the simple peasant sees the half of a frog projecting above the water, he unerringly infers the half of the frog which he does not see. To the expert student in our great science, history is a frog; half of it is submerged, but he knows it is there, and he knows the shape of it.” (Marotti, 1986)

More recently, Henry Kissinger, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate and former United States Secretary of State, wrote many books on foreign policy, international affairs, and diplomatic history. He took a very analytical view of the past with the opinion that each generation determines what is of historical significance and what is not. Kissinger once argued, “History is not, of course, a cookbook offering pre-tested recipes. It teaches by analogy, not by maxims. It can illuminate the consequences of actions in comparable situations, yet each generation must discover for itself what situations are in fact comparable.” (United States Army Sergeants Major Academy, 2008).

While these four individuals argued differing views of history, one thing is constant, history is worth studying. Whether it is studied as a means of satire, public policy, or for pure enjoyment, history is an essential part of understanding our civilization.

### **Conclusion**

For the military leader, the importance of history cannot be understated. By studying history, the military leader uses it as the basis for operational decision making. Military history provides the leader with an understanding of military concepts, war fighting doctrine, leadership decision in action, and provides an instrument to learn from past experiences to direct current and future military operations.

Military history, theory, and doctrine are the framework from which our Army fights and wins on the battlefield. Our history is who we are as a nation and an Army. It is the basis of our military culture, it is ingrained in our traditions and tactics, and it defines our Army Values.

While views of history vary from scholar to scholar and tactician to tactician, one thing is clear, history is of vital importance to us all. John Adams,

the second president of the United States, once argued, "I must study politics and war that my sons may have liberty to study mathematics and philosophy". (Fleming, 1997) History has and always will have a place in written books and the psyche of mankind regardless of one's view of the subject.

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